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ABSTRACT
The present dissertation is concerned with the processing difficulty of
quantified sentences and how it can be modeled based on semantic
theory. Processing difficulty of quantified sentences is assessed us-
ing psycholinguistic methods such as systematically collecting truth-
value judgments or recording eye movements during reading. Predic-
tions are derived from semantic theory via parsimonious processing
assumptions, taking into account automata theory, signal detection
theory and computational complexity.
Chapter 1 provides introductory discussion and overview. Chap-
ter 2 introduces basic theoretical concepts that are used throughout
the rest of the dissertation. In chapter 3, processing difficulty is ap-
proached on an abstract level. The difficulty of the truth evaluation
of reciprocal sentences with generalized quantifiers as antecedents is
classified using computational complexity theory. This is indepen-
dent of the actual algorithms or procedures that are used to evaluate
the sentences. One production and one sentence-picture verification
experiment are reported which tested whether cognitive capacities
are limited to those functions that are computationally tractable. The
results indicate that intractable interpretations occur in language com-
prehension but also that their verification rapidly exceeds cognitive
capacities in case the verification problem cannot be solved using sim-
ple heuristics. Chapter 4 discusses two common approaches to model
the canonical verification procedures associated with quantificational
sentences. The first is based on the semantic automata model which
conceives of quantifiers as decision problems and characterizes the
computational resources that are needed to solve them. The second
approach is based on the interface transparency thesis, which stip-
ulates a transparent interface between semantic representations and
the realization of verification procedures in the general cognitive ar-
chitecture. Both approaches are evaluated against experimental data.
Chapter 5 focuses on a test case that is challenging for both of these
approaches. In particular, increased processing difficulty of more than
n as compared to fewer than n is investigated. A processing model
is proposed which integrates insights from formal semantics with
models from cognitive psychology. This model can be seen as im-
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plementation and extension of the interface transparency thesis. The
truth evaluation process is conceived of as a stochastic process as
described in sequential sampling models of decision making. The
increased difficulty of fewer than n as compared to more than n is at-
tributed to an extra processing step of scale-reversal that precedes
the actual decision process. Predictions of the integrated processing
model are tested and confirmed in two sentence-picture verification
experiments. Chapter 6 discusses whether and how the integrated
processing model can be extended to other quantifiers. An extension
to proportional comparative quantifiers, like fewer than half and more
than half is proposed and discussed in the light of existing experi-
mental data. Moreover, it is shown that what are called empty-set
effects can be naturally derived from the model. Chapter 6 presents
data from two eye tracking experiments that show that fewer than
leads to increased difficulty as compared to more than already dur-
ing reading. Moreover, this effect is magnified if such quantifiers are
combined with overt negation. Potential accounts of these findings
are discussed. Conclusions are summarized in chapter 8.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die vorliegende Dissertation bescha¨ftigt sich mit der Verarbeitungs-
schwierigkeit quantifizierter Sa¨tze und damit, wie diese ausgehend
von semantischer Theorie modelliert werden kann. Die Verarbeitungs-
schwierigkeit quantifizierter Sa¨tze wird mittels psycholinguistischer
Methoden, wie der systematischen Erhebung von Wahrheitswertur-
teilen oder dem Aufzeichnen von Blickbewegungen wa¨hrend des Le-
sens, ermittelt. Vorhersagen werden aus der semantischen Theorie
mittels sparsamer Verarbeitungsannahmen abgeleitet. Dabei werden
die Automatentheorie, die Signalentdeckungstheorie und die Kom-
plexita¨tstheorie beru¨cksichtigt.
Kapitel 1 bietet eine einleitende Diskussion und einen U¨berblick.
Kapitel 2 fu¨hrt grundlegende theoretische Konzepte ein, die u¨ber
den Rest der Dissertation hinweg verwendet werden. In Kapitel 3
wird Verarbeitungsschwierigkeit auf einer abstrakten Ebene ange-
gangen. Die Schwierigkeit der Wahrheitsbewertung von reziproken
Sa¨tzen mit generalisierten Quantoren als Antezedens wird mit Hil-
fe der Komplexita¨tstheorie klassifiziert. Dies geschieht unabha¨ngig
von den Algorithmen oder Prozeduren, die tatsa¨chliche verwendet
werden, um die Sa¨tze zu evaluieren. Ein Produktions- und ein Satz-
Bild-Verifikations-Experiment werden berichtet, welche untersuchten,
ob kognitive Fa¨higkeiten auf solche Funktionen begrenzt sind, die ef-
fizient berechnet werden ko¨nnen. Die Resultate zeigen, dass Interpre-
tationen, die nicht effizient berechenbar sind, zwar beim Sprachver-
stehen vorkommen aber auch, dass deren Verifikation rasch kogni-
tive Fa¨higkeiten u¨berschreitet, falls das Verifikationsproblem nicht
durch simple Heuristiken gelo¨st werden kann. Kapitel 4 diskutiert
zwei ga¨ngige Ansa¨tze, die kanonischen Verifikationsprozeduren, die
mit quantifizierten Sa¨tzen verbunden sind, zu modellieren. Der erste
basiert auf dem Modell der semantischen Automaten, welches Quan-
toren als Entscheidungsprobleme betrachtet und die Rechenressour-
cen charakterisiert, die zu deren Lo¨sung notwendig sind. Der zweite
Ansatz basiert auf der These der Schnittstellen-Transparenz, die eine
durchsichtige Schnittstelle zwischen semantischen Repra¨sentationen
und der Realisierung von Verifikationsprozeduren innerhalb der all-
gemeinen kognitiven Architektur stipuliert. Beide Ansa¨tze werden
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anhand experimenteller Befunde bewertet. Kapitel 5 konzentriert sich
auf einen Beispielsfall der fu¨r beide diese Ansa¨tze eine Herausforde-
rung darstellt. Und zwar wird dort die erho¨hte Verarbeitungsschwie-
rigkeit von mehr als n im Vergleich zu weniger als n untersucht. Es
wird ein Verarbeitungsmodell vorgeschlagen, welches Erkenntnisse
aus der formalen Semantik mit Modellen aus der Kognitionspsycho-
logie integriert. Dieses Modell kann als Implementierung und Erwei-
terung der These der Schnittstellen-Transparenz gesehen werden. Der
Prozess der Wahrheitsbewertung wird als stochastischer Prozess ver-
standen, a¨hnlich sogenannter sequential samplingModelle, also solcher,
die Entscheidungsprozesse mittels sequentieller probabilistischer Me-
thoden beschreiben. Die erho¨hte Schwierigkeit von weniger als n im
Vergleich zu mehr als n wird einem zusa¨tzlichen Verarbeitungsschritt
der Skalen-Umkehr zugeschrieben, welcher dem eigentlichen Ent-
scheidungsprozess vorangeht. Vorhersagen dieses integrierten Mo-
dells werden in zwei Satz-Bild-Verifikations-Experimenten getestet
und besta¨tigt. In Kapitel 6wird diskutiert, ob und wie das vorgeschla-
gene integrierte Modell auf andere Quantoren erweitert werden kann.
Eine Erweiterung auf proportionale komparative Quantoren, wie z.B.
weniger als die Ha¨lfte and mehr als die Ha¨lfte wird vorgeschlagen und
im Lichte existierender experimenteller Befunde diskutiert. Weiter-
hin wird gezeigt, dass sogenannte empty-set effects auf natu¨rliche Wei-
se aus dem vorgeschlagenen Modell abgeleitet werden ko¨nnen. Ka-
pitel 6 beschreibt die Daten aus zwei Blickbewegungsverfolgungs-
Experimenten, die zeigen, dass weniger als schon beim Lesen zu
erho¨hter Schwierigkeit im Vergleich zumehr als fu¨hrt. Zusa¨tzlich wird
dieser Effekt versta¨rkt, wenn solche Quantoren mit overter Negation
kombiniert werden. Mo¨gliche Erkla¨rungen dieser Befunde werden
diskutiert. Die Schlussfolgerungen werden in Kapitel 8 zusammen-
gefasst.
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INTRODUCTION
Sentences that contain quantifiers differ greatly in how difficult they
are to process. To illustrate this basic phenomenon, let us focus on
one type of example that demonstrates this very clearly. The type
of example I have in mind was discussed by Geurts and van der
Slik (2005), who considered sentences like in 1:1. Think of these as
a description of a local tennis tournament in which the staff of a
hospital participated.
(1:1) Every nurse played against more than two doctors.
All doctors are democrats.
Therefore, every nurse played against more than two democrats.
Most people easily recognize that the last sentence follows from the
other two. Interestingly, changing one word not only renders the
conclusion invalid but also drastically affects the perceived difficulty:
(1:2) Every nurse played against fewer than two doctors.
All doctors are democrats.
Therefore, every nurse played against fewer than two democrats.
Judging the validity of this inference is perceived to be quite difficult.
One may ask what causes this increased perceived difficulty. The two
words fewer and more do not differ in syntactic category and thus syn-
tactic factors can be safely excluded. Furthermore, it is difficult to
imagine that phonological features or features like lexical frequency
are responsible. There are also no obvious pragmatic differences. Fi-
nally, the invalidity of the inference in 1:2, as compared to the validity
of 1:1, does also not provide an explanation: If we additionally change
the quantifier every to at most three, the conclusion is valid again, but
the inference seems to be even more demanding. What remains as
an explanation of the difference in perceived difficulty is the lexical
semantics of these words and how it interacts with sentence meaning.
2 introduction
The increased difficulty of 1:1 vs. 1:2 is not only accessible through
introspection. Actually, Geurts and van der Slik (2005) asked par-
ticipants in an experiment to judge whether inferences like these
are valid. The proportion of erroneous responses was substantially
higher in experimental conditions that presented sentences like 1:2
than in conditions that presented sentences like 1:1. This shows that
‘semantic difficulty’ can be measured. In fact, the semantic difficulty
of quantified sentences was investigated experimentally using psy-
cholinguistic methods at least since Just and Carpenter (1971) and
especially received attention in recent years. It has been shown that
a number of different experimental measurements are sensitive to it.
Measurable semantic processing difficulty opens up the potential to
study many interesting aspects of sentence meaning and how it is pro-
cessed. At the same time, classical semantic theory does by itself not
provide the tools to describe, explain, or predict semantic processing
difficulty.
The present thesis is concerned with the question whether and
how we can amend semantic theory in order to model the processing
difficulty of quantified sentences. The method is to make minimal
and well-motivated processing assumptions, conjoin them to existing
semantic theory and to test whether this makes correct predictions.
The processing assumptions are motivated from neighboring fields
within the cognitive sciences such as computer science or cognitive
psychology.
In the rest of this introduction, the relation between theory and
experiment in semantics is discussed briefly (section 1.1), the phe-
nomenon under investigation in this dissertation is delimited (section
1.2) and a summary is given (section 1.3)
1.1 the relation between theory and experiment in
semantics
Formal semanticists have accumulated insights about how grammat-
ical operations derive the meanings of larger linguistic constructions
from the meanings of their lexical parts. Traditionally, the typical data
source for semantic theorizing are introspective judgments about sen-
tences or discourse fragments – in particular, about their truth con-
ditions, their possible readings, their semantic well-formedness or
entailments among them. Today, the introspective data are comple-
mented by a growing amount of experimental data. Among these are
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proportions of response categories or reaction times (RTs) collected in
forced-choice tasks, reading time measures obtained from self-paced
reading or eye-tracking experiments and also data from EEG, MEG
or fMRI studies. Some of these methods have only recently become
broadly available.
It has been recognized by semanticists that these kinds of data
could potentially be useful to test or develop semantic theory (see
e.g. the handbook articles of Bott, Featherston, Rado´, & Stolterfoht,
2011 and Krifka, 2011). In addition, semanticists have recently started
to ask whether their theories are cognitively plausible (among many
others see van Lambalgen & Hamm, 2005; McMillan, Clark, Moore,
Devita, & Grossman, 2005; Baggio & van Lambalgen, 2007; Pietroski,
Lidz, Hunter, & Halberda, 2009; Bott, 2010; Szymanik & Zajenkowski,
2010; Pylkka¨nen, Brennan, & Bemis, 2011; Hackl, Koster-Hale, & Var-
voutis, 2012). This development may not seem surprising. After all,
the classical way to evaluate semantic theory is by comparing its pre-
dictions to speaker judgments which are obviously the result of some
cognitive process. Thus, to have some understanding of the process
that underlies speaker judgments, at some level of abstraction, may
even be a necessary condition to develop a precise and accurate se-
mantic theory. Moreover, devising cognitively realistic semantic theo-
ries may allow us to make better use of experimental methods.
However, this development is surely not endorsed in every strand
of semantics and there is certainly room for disagreement. On the
conceptual level, recent developments may thus call for a reevaluation
of what semantic theory should be able to describe, explain or pre-
dict. A recent discussion of this fundamental question can be found
in the target article by Hamm, Kamp, and Van Lambalgen (2006) and
responses to it. It may also be worthwhile to take a look at debates in
syntax, where analogous questions have been and still are discussed
in terms of the competence-performance distinction (Chomsky, 1965).
Moreover, the questions whether grammar and language processing
constitute two separate systems (for a recent discussion, see Lewis &
Phillips, 2015) or what the relation is between linguistics and neuro-
science (e.g. Poeppel & Embick, 2005) are also closely related. These
fundamental questions are not touched upon here. Instead, it is re-
flected on what conclusions theoretical semanticists can draw from
the growing body of experimental data and how semantic theories
could be amended to accommodate the data.
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1.1.1 Conclusions about semantic theory from experiments
A general problem pertaining to the relation between theory and ex-
periment in semantics is that semantic theories only rarely make falsi-
fiable predictions about the above-mentioned dependent measures. It
is rather obvious that classical formal semantic theories (e.g. Kamp &
Reyle, 1993; I. Heim & Kratzer, 1998) do not make immediate predic-
tions about, e.g., the time needed to perform a meta-linguistic judg-
ment or to read a word and integrate it into the unfolding interpreta-
tion of a sentence. Similarly, electrophysiological data or neuroimag-
ing data are also not predicted by formal semantic theory. Often,
the reason for the lack of immediate predictions can be found in the
fact that either no processes are described or the processes are not in-
tended as cognitive models. In consequence, it is difficult to evaluate
such theories against data of the mentioned kind. Without resorting
to additional processing assumptions, hardly any conclusions about
the validity of the theories can be drawn from the data.
Proportions of response categories in forced-choice tasks may seem
less problematic at first sight because these data resemble the clas-
sical introspective judgments rather closely. For example, consider
sentence-picture verification. It may seem trivial to derive predictions
about the outcome of verification experiments from semantic theory
because they should follow from the truth conditions of a sentence –
the prime object of study in formal semantics. However, because of
the ubiquity of gradience, even this case is problematic. Formal se-
mantic theories generally either predict that a sentence, under one
particular reading, is true or that it is false in a particular context.
What is, instead, typically found in sentence-picture verification and
other forced-choice tasks are graded proportions of judgments. The
observed proportions lie anywhere between 0 and 1 and, crucially, are
also affected by multiple, possibly non-linguistic factors in a gradual
fashion. Most formal semantic theories do not provide the means to
predict these kinds of experimental outcomes (for related discussions
concerning theories of syntax and grammaticality judgments see, e.g.,
Sorace & Keller, 2005; Featherston, 2007; Bader & Ha¨ussler, 2010).
Strictly speaking, the ubiquity of graded proportions, therefore,
leaves only two choices. Firstly, we could reject the classical theo-
ries because they are not equipped to describe the experimental out-
comes accurately. Secondly, we could reject the idea that they make
predictions about the experimental outcomes and thus ignore the ex-
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periments as far as semantic theorizing is concerned. For example,
we may hold that the graded proportions come about because of
extra-linguistic cognitive processes distinct from what semantic the-
ory aims to describe (e.g. core grammatical knowledge or a part of
an encapsulated language module; cf. Fodor, 1986). It seems that the
latter option is often preferred.
1.1.2 Accommodating experimental results in semantic theory
We could make better use of experimental data if we were able to pre-
dict the experimental outcomes based on semantic theory. One way
to approach this is to introduce additional assumptions and conjoin
them to the existing theories. Pursuing this route is attractive as it
allows us to maintain the strengths of the existing theories, for exam-
ple, their compositionality. In fact, this approach is not uncommon,
as illustrated by the following highly selective list of examples from
the literature.
For instance, to accommodate graded proportions of judgments
in forced choice tasks we may introduce uncertainty into the seman-
tic representations (Goodman & Lassiter, 2015). In particular, un-
certainty may be introduced at the level of ambiguity resolution (e.g.
Brasoveanu & Dotlacˇil, 2013) or it may be due to the perception of (e.g.
Pietroski et al., 2009; Lidz, Pietroski, Halberda, & Hunter, 2011; Scon-
tras, Graff, & Goodman, 2012; Tomaszewicz, 2013) or prior expecta-
tions about (Scho¨ller & Franke, 2015, 2016) the non-linguistic context.
Another example is to predict RT in forced choice tasks on the basis
of some measure of how complex the semantic representations are –
the simplest such measure probably being the number of symbols
(e.g. H. Clark & Chase, 1972; Geurts, Katsos, Moons, & Noordman,
2010). More symbols may lead to longer response latencies, possibly
because the symbols correspond to computational steps.1 Moreover,
in order to predict reading times, we may assume that ambiguity de-
creases reading speed, especially if there is close competition between
readings (e.g. Filik, Paterson, & Liversedge, 2004; Bott & Rado´, 2009).
Similarly, we may assume that unlikely semantic interpretations take
longer to process than likely ones (Brasoveanu & Dotlacˇil, 2013) or
that revision or reanalysis of semantic representations takes time (e.g.
1Number of symbols is clearly only one possibility and it does not necessarily cor-
relate with processing complexity (cf. the remark on expression complexity and data
complexity by Szymanik, 2016, p. 104)
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Hackl et al., 2012; Bott & Schlotterbeck, 2015).2 As a final example,
in order to predict neural activity based on classical semantic theory,
we may assume that different types of semantic composition are car-
ried out in different brain areas (Westerlund, Kastner, Al Kaabi, &
Pylkka¨nen, 2015).
Once experimental results are accommodated in semantic theory
via auxiliary processing assumption, we may wish to decide between
different alternatives. A major methodological difficulty in testing se-
mantic theories that are amended with auxiliary processing assump-
tions is that we do generally not know whether a given experimental
outcome would falsify the semantic core theory or the additional pro-
cessing assumptions (for a recent discussion of this issue with regard
to experimental pragmatics, see Chemla & Singh, 2014a, 2014b).
As an illustration, consider the discussion surrounding one of the
the mentioned examples, namely the study of Hackl et al. (2012). The
authors discuss experimental data including reading times and off-
line ratings of sentences involving antecedent contained deletion. The
purpose of their study was to decide between two competing types
of theories on quantifier interpretation, namely quantifier raising (QR)
and type shifting theories. They claimed that their data are compati-
ble with QR but inconsistent with type-shifting theories. In response,
Gibson et al. (2015) argued that Hackl et al. made processing assump-
tions with regard to the QR theory that are implausibly strong. Ac-
cording to Gibson et al., the experimental findings are in fact inconsis-
tent with the QR theory, but can be accounted for by the type shifting
theory using yet other processing assumptions. Also related is a com-
ment of Szabolcsi (2014), who argued that, under a broader concep-
tion of type-shifting theories, Hackl et al.’s original data are actually
just as compatible with type-shifting as they are with QR. Even omit-
ting its details, this discussion exemplifies the difficulty of evaluating
a semantic core theory using experimental data in combination with
processing assumptions.
From a practical point of view, we should therefore strive to meet
two criteria when trying to model experimental data based on for-
mal semantic theory. Firstly, core theories should be preferred that
lend themselves to being developed into processing models. This en-
tails, for example, that core theories should not only be formulated
2One complication with this kind of auxiliary assumption is that, in formal theories,
semantic interpretation is often not described in an incremental fashion but language
comprehension often proceeds incrementally. For discussion see Bott and Sternefeld
(2017), who discuss challenging cases and propose an incremental event semantics.
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explicitly and precisely but also that they should describe efficiently
computable functions (Frixione, 2001). Secondly, processing assump-
tions used to amend semantic core theories should be parsimonious
and well-motivated. Optimally, auxiliary processing assumptions are
independently motivated from empirical research or through careful
theoretical consideration. In the absence of further information, these
criteria increase the credibility of a theory and its chance to be com-
patible with a wide range of data. These criteria will be taken into
account in what follows.
Conceptually, a procedural perspective on meaning is taken in the
present work. The meaning of a sentence is conceived of as a proce-
dure or an algorithm (cf. the formalism of Moschovakis, 1994) that
computes its truth value in context. This approach seems to be suit-
able for the investigation of semantic processing difficulty, especially
since much of the dissertation is concerned with sentence-picture ver-
ification. It is surely an unusual approach to semantics but one that is
not new and can be traced back to one of the founding fathers of the
systematic and formal study of meaning, Gottlob Frege. Recent sum-
maries and discussions of the philosophical position that meanings
are procedures can be found in Szymanik (2009, 2016) who refers to
Tichy´, van Benthem and Suppes among others (see also Pietroski et
al., 2009). Here, we leave it at these hints because the philosophical
issues are not our main concerns.
1.2 delimiting the phenomenon
The present work is concerned with the question whether and how
processing difficulty of quantified sentences can be modeled based on
semantic theory. The focus on quantified sentences is motivated by
the fact that quantifiers can quite confidently be said to be the most
studied type of expressions in formal semantics. This implies, among
other things, that there is a rich theoretical background we can make
use of. In addition, it will become clear as we go that the processing
of quantifiers has, especially in the last fifteen years, received a lot of
attention and our knowledge about it has grown continuously. The
present work contributes to this vibrant development.
The processing of quantified sentences is a complex multi-faceted
phenomenon. The focus of the present work is on a small aspect of
it: We focus on comprehension and truth evaluation of sentences that
contain one quantifier, the main focus being on truth evaluation. This
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is justified by the fact that semantic theory is most explicit with re-
gard to what truth conditions sentences or discourse fragments have.
Furthermore, truth conditions may be viewed as the one common de-
nominator among semantic theories, which come in many different
flavors but share the common goal to describe the truth conditions
of sentences in a systematic fashion. Moreover, collecting truth-value
judgments is arguably among the empirical methods that are most
informative about different aspects of sentence meaning including
how it is processed (see e.g. Krifka, 2011, for discussion). Hopefully,
studying truth evaluation first will lay the groundwork to study other
aspects of the processing of sentence meaning in future research.
A number of topics should be mentioned here that are interest-
ing and important aspects of the processing of quantified sentences
but are nevertheless not discussed in any detail in this dissertation.
Firstly, the present work is concerned with semantic processing and,
thus, other aspects of the processing of quantified sentences are not
covered. Most notably, pragmatic aspects are neglected. Throughout
the dissertation examples, discussions, experimental procedures and
experimental materials are chosen or conducted in such a way that
relevance of pragmatic factors should be minimal.
Furthermore, we focus on sentence meaning and, therefore, dis-
course related phenomena are not covered. There is obviously a vast
literature on discourse related aspects of the interpretation of quanti-
fiers, not only in semantics but also in psycholinguistics. These and
related issues are not discussed here. Moreover, reasoning with quan-
tified sentences (in the syllogistic sense) is also not discussed. This
aspect of the semantics of quantifiers has, of course, received much
attention in linguistics, logic, and psychology and there are many
unresolved questions. But it is not discussed here.
Finally, the interpretation of multiply quantified sentences is a
topic that has attracted attention by semanticists since the birth of
formal semantics and has also received attention in psycholinguistics
in more recent years. The processing of multiply quantified sentences,
and in particular the resolution of quantifier scope ambiguities is not
the subject of this work.
1.3 summary of the dissertation
Chapter 2 introduces basic theoretical concepts that are used through-
out the rest of the dissertation.
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In chapter 3, processing difficulty is approached on an abstract
level. The difficulty of the truth evaluation of quantified sentences is
classified using computational complexity theory. Two experiments
are reported which tested whether cognitive capacities are limited to
those functions that are computationally tractable (PTIME-cognition
thesis). In particular, the semantic processing of reciprocal sentences
with generalized quantifiers, i.e., sentences of the form Q dots are
directly connected to each other, where Q stands for a generalized quan-
tifier, e.g. all or most is investigated. Sentences of this type are notori-
ously ambiguous and it has been claimed that the logically strongest
reading is preferred (strongest meaning hypothesis). Depending on
the quantifier, the verification of their strongest interpretations may
be computationally intractable whereas the verification of the weaker
readings is always tractable. A picture completion experiment and a
picture verification experiment are reported that investigated whether
comprehenders shift from an intractable reading to a tractable read-
ing which should be dispreferred according to the strongest meaning
hypothesis. The results from the picture completion experiment indi-
cate that intractable readings occur in language comprehension. Their
verification, however, rapidly exceeds cognitive capacities in case the
verification problem cannot be solved using simple heuristics. In par-
ticular, it is argued that during verification, guessing strategies are
used to reduce computational complexity.
Chapter 4 discusses two common approaches to model the canoni-
cal verification procedures associated with quantificational sentences.
The first is based on the semantic automata model. This model con-
ceives of quantifiers as decision problems or, equivalently, formal lan-
guages and characterizes the computational resources that are needed
to compute them. The second approach is based on the interface
transparency thesis, which stipulates a transparent interface between
semantic representations and how verification procedures are real-
ized in the general cognitive architecture. Predictions of both ap-
proaches are compared to experimental data from psycholinguistic
experiments.
Chapter 5 focuses on a particularly interesting test case that is
challenging for both of these approaches. In particular, increased
processing difficulty of modified numerals of the form more than n
as compared to fewer than n is investigated. An integrated process-
ing model is proposed for these cases which integrates insights from
formal semantics with models from cognitive psychology of how nu-
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merical information is represented and processed. This model can be
seen as implementation and extension of the interface transparency
thesis. The truth evaluation process is conceived of as a stochastic
process as decribed in sequential sampling models of decision mak-
ing. The increased difficulty of fewer than n as compared to more
than n is attributed to an extra processing step of scale-reversal that
precedes the actual decision process. Predictions of the integrated
processing model are tested and confirmed in two sentence-picture
verification experiments. The first is an ordinary sentence-picture ver-
ification experiment; the second employs the response-signal speed-
accuracy tradeoff procedure in order to control the processing time
participants use.
Chapter 6 discusses whether and how the integrated processing
model can be extended to other quantifiers. It is shown how it can be
extended to proportional comparative quantifiers, like fewer than half
and more than half. This extension is discussed in the light of existing
experimental data. Moreover, it is shown that what are called empty-
set effects can be naturally derived from the model.
Chapter 7 presents data from two eye tracking experiments that
show that fewer than n leads to increased difficulty as compared to
more than n already during reading. The same holds fewer than half
as compared to more than half, especially if these quantifiers are com-
bined with sentence negation. Potential accounts of these findings
are discussed and it is speculated how processing difficulty during
reading and during verification may be related to each other.
Conclusions are presented in chapter 8.
2
THEORET ICAL PREL IMINARIES
The present chapter introduces some theoretical preliminaries that
are used throughout the dissertation. The intention in writing the
present chapter was, of course, to pull some basic stuff out of the
later chapters in order to keep discussions to the point. The reader is
neither expected nor supposed to read this chapter from A to Z, espe-
cially not on first pass. Rather he or she is invited to skip this chapter
and jump back as needed. References are provided throughout the
text, so the reader knows when to jump back.
It is presumed that readers are familiar with common formal ap-
proaches to the semantics of natural language (for an introduction
see, e.g., Gamut, 1991a, 1991b; I. Heim & Kratzer, 1998) and with
mathematical logic (e.g. Rautenberg, 2009). Moreover, familiarity
with probability theory and statistics is presupposed (e.g. Dekking,
2005). Finally, basic concepts from cognitive psychology (e.g. Ander-
son, 2015) and neuroscience (e.g. Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Mallot, 2013)
are also presupposed.
2.1 two perspectives on theory building in cognitive
science
Let us start with two influential perspectives on theory building in
cognitive science that are useful to have as background for the chap-
ters to follow: the so-called tri-level hypothesis of Marr (1982) and the
rational analysis of Anderson (1990). They are briefly introduced here.
Both Marr and Anderson (1990) discuss different “levels of analysis.”
The interested reader may consult Anderson (1990, pp. 3–23) for a
comparison of his own perspective to related discussions in the litera-
ture (including, for example, Marr’s three levels and the competence-
performance distinction of Chomsky, 1965).
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2.1.1 Marr’s three levels
While studying the visual system, Marr (1982) developed his tri-level
hypothesis. He proposed that there are three levels at which an “in-
formation processing device must be understood before one can be
said to have completely understood it” (p. 24):
1. Computational theory:
What problem does the system solve in terms of an input-output
mapping?
2. Representation and algorithmic
What are the representations of input and output and what is
the algorithm that transforms input to output?
3. Hardware implementation
How is the algorithm that transforms input to output realized
physically?
To illustrate these levels, Marr used a cash register. The main
purpose of a cash register is to add or subtract prizes of items in
an appropriate manner. This is what has to be specified at the first
level. In particular, it requires some theory of arithmetic. At the
second level, the representations and algorithms are specified. For
example, Arabic numerals can be used to represent prices and “for
the algorithm we could follow the usual rules about adding the least
significant digits first and “carrying” if the sum exceeds 9” (p. 23).
The third level describes the physical device in which the algorithm
is implemented. Marr stressed that one and the same algorithm may
be carried out by many different devices.
Marr noted that, while the three levels may, in principle, be stud-
ied individually, there are some dependencies between them. For
example, some algorithm may be less efficient but more robust (level
2) than another one. Depending on what problem has to be solved
(level 1), one or the other may be better suited. Similarly, there are
dependencies between the second and third level. Marr compares the
low number of connections in proportion to the number of gates in
digital computers to the relatively high number of connections in pro-
portion to nerve cells in a brain. He mentions that the former type of
architecture (level 3) is better suited to perform operations in series
than in parallel (level 2).
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The present work is mostly concerned with the relation between
levels one and two. Semantic theory is taken as a level-1 description
and it is asked what assumptions need to be added in order to model
processing difficulty and how these assumptions are motivated. Usu-
ally, it is assumed that an analysis on the second level is needed to
model processing difficulty, but see chapter 3 for an approach that
derives predictions about processing difficulty more or less directly
from the first level and section 4.1 for descriptions that may be said to
be situated at level 1.5 (i.e. between levels one and two; cf. Frixione,
2001, p. 382 who refers to Christopher Peacocke). Of course, the
study of processing difficulty and the second level of description may
also feed back into level-1 theories.
2.1.2 Andersons’s rational analysis
During his study of the human memory system Anderson (1990) de-
veloped a research methodology, called rational analysis, that has been
very influential in cognitive science: To build a theory of a cognitive
function the following steps are iterated (pp. 29–30):
1. Goals:
Specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system.
2. Environment:
Develop a formal model of the environment to which the sys-
tem is adapted.
3. Computational limitations:
Make minimal assumptions about computational limitations.
4. Optimization:
Derive the optimal behaviour function given 1 3.
5. Data:
Examine the empirical evidence to see whether the predictions
of the behaviour function are confirmed.
6. Iteration:
Repeat, iteratively refining the theory.
At several places in this dissertation aspects of this methodology
are used. This applies especially to two chapters. The first is chapter
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4, where two common approaches are discussed how to character-
ize canonical verification procedures for natural language quantifiers.
The second is chapter 5, where an processing model is proposed that
integrates insights from linguistics and cognitive psychology.
2.2 generalized quantifiers and some of their
properties
The term generalized quantifier (GQ) is of particular importance for
the present work (see Peters & Westersta˚hl, 2006, for an introduction
and comprehensive overview). This term has slightly different, but
related, usages in mathematical logic and formal linguistics. Here, we
provide the general definition due to Per Lindstro¨m (cf. Szymanik,
2009) in order to be able to capture the semantics of natural language
determiners as well as quantified reciprocals (the topic of chapter 3).
Definition 2:1 (Generalized Quantifier, GQ, Lindstro¨m, 1966). Let
a1, ..., an be integers. A generalized quantifier Q of type t = (a1, ..., an) is a
class of models (i.e. relational structures) of a vocabulary st = fR1, ...,Rng,
such that Ri is ai-ary, for 1  i  n, and Q is closed under isomorphism,
i.e. ifM andM0 are isomorphic, thenM 2 Q iffM0 2 Q.
As usual, a model M of a vocabulary fR1, ...,Rng consists of a non-
empty set M, called domain (or universe) ofM, and relations RMi 
Mai for each predicate symbol Ri from the vocabulary, i.e. M =
(M,RM1 , ...,R
M
n ). Note that, a generalized quantifier Q characterizes a
second order relation QM between first order relations over a domain
M. We may thus also write QM(RM1 , ...,R
M
n ) instead of M 2 Q. In
the following, the superscript is ommitted and relations are referred
to with predicate symbols since the context provides disambiguation
in most cases.
Example 2:2. The generalized quantifiers 92 of type (1) and AtLeastTwo,
Every and Most of type (1, 1) can be defined as:
92 := fM : jR1j  2g
AtLeastTwo := fM : jR1 \ R2j  2g
Every := fM : jR1 n R2j = 0g
Most := fM : jR1 \ R2j > jR1 n R2jg.
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Corresponding to a generalized quantifier Q, we may introduce a
variable binding operator Q in order to build formulas in the follow-
ing way.1
Definition 2:3 (Logics with Generalized Quantifiers). Let L be a logic
and Q a generalized quantifier of type (a1, ..., an). L is extended to the logic
L(Q) via the following two rules:
• If v1, ..., vn are ai-tuples of pairwise distinct variables ranging over
individuals and f1[v1], ..., fn[vn] are formulas, then the following is a
formula:
Qv1, ..., vn
 
f1[v1], ..., fn[vn]

.
• Qv1, ..., vn
 
f1[v1], ..., fn[vn]

is true in a modelM iff
QM

fM,v11 , ..., f
M,vn
n

,
where fM,vii = fa 2 Mai : fi[a/vi] is true inMg.
Below in chapter 4, we will classify quantifiers according to defin-
ability and correlate this with the computational resources needed to
decide whether QM(A, B). For this purpose, the following definition
is useful.
Definition 2:4 (Definability of GQs). Let Q be a GQ of type t and L a
logic. We say Q is definable in L iff there is an L-sentence f of vocabulary
st, such that for every st-structureM: M j= f,M 2 Q.2
In formal semantics, GQs are often equated with determiner de-
notations. The reason is that natural language determiners, such as
some, all, or most, can be analyzed as GQs of type (1, 1). For example,
consider sentences of the form Det A are B, where A and B denote
unary relations (e.g. nouns). We can analyze the determiner Det as
a generalized quantifier Q by demanding that Det A are B is true in
a model M iff QM(A, B). Equivalently, we may translate Det A are
B to Qx, y (Ax, By) (by convention also written as Qx (Ax, Bx)). To
give a simple, concrete example, we may analyze the determiner all
as denoting the type (1, 1) quantifier fM : A  Bg. We call deter-
miners that denote type (1, 1) generalized quantifiers quantificational
1 The term logic used in Definition 2:3 and below can simply be understood as the
combination of a syntax and a semantics as found in introductions to first order
logic (e.g. van Dalen, 1994). Some discussion and references to literature is provided
by Peters and Westersta˚hl (2006, pp. 449–451).
2As usual, M j= f means that formula f is true in model M (see e.g. Rautenberg,
2009).
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determiners. Moreover, the first argument of a quantificational deter-
miner is referred to as its restriction (or restrictor) and the second is
referred to as its scope.
Note on terminology. The term “generalized quantifier theory” is ambigu-
ous. In linguistic contexts, it is often used to refer to a collection of hypothe-
ses about the semantics of determiners, determiner phrases or noun phrases.
For example, it may be used to refer to a collection of hypotheses put forward
by Barwise and Cooper (1981) or in related work. The term is not used this
way here, but simply refers to the theory of GQs. The aforementioned type
of hypotheses are considered linguistic applications of generalized quantifier
theory (GQT).
The mentioned approach to the semantics of determiners has pro-
duced a fruitful line of research within formal semantics (see e.g.
Keenan, 2006; Peters & Westersta˚hl, 2006, for overview). One achieve-
ment of this research was to differentiate quantificational determiners
with respect to their logical properties and formulate grammatical
generalizations based on these properties. One famous example con-
cerns the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs) like anything or
ever. After observing that certain determiners (or noun phrases) li-
cense NPIs (examples 2:5-a,d) whereas others do not (2:5-b,c,e,f), one
may ask which exactly the licensors are and what they have in com-
mon (apart from being an NPI licensor). A good first approxima-
tion can be given in terms of a property called monotonicity: NPIs
occur only in downward monotone contexts (Fauconnier, 1978; Ladu-
saw, 1980, but see also Giannakidou, 2011 for a refined hypothesis).
(2:5) a. No student had read anything about gauge theory.
b. *Every student had read anything about gauge theory.
c. *Some student had read anything about gauge theory.
d. No student had ever read about gauge theory.
e. *Every student had ever read about gauge theory.
f. *Some student had ever read about gauge theory.
(modfied from Ladusaw, 1980)
Below, monotonicity will be of relevance. This property depends on
the inferences that a particular quantifier allows. To get the idea
across, we can say that monotone increasing quantifiers (or operators
in general) are those that license inferences from more specific to less
specific expressions (cf. 2:6), whereas monotone decreasing quantifiers
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license inferences from less specific to more specific expressions (cf.
2:7). A formal definition is given below.
(2:6) Every student sings and dances.
) Every student sings.
; Every student sings, dances and claps hands.
(2:7) No student sings and dances.
; No student sings.
) No student sings, dances and claps hands.
Definition 2:8 (Monotonicity). A generalized quantifier Q of type
(a1, ..., an) is called:
• monotone increasing in its i-th argument iff from QM[R1, . . . ,Rn] and
Ri  R0i  Mai follows QM[R1, . . . ,Ri 1,R0i,Ri+1, . . . ,Rn],
• monotone decreasing in its i-th argument iff from QM[R1, . . . ,Rn]
and R0i  Ri  Mai follows QM[R1, . . . ,Ri 1,R0i,Ri+1, . . . Rn]
• non-monotone in its i-th argument iff it is neither monotone increas-
ing nor decreasing in that argument.
Convention. If a generalized quantifier of type (1, 1) is monotone increas-
ing or decreasing in its second argument, we say that it is upward entail-
ing (UE) or downward entailing (DE), respectively. Otherwise, we call it
non-monotone.
2.2.1 CE-quantifiers as relations between numbers
Other properties of quantifiers have been hypothesized to be semantic
universals, i.e. properties that all quantificational determiners in ev-
ery natural language have (Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Keenan & Stavi,
1986; van Benthem, 1986), and are still considered as such. Two of
these properties are relevant here. As we will see shortly, these two
properties in combination lead to yet another conception of quantifi-
cational determiners, namely as relations between numbers. The first
is domain independence (or EXT which is mnemonic for extension).
Definition 2:9 (Domain Independence, EXT). A quantifier Q of type
(1, 1) is domain independent iff QM(A, B) , QM0(A, B), for A, B, M 
M0.
EXT has the effect that no entities outside the set A [ B matter if
we want to decide whether QM(A, B) holds. The second property
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is conservativity (CONS), which reduces the relevant elements even
further. If a quantifier is conservative we do not need to consider any
elements that are in B but not in A.
Definition 2:10 (Conservativity3, CONS). A quantifier Q of type (1, 1)
is called conservative iff QM(A, B) , QM(A, A \ B), for A, B  M.
GQs of type (1, 1) that satisfy both, CONS and EXT are called CE-
quantifiers. Both properties in combination have the effect that only
the sets A \ B and A n B are relevant to decide whether QM(A, B).
Moreover, because GQs are closed under isomorphisms, only the car-
dinalities jA\ Bj and jA n Bj count. As a consequence CE-quantifiers
can be considered two-place relations between cardinal numbers.
Proposition 2:11 (CE-quantifiers as relations over cardinal numbers).
A quantifier Q is a CE-quantifier iff there is a (unique) binary relation RQ
over cardinal numbers such that RQ(jA n Bj, jA \ Bj) , QM(A, B), for
A, B  M.
Proof. Follows from Peters and Westersta˚hl (2006, pp. 158-160).
The following corollary tells us that CE-quantifiers can be identi-
fied with subsets ofN2 once we restrict ourselves to finite structures.
Corrolary 2:12. A quantifier Q is a CE-quantifier iff there is a (unique)
binary relation RQ overN such that, for any finite sets M and X,Y  M,
RQ(jX nYj, jX \Yj) , QM(X,Y).
Example 2:13. Here are the relations for the CE-quantifiers from above:
RAtLeastTwo(a, b) , b  2
REvery(a, b) , a = 0
RMost(a, b) , b  a.
Note. In what follows, we restrict ourselves to finite structures.
For illustration of the relations just introduced, the so-called num-
ber tree is useful (van Benthem, 1986). In the number tree, each node
corresponds to some (x, y) 2N2. This is shown in Figure Ia. To repre-
sent a CE-quantifier Q, we replace (x, y) with the symbol + whenever
RQ(x, y) holds and with   otherwise. Examples are shown in Figure
3A completely parallel definition applies to the concept of quantifiers used by Keenan
and Stavi (1986), which is discussed in section 6.1.
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(0,0)
(1,0) (0,1)
(2,0) (1,1) (0,2)
(3,0) (2,1) (1,2) (0,3)
(4,0) (3,1) (2,2) (1,3) (0,4)
... ... ... ... ... ...
(a) General format
 
   
    +
    + +
    + + +
... ... ... ... ... ...
(b) AtLeastTwo
+
+ +
+ +  
+ +    
+ +      
... ... ... ... ... ...
(c) AtMostTwo
Figure I. CE-quantifiers in the number tree.
Ib and Ic. These are, of course, just geometrical representations of the
characteristic function of RQ. They are useful because they reveal cer-
tain properties of CE-quantifiers. For example, UE quantifiers have
the property that pluses propagate to the right, so to speak (see Fig-
ure IIa). Moreover, in the number tree representations of quantifiers
that are monotone increasing or decreasing in their first argument,
pluses propagate either upward or downward along the direction of
the two ‘axes’ of the number tree (see Figure IIb) and quantifiers that
are intersective, which means that QM(A, B) is equivalent to QM(B, A),
have the property illustrated in Figure IIc.
2.3 decision problems and automata
A large part of this dissertation is concerned with truth-value judg-
ments for quantified sentences. Therefore, the concept of a decision
problem is useful. A decision problem essentially is a function that
maps some input to 1 or 0. Thus, truth-value judgments can be con-
sidered a special case. This perspective also opens up connections to
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(a) Mononicity 2nd argument (b) Mononicity 1st argument
(c) Intersective quantifiers
Figure II. Some properties of CE-quantifiers in the number tree. Pluses
propagate in the direction of the arrows.
the theory of formal languages because decision problems and for-
mal languages are precisely the same thing. The following definition
is taken from Arora and Barak (2009). As usual, the notation S refers
to the Kleene closure of S (see Arora & Barak, 2009, p. 1 and see also
Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979 for an overview of formal languages and
automata theory).
Definition 2:14 (Decision problem). Let S be any finite set, called an
alphabet. A decision problem is a function f : S ! f0, 1g. We identify f
with the subset L f := fx 2 S : f (x) = 1g of S and also refer to L f as a
formal language.
Languages (or decision problems) can be categorized according
to the Chomsky hierarchy and also according to the type of com-
putational device needed to recognize (or compute) them (see e.g.
Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979). A relatively simple class of languages are
the regular languages. There are several equivalent ways to define reg-
ular languages. One example, is to define the type of grammar that
generates these languages, called regular grammars. Another possibil-
ity, is to determine which kind of computational device is needed to
recognize them. The regular languages are exactly those languages
that are recognized by a certain type of computing device, namely a
deterministic finite state automaton (DFA). This means that every regu-
lar language can be associated with a DFA that computes the corre-
sponding function, and vice versa.
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Definition 2:15 (Deterministic finite state automaton). A deterministic
finite state automaton is a quintuple (Q,S, d, q0, F), where:
• Q is a finite set of states;
• S is an alphabet called the input alphabet;
• d : Q S! Q is a function called transition function;
• F  Q is the set of accepting states;
• q0 2 Q the start state.
A DFA works as follows: At the beginning of a computation, it is
in its initial state q0. Then, it reads input symbols one after the other
and changes its current state according to the transition function d. A
picture helps to illustrate the workings of this kind of device. Con-
sider the simple regular language 1 := fe, 1, 11, . . .g, which contains
the empty string, e, and any string of only 1s. Figure IIIa shows a
DFA that recognizes this language. It starts in the initial state and
then behaves as can be read off from the labeled arrows: Every time
it reads a 1 it follows the loop and does not change state. As soon
as a 0 is encountered it moves to q1. Once it is there, no arrow leads
back and it has to stay. The state q0 is an accepting state, as indicated
by the double circle. If no symbol is left to read and the automaton is
in q0, it accepts the string, otherwise it rejects it.
A well-known non-regular language is f1n0n : n  1g.
This is the language that consists of strings with a certain num-
ber of 1s followed by the same number of 0s. Another ex-
ample is the language fs 2 S : #1(s) > #0(s)g, the sub-
set of f0, 1g that contains a larger number of 1s than 0s
(#1(s) denotes the number of 1s in s, #0(s) the number of 0s). Both of
these languages are called context-free. To show that these languages
are not regular and thus not recognized by a DFA, the pumping lemma
may be used (see e.g. Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979, pp. 55-56). To recog-
nize languages like these, a more capable device is needed. Both of
them are recognized by pushdown automata (PDA).
Definition 2:16 (Pushdown automaton, PDA). A (non-deterministic)
PDA is a tuple (Q,S, G, d, q0,Z0, F), where:
• Q is a finite set of states;
• S is an alphabet called the input alphabet;
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• G is an alphabet called the stack alphabet;
• q0 2 Q is the initial state;
• Z0 /2 G is a stack symbol called start symbol;
• d is a mapping from Q (S [ feg) G to finite subsets of Q G;
• F  Q the set of accepting states.
A PDA makes use of a memory device called a stack. This is a ‘last
in, first out’ data type. Symbols can be pushed onto or popped off the
top of the stack. The mapping d determines the permissible “moves”
given the current state, input symbol and top symbol on the stack. A
string is accepted by PDA if reading the string and following d either
permits an accepting state to be reached or emptying the stack. A
PDA that recognizes the language fs 2 S : #1(s) > #0(s)g is shown
in Figure IIIb. This automaton works similar to the DFA to its left.
The main difference is that each state transition is accompanied by a
stack operation. The arrow labels are read as follows: q, z/g means
that the transition may be followed if the input symbol is q and z is
the top stack symbol. At the same time, z is replaced with g. The
automaton in Figure IIIb pushes 1s and 0s onto the stack (top four
lines above the loop over q0) until a pair of a 1 and a 0 is encountered
(one on the stack, one in the input; bottom two lines above q0). In the
latter case, the top stack symbol is popped and the next input symbol
is read. This way, 1s and 0s are matched in number. An input string
is accepted if only 1s but no 0s are left on the stack in the end.
A language that is not context-free is, for example, fanbncn : n 2
Ng. This can be shown using a pumping lemma for context-free lan-
guages (Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979). This language belongs to the class
of context-sensitive languages. Because context-sensitive languages are
not of much importance in what follows, we skip one level of the
Chomsky hierarchy and introduce the Turing machine next. This
kind of device recognizes the recursively enumerable languages and is
thus the mightiest device in the Chomsky hierarchy. I provide the def-
inition in which the machine has k tapes (Arora & Barak, 2009) here.
A tape is devided into cells that may each contain a symbol. There is
no restriction on the length of a tape. The first tape is called the input
tape and can only be read; the other k  1 tapes are called work tapes
and are read and write tapes; the last of these is a designated output
tape. The symbols L, S and R that occur in the definition below deter-
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q0 q10
1 0
1
(a) DFA that recognizes 1
q0 q1 q2
e,1/e
1,Z0/1
0,Z0/0
1,1/11
0,0/00
1,0/e
0,1/e
e,Z0/Z0
e,1/e
1
(b) PDA that recognizes fs : #1(s) > #0(s)g
Figure III. Two example automata
mine whether the k read-write heads move left, stay or move right at
the end of each computational step.
Definition 2:17 (Deterministic Turing machine). A (k-tape) Turing ma-
chine is a tuple (G,Q, d), where:
• G is a set of symbols, including a designated ‘blank’ symbol , a des-
ignated ‘start’ symbol B and the symbols 1 and 0;
• Q is a set of states, including a ‘start’ state qstart and a designated
‘halt’ state qhalt;
• d : Q Gk ! Q Gk 1  fL, S,Rgk is called transition function
I will not give examples of Turing machines (TMs) that compute
specific problems. Rather, they are introduced here for the following
two reasons. Firstly, the following thesis is generally believed, which
makes TMs the model of computation.
Hypothesis 2:18 (Church-Turing thesis). Any function that is computable
(in an informal and intuitive sense) can be computed by a TM.
A reason to believe this thesis is that numerous alternative models
have been proposed that could be proven to be equivalent to the TM
model. Moreover, I am not aware of a counterexample. Secondly,
because of their universal character, TMs will be important as a the-
oretical concept in the next section, which is about Computational
Complexity Theory.
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2.4 basic notions from computational complexity
theory
In chapter 3, quantified sentences are distinguished according to their
computational complexity, the object of study in computational com-
plexity theory (see Arora & Barak, 2009, from whom the present sec-
tion is adopted, for an introduction and comprehensive overview).
The presents section introduces the two important complexity classes
P andNP and also discusses the complexity of two example problems
that are relevant in chapter 3.
2.4.1 Two important complexity classes
The most basic concept that is needed in order to talk about compu-
tational complexity is:
Definition 2:19 (Running time). Let f : f0, 1g ! f0, 1g and T :N!
N be some functions and M a TM. We say M computes f in T(n)-time if
for every x 2 f0, 1g, if M is initialized to the start configuration on input
x, then after at most T(jxj) steps it halts with f (x) written on its output
tape (written as M(x) = f (x)).
Given the definition of running time, we can introduce the class P
of functions that can be computed in polynomial time by a determin-
istic TM. Firstly, we define classes of functions according to running
times.
Definition 2:20. Let T : N ! N be some function. We denote with
DTIME(T(n)) the set of all decision problems that are computable in c 
T(n)-time for some constant c.
Secondly, we define P as the union of the classes of functions with
polynomial running time.
Definition 2:21 (The class P). P :=
S
c1DTIME(nc)
Another important complexity class is NP, which stand for non-
deterministic polynomial time. The original definition of this class makes
use of the concept of a non-deterministic Turing machine. A useful
intuitive way to think of this kind of device is that it simultaneously
tries all the potential ‘solutions’ of a problem. The class NP can, how-
ever, also be defined on the basis of a deterministic TM. Here, the
idea is that a computational problem belongs to the class iff it can be
2.4 basic notions from computational complexity theory 25
checked in polynomial time whether a potential solution is correct.
With respect to decision problems, ‘solutions’ are what is called cer-
tificate in the following definition. Certificates can be thought of as
proofs of the correct answer or hints at the correct answer.
Definition 2:22 (The class NP). A decision problem f is in NP if there
exists a polynomial p : N ! N and a polynomial-time TM M, such that
for every x 2 f0, 1g,
x 2 L f , 9u 2 f0, 1gp(jxj) : M(x, u) = 1.
If x 2 L f and u 2 f0, 1gp(jxj) satisfy M(x, u) = 1 then we call u a
certificate for x, w.r.t. L and M.
It is obvious that P  NP whereas the question whether P = NP
is a famous unsolved mathematical problem. An important class of
problems among those in NP are the complete ones:
Definition 2:23 (Reducibility,NP-hardness and completeness). We say
that a decision problem f is polynomial-time reducible to a decision problem
g, denoted by f p g, if there is a polynomial time computable function
h : f0, 1g ! f0, 1g such that for every x 2 f0, 1g, f (x) = 1 iff
g(h(x)) = 1.
We call g NP-hard if f p g for every f in NP. If g is, in addition, in
NP it is called NP-complete.
NP-complete and -hard problems are not uncommon in actual
computer applications (see e.g. Garey & Johnson, 1979). These prob-
lems are called intractable because under the assumption that P 6= NP
efficient solutions of these problems are beyond reach even if we fac-
tor in that actual computing devices become more and more efficient
(cf. Arora & Barak, 2009, ch. 1 & 2). NP-complete problems are the
most difficult problems in NP in the sense that, by the reductions
mentioned in the above definition, a way to solve one of these prob-
lems efficiently also constitutes an efficient solution to all the others
(modulo a polynomial time transformation). If one polynomial time
algorithm for any of these problems were found, it would have been
shown that P = NP.
2.4.2 Two problems
In chapter 3, oneNP-complete and oneNP-hard problem are relevant
because these correspond to the verification of certain readings of
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natural language sentences, in particular what we call complete graph
readings of quantified reciprocals (cf. Szymanik, 2010). These two
problems are described here briefly.
The CLIQUE problem consists in deciding whether there is a com-
pletely connected subgraph of a certain size in a graph (see Garey
& Johnson, 1979, problem GT19). It is one of the 21 classical NP-
complete problems presented by (Karp, 1972).
Definition 2:24 (CLIQUE problem). Given a finite graph G and a positive
integer k, is there a complete subgraph of k or more vertices?
The MAXCLIQUE problem is related to CLIQUE. It consists in de-
ciding whether the maximal connected subgraph in a graph is of a
certain size.
Definition 2:25 (MAXCLIQUE problem). Given a finite graph G and a
positive integer k, is the maximum complete subgraph of G of size k?
Proposition 2:26. MAXCLIQUE is NP-hard.
A simple proof of the NP-hardness of MAXCLIQUE proceeds via a
polynomial-time reduction from 3SAT (see e.g. Garey & Johnson,
1979, p. 46). This reduction is parallel to the one used by Arora and
Barak (2009, p. 51) to proof NP-completeness of another well-known
problem called INDSET (for “independent set”), which is complemen-
tary to the CLIQUE problem.
2.5 hypothesis testing and signal detection theory
In parts of chapters 4 and 5, it is assumed that the cardinality of a set
(also referred to as numerosity) is mentally represented in a noisy and
analog format (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Under this assumption,
performance in tasks that involve comparison of numerosities can
be described using signal detection theory (SDT, see e.g. Green &
Swets, 1966) and related approaches. Crucially, this also applies to
the verification of certain quantifiers, e.g. proportional quantifiers (cf.
Pietroski et al., 2009) and, as is argued in chapter 5, also numerical
ones.
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2.5.1 Hypothesis testing problems and decision rules
In order to describe such tasks, we think of them as hypothesis testing
problems, which are defined as follows (most of the present section is
taken from Poor, 1994).
Definition 2:27 (Hypothesis-testing problem). Let Y be a random vari-
able and P0 and P1 two probability distributions. By a hypothesis-testing
problem we refer to the problem of deciding which of the following two hy-
potheses is true:
H0 : Y  P0
H1 : Y  P1.
A hypothesis testing problem is solved using a decision rule. Such a
rule specifies when we choose H0 and when we choose H1.
Definition 2:28 (Decision rule). Let (G0, G1) be a partition of the observa-
tion set G. A decision rule is a function
d : G! f1, 0g, y 7!
8<:1, if y 2 G10, if y 2 G0.
In what follows, we let L(y) denote p1(y)p0(y) , where pi is the density
of Pi, for i 2 f0, 1g. We call this quantity the likelihood ratio. Moreover,
the following type of decision rule is central.
Definition 2:29 (likelihood ratio test, LRT). A decision rule is called likeli-
hood ratio test if, for some threshold tf, it has the form:
df(y) :=
8<:1, if L(y)  tf0, if L(y) < tf.
Decision rules can be designed to fulfill different optimality crite-
ria. One type of optimal decision rules are called Bayes rules. They
are based on minimization of the so-called Byes risk.
Definition 2:30 (Bayes risk). Assume that, for i, j 2 f1, 0g, Cij  0
represents the cost of choosing Hi if Hj is true and assume that we can
assign a (prior) probability pi to the event that Hj is true. Then, the Bayes
risk r of a decision rule d is defined as:
r(d) :=
1
å
j=0
1
å
i=0
pjCijPj(Gi).
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Proposition 2:31. Given any hypothesis testing problem (and assuming
C11 < C01), the following decision rule, called Bayes rule, is optimal in the
sense that it minimizes Bayes risk:
dB(y) :=
8<:1, if L(y)  tB0, if L(y) < tB , where tB := p0C10   C00p1C01   C11 .
Proof. See Poor (1994, section II.B).
The following cost assignment is called uniform. Under a uniform
cost assignment, tB simplifies to p0p1 and it follows as a corollary that,
in this case, the Bayes rule also minimizes the overall probability of
error.
Cij =
8<:0, if i = j1, if i 6= j
More generally, in case no cost assignment is available, an opti-
mality criterion can be formulated on the basis of trading off chances
of falsely rejecting H0 (called false alarm) against the chances of falsely
rejecting H1 (called miss). The Neyman-Pearson criterion is to fix an up-
per bound on the probability of a false alarm and then to minimize
the probability of a miss. The Neyman-Pearson lemma (see Poor, 1994,
pp. 23–25) states that, for a given hypothesis testing problem and a
fixed false alarm probability, a, there exists a unique (randomized)
LRT, and thus a unique threshold tNP,a that minimizes the probabil-
ity of a miss.
It is obvious that, in case the likelihood ratio, L(y), depends in a
strictly monotone fashion on y, a decision rule can be formulated that
is equivalent to the LRT but is based on y instead of L(y): Instead of
comparing L(y) to tf we compare y to L 1(tf).
2.5.2 Sequential hypothesis testing
The approach of the previous section can be generalized to the case
where observations are sampled in sequence until a decision can ‘con-
fidently’ be made. In the present section, a generalization of the LRT,
called the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), is introduced first; af-
ter that, some basic stochastic processes are defined; next, it is shown
that certain sequential hypothesis testing procedures can be under-
stood in terms of these processes; and finally, it is discussed how all
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of this can be used to model decision making processes as studied in
psychological experiments. Most of the present section is taken from
Poor (1994) and Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, and Cohen (2006),
but see also Stone (1960), Ratcliff (1978) and Gold and Shadlen (2001).
2.5.2.1 The sequential probability ratio test
Suppose that instead of one realizations, y, our decision is based on
a sequence, (yi)i2N, of realizations of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables, (Yi)i2N. The corresponding hy-
pothesis testing problem is:
H0 : Yk  P0, k = 1, 2, . . .
H1 : Yk  P1, k = 1, 2, . . . .
Because the Yi are independent, the likelihood ratio after i-th obser-
vation is:
LRi = Õ
1ji
p1(yj)
p0(yj)
. (2:32)
The so-called sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) is based on two
predefined decision boundaries, t and t. As long as t < LRi < t,
no decision is made. As soon as one of the decision boundaries is
crossed, a decision is made according to the following rule.
dS(y) :=
8<:1, if LRi  t0, if LRi  t (2:33)
It can be shown that the SPRT is optimal in the sense that it needs
the fewest possible sample observations yi on average to achieve fixed
error probabilities, which are determined by the boundaries. This
theorem is due to Wald and Wolfowitz (1948) and is, for example,
discussed by Poor (1994, section III.D) and Bogacz et al. (2006). As
before, it is possible to formulate specific optimality criteria, such as,
for example, minimizing an analogue of the above-mentioned Bayes
risk, and choose the decision boundaries accordingly. What such cri-
teria have in common is that they weigh the expected number of
observations that is needed to reach a decision against error proba-
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bilities. This is, however, beyond the scope of our present discussion
(for more details see e.g. Bogacz et al., 2006).
2.5.2.2 Random walks and diffusion processes
In the present section, some basic stochastic processes are introduced.
These are adopted from (Kannan, 1979) and (Lawler, 1995). In the
next section, they are related to hypothesis testing problems.
Definition 2:34 (Random walk). A family of random variables (Xi)i2N
is called a time discrete stochastic process. If such a process has the form,
Xi = X0 +å
i>0
Yi,
and (Yi)i2N+ are i.i.d., then it is called a random walk.
The time continuous analogue of a random walk is a drift diffusion
process. These processes are generalizations of the so-called Wiener
process, often denoted by W. Therefore, we define the latter first. In
the following definition, N denotes a normal distribution.
Definition 2:35 (Wiener Process). A Wiener process is is a family of ran-
dom variables (Xi)i2R+ that satisfies the following conditions.
(1) X0 = 0 with probability one.
(2) if s1  t1, s2  t2, . . . sn  tn, then Xt1   Xs1 ,Xt2   Xs2 , . . .Xtn  
Xsn are independent.
(3) For 0  s < t, Yt  Ys  N (0, (t  s)).
AWiener process is a special case of a drift diffusion process. It is
called stationary since it has zero expected increments, or zero drift.
In general, drift diffusion processes need not be stationary and may
have non-zero drift.
Definition 2:36 (Drift diffusion process). A drift diffusion process with
drift m and variance parameter s2 is a family of random variables (Xi)i2R+
which satisfies the conditions from the previous definition except for the third
which is replaced by:
(3’) Yt  Ys  N ((t  s)m, (t  s)s2).
Using a stochastic differential equation such a process can also be written as
follows, where W denotes a Wiener process.
dX = m dt+ s dW (2:37)
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2.5.2.3 Relation to hypothesis testing and application to experimental data
In the present section, drift diffusion processes are related to hypoth-
esis testing problems. Furthermore, it is explained briefly how such
processes can be used as a model of human decision making, specifi-
cally in two alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks.
A decision procedure that is equivalent to the SPRT is obtained
by taking the logarithm of equation (2:32), such that the log likelihood
ratio (LLR) after the i-th observation is:
LLRi = å
1ji
log L(yj).
More observations are sampled as long as log t  LLRi  log t. As
soon as one of the decision boundaries, log t or log t, is crossed, a
decision is made according to a decision rule that is completely ana-
logue to 2:33. Thus, we can conceive of the SPRT as the random
walk:
Z0 = 0,
Zi = Z0 + å
1ji
log L(Yj), for i  1. (2:39)
Moreover, if the i.i.d. random variables log L(Yj) have mean m and
variance s2, then the random walk in 2:39 converges to its continuum
limit Xt as defined by the equation in 2:37, after a change of scale
(see Bogacz et al., 2006, Appendix A). Therefore, we can also think
of the optimal decision procedure for sequential hypothesis testing
problems as a drift diffusion process.
Stochastic processes have been used to model human descion
making at least since Stone (1960). In his drift diffusion model (DDM),
Ratcliff (1978) famously proposed to model actual decision processes
performed by humans in psychological experiments using drift diffu-
sion processes. The application of the drift diffusion model (DDM)
and similar models in cognitive science was recently reviewed by
Forstmann, Ratcliff, and Wagenmakers (2016). Given a set of free
model parameters, the DDM allows us to predict proportions of er-
rors, the expected decision time and the distribution of decision times.
For example, if we assume no response bias, which is appropriate in
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a situation with equal priors and uniform cost assignment, the pro-
portion of errors (denoted ER) is predicted to be:
ER =
1
1+ exp (mz/s2)
(2:40)
and the mean decision time (DT) is predicted to be
DT =
z
m
tanh
mz
s2

, (2:41)
where z = 12(t   t) is the distance from the so-called starting point,
i.e. 0, to the (symmetric) decision boundaries (for details see e.g. Bo-
gacz et al., 2006).
More precisely, this model is appropriate in the so-called free re-
sponse paradigm, in which the participants of an experiment deter-
mine the time when the decision is made. If the decision time is
controlled by the experimenter, e.g. via a response signal, the deci-
sion process can be modeled analogously to the LRT from section
2.5.1. In that case, ER is predicted as (again, see Bogacz et al., 2006,
for details):
ER = F

 A
s
p
DT

, where F(x) =
Z x
 ¥
1p
2p
e t
2/2dt. (2:42)
2.6 gradable adjectives and comparatives
In chapters 5 and 6, compartive quantifiers like more than five or fewer
than half of the are analyzed using the syntax and semantics of ordi-
nary comparatives, as was suggested by Hackl (2000). Ordinary com-
paratives involve gradable adjectives like tall, heavy or old. The ability
of adjectives like these to appear in comparatives is even considered a
diagnostic for their gradability (Lassiter, 2015). Another robust one is
their ability to combine with degree modifiers, e.g. very tall, somewhat
heavy or quite old. Some basic aspects of the syntax and semantics of
gradable adjectives and comparatives are briefly summarized in the
present section.
There are two prominent approaches to the semantics of gradable
adjectives. The first is called the vague predicate analysis. It is based
on the idea that gradable adjectives denote special kinds of predi-
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cates, namely vague ones, that are interpreted via partial, context-
dependent truth assignments. These truth assignments are subject
to certain consistency constraints and thus induce an ordering over
their domain (Klein, 1980 who refers to a paper by Hans Kamp). The
second approach is referred to as the scalar analysis. It is based on
mappings from individuals to degrees, i.e. elements of an ordered set
(Cresswell, 1976). Here, we focus on the latter type of approach. For
comparison of the two and discussion about how they are related the
reader is referred to von Stechow (1984), Kennedy (1997) and Lassiter
(2015).
2.6.1 Degrees
Scalar analyses of gradable adjectives are based on a special kind
of objects called degrees. The intuition is that degrees are certain
measurements of individuals (e.g. height, weight, age, etc.). More
formally, they are elements of a scale which is defined as a triple
hD,, DIMi, where D is a set,  is a reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive relation over D and DIM is the dimension of D (e.g. height
in meters, weight in kg, age in years, etc.). The semantic type of de-
grees is denoted by d. There is much more to say about the type of
scales that are relevant to the semantics of natural language (For re-
cent discussions see Kennedy & McNally, 2005a; Fox & Hackl, 2007
and Solt, 2015), but we will leave it at this brief introduction. More-
over, we will usually ignore dimensions, assume that degrees are to-
tally ordered and assume that they are equipped with an addition
operation denoted by +. Specifically, we think of a scale as a totally
ordered group (D,+,). Going even further, we can often simply think
of scales as structures that are isomorphic to the real numbers.
2.6.2 Two types of scalar analyses
In 2:43-a the scalar adjective tall appears in what is called its positive
form. Scalar analyses assign an interpretation as indicated in the
paraphrase, 2:43-b, to sentences like this. Comparative sentences like
2:44-a are analyzed as exemplified in 2:44-b.
(2:43) a. Simon is tall.
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b. Paraphrase: The degree to which Simon is tall exceeds the
range of ‘neutral’ degrees of tallness in the relevant com-
parison class.
(2:44) a. Elin is taller than Simon (is).
b. Paraphrase: The degree to which Elin is tall exceeds that
to which Simon is tall.
There are two prominent variants of the degree-based approach to
gradable adjectives and comparatives. The first takes gradable ad-
jectives to denote binary relations between individual and degrees
(Cresswell, 1976,von Stechow, 1984, see also Beck, 2011). The second
approach assumes gradable adjectives to denote functions that map
individuals to degrees, called measure functions (Kennedy, 1997 and
reference therein, specifically Bartsch and Vennemann). These two
approaches result in slightly different lexical entries, syntactic struc-
tures and semantic mechanisms. The question which approach, if any
of the two, is empirically adequate is not settled yet. One crucial dif-
ference between the two approaches lies in what predictions follow
regarding the possibility of certain scope ambiguities (for discussion
see Kennedy, 1997 and I. Heim, 2000) and the syntactic and seman-
tic status of than-phrases (Bhatt & Pancheva, 2004; Grosu & Horvath,
2006). Both approaches are illustrated briefly here by means of the
examples in 2:44 and 2:43.
2.6.2.1 The relational approach
The relational approach conceives of gradable adjectives like tall as
binary relations between degrees and individuals (see first row of
Table IVa). As the following example shows, the degree argument
may be overtly realized in form of a measure phrase like 85 cm. In that
case, it combines with the adjective to form an AdjP.
(2:45) Simon is 85 cm tall.
the positive . In sentences like 2:44 there is no overt degree ar-
gument. It is commonly assumed that a phonologically silent degree
quantifier called pos takes its place (see Figure Va). This quantifier
provides an implicit standard of comparison. The first row of Table
IVa shows a lexical entry of pos. The predicate ntrQ,C is meant to
encode a ’neutral interval’ of degrees with respect to a degree predi-
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Table IV
Some lexical entries.
(a) relational approach
tall Adj <d,<e,t>> ld.lx.height(x)  d
pos Deg <<d,t>,t> lQ.8d0 ntrQ,C d0 ! Q d0
-er Deg <<d,t>,<<d,t>,t>> lP.lQ.9d0 :P d0 ^Q d0
(b) functional approach
tall Adj <d,e> height
pos Deg <<e,d>,<d,t>> l f .lx. f (x) > s( f , c)

-er Deg <<e,d>,<<<e,d>,d>,<e,t>>> l f .lG.lx. f (x) > G( f )
cate Q (type <d,t>) and a contextually determined comparison class C
(type <e,t>; for technical details and discussion see e.g. von Stechow,
1984; Kennedy, 2007). In order to achieve an interpretable logical
form (LF), pos is assumed to undergo QR (see I. Heim & Kratzer,
1998). In order for sentence 2:44-a to be true, Simon’s height has to
be an upper bound of the neutral interval. Figure V illustrates the
syntax and semantics of sentence 2:44-a according to the relational
approach. For more details the reader is referred to the cited liter-
ature. Of course, some relational proposals in the literature differ
slightly from what is presented here. For example, one common al-
ternatives for the lexical semantics of pos is something along the lines
of: lQ.max(ld.Q d

> s, where s is the contextually determined stan-
dard of comparison. The version chosen here is a notational variant
of the subset semantics: lQ.NQ,C  Q (cf. von Stechow, 1984; I. Heim,
2006; Solt, 2009; Beck, 2011), which is more general than the version
using max.
the comparative . The comparative morpheme -er relates two
degree predicates. A lexical entry is provided in the third row of
Table IVa. 4 At LF, -er composes with the than-phrase, which yields
a degree quantifier of type <<d,t>,t>. This expression undergoes
QR – just like pos – to obtain an interpretable structure. Figure VI
shows the syntactic structure and translation to a typed language.
The surface word order is derived from the syntactic structure in VIa
by way of two further steps. Firstly, the than-phrase is extraposed.
4Note that according to this analysis -er corresponds to a non-conservative GQ (cf.
Bhatt & Pancheva, 2004; Grosu & Horvath, 2006), which is surprising given the fact
that such GQs are not found in the nominal domain.
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Secondly, a morphological rule has to apply that turns -er tall into
taller.
2.6.2.2 The functional approach
The functional approach identifies gradable adjectives with measure
functions that map individuals to degrees. This is shown in the first
row of Table IVb. To obtain a predicate and eventually a proposition
from this denotation, degree morphology, i.e. lexical material of cat-
egory Deg, like pos or -er, is crucial. A syntactic difference between
the functional and the relational approach is that, in the former, the
degree expression is considered the head and the adjective the com-
plement whereas the latter assumes opposite roles.
the positive . In the positive form, the value of a measure func-
tion f , e.g. Simon’s height, is compared to the standard s( f , c). This is
straightforwardly achieved using the lexical entry in the second row
of Table IVb. As above, the standard depends on the compositionally
provided measure function and a contextually determined compari-
son class c. In contrast to the relational approach, no QR takes place.
Detailed derivations are shown in Figure VII.
the comparative . A lexical entry of the comparative morpheme
is given at the bottom of Table IVb. As shown in Figure VIII compara-
tives are interpreted in situ, without QR. The interpretation of the PP
is simplified in the figure. Originally, Kennedy (1997) proposed that
the PP is interpreted as lg.max
 
ld.g(simon)  d. For our example
sentence, the end result is, however, the same. Another point I want
to highlight is that the denotation of -er is tailored to the case of com-
parative deletion. In the case of comparative subdeletion, as in the table is
wider than the door is high, for example, Kennedy proposes a different
denotation of -er: l f .ld.lx. f (x) > d.5
5He stressed that these variants make use of different combinatorics but do not lead to
any truth-conditionally relevant differences. I would like to add that the denotation
in Table IVa can, in fact, be derived from the just-mentioned one by application
of the type shifter lF.lr.ls.F(r)(s(r)), which is discussed by Jacobson and Barker
(2005) under the name s.
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2.7 combinatory categorial grammar
In chapters 5 and 6, combinatory categorial grammar (CCG; Ades &
Steedman, 1982 and Szabolcsi, 1987) is used to derive symbolic mean-
ing representations of comparative quantifiers. The basics of this for-
malisms are introduced here.
CCG is a grammar formalism in which syntax and semantics go
hand in hand (for an introduction, see e.g. Steedman & Baldridge,
2011). It derives syntactic well-formedness, and implicitly also syn-
tactic structure, in tandem with symbolic meaning representations.
Furthermore, it is a lexicalist formalism that assumes only a small set
of derivation rules and, apart from these, encodes linguistic regular-
ity in the lexicon. Moreover, the formalism is relatively expressive
but still allows for efficient parsing (see Steedman, 2000, part III or
Steedman & Baldridge, 2011 for discussion). From a psycholinguis-
tic perspective, CCG is especially interesting because, in many cases,
it allows for strictly incremental, i.e. word-by-word, syntactic pars-
ing and semantic interpretation (for discussion see e.g. Altmann &
Steedman, 1988; Steedman, 2000; Demberg, 2012).
As in many other formalisms, lexical items have a syntactic cat-
egory and a semantic denotation in CCG. Syntactic categories may
be primitive (e.g. S or NP) or complex (e.g. S/NP). Complex cate-
gories encode potential combinations with other categories. For in-
stance, the category S/NP is looking to combine with an expression
of category NP to its right to yield a sentence, i.e. an expression of
category S. The category SnNP, where the slash points in the oppo-
site direction, is looking to combine with an NP to its left to form a
sentence. On the semantic side, expressions with category S/NP or
SnNP denote functors that apply to arguments denoted by expressions
of category NP. With the exception of a few unary type-shifting rules,
derivation rules combine two adjacent expressions to form an expres-
sion with new syntactic category and semantic denotation. Combi-
nators (i.e. lambda expression with no free variables) are used to
combine denotations. One example is the combinator B, which is
defined by B f ga := f (ga) and thus corresponds to the lambda-term
lx.ly.lz.x(yz). The combinator B is used in so-called function com-
position rules. The rules and combinators that are standardly used
in CCG are given below. In general, left-associative notation is used
in all rules and derivations, i.e. (xy)z is written as xyz. In the rules
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below, The symbols X, Y and Z denote variables over syntactic cate-
gories and f , g, a range over denotations.
There are two rules for functional application. In the first, the
functor precedes its argument. In the second, the argument precedes
the functor. They correspond to the above examples.
(2:46) Functional application rules
a. Forward functional application
X/Y : f Y : a )> X : f a
b. Backward functional application
Y : a XnY : f )< X : f a
The second type of rules implements function composition. It is
based on the combinator B. There are four basic composition rules,
which are shown in 2:47. Moreover, these four rules can be general-
ized as in 2:48.
(2:47) Composition rules
a. Forward harmonic composition
X/Y : f Y/Z : g )>B X/Z : lx. f (gx)
b. Backward harmonic composition
YnZ : g XnY : f )<B XnZ : lx. f (gx)
c. Forward crossing composition
X/Y : f YnZ : g )>B XnZ : lx. f (gx)
d. Backward crossing composition
Y/Z : g XnY : f )<B X/Z : lx. f (gx)
(2:48) Generalized composition rules
a. Generalized forward harmonic composition
X/Y : f Y/Z1/Z2 : g )>B2 X/Z1/Z2 : lx.ly. f (gxy)
b. Generalized backward harmonic composition
YnZ1nZ2 : g XnY : f )<B2 XnZ1nZ2 : lx.ly. f (gxy)
c. Generalized forward crossing composition
X/Y : f YnZ1nZ2 : g )>B2 XnZ1nZ2 : lx.ly. f (gxy)
d. Generalized backward crossing composition
Y/Z1/Z2 : g XnY : f )<B2 X/Z1/Z2 : lx.ly. f (gxy)
Finally, there is a forward and a backward type-raising rule. These
two rules make use of the combinator T, which is defined by Ta f :=
f a and corresponds to the lambda term lx.ly.yx
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(2:49) Type-raising rules
a. Forward type-raising
X : g )>T Y/(YnX) : l f . f g
b. Backward type-raising
Y : g )<T Yn(Y/X) : l f . f g
In Figure IX, an example CCG derivation is shown. The first line
of the derivation corresponds to lexical retrieval. Rule applications
are written horizontally instead of vertically. For example, applica-
tion of the rule in 2:49-a is written as:
X
g
>T
Y/(YnX)
l f . f (g)
Below, in chapters 5 and 6, a special type of lexical retrieval is
used. In particular, lexical items are decomposed into several seman-
tic building blocks that can independently interact with their local
environment. Moreover, rudimentary use of features is made to rule
out ungrammatical derivations. Specifically, features will be used to
encode that the comparative morpheme selects for a than-phrase. A
typical example of the usage of features is case marking. For example,
the category NPacc carries the accusative feature and SnNPnom/NPacc
would be the category of a transitive verb that selects for a nominative
subject and an accusative object.
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3
EASY SOLUT ION TO A HARD PROBLEM?
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEX ITY AND
PROCESS ING DIFF ICULTY OF QUANTIF IED
RECIPROCALS1
A first step towards cognitively plausible semantic theories would
be to establish a link between the truth conditions of a sentence and
how it is processed. Approaching this problem from an abstract point
of view, we may claim that a theory of cognition can only be realis-
tic if computations are bounded in computational complexity since
they have to be performed in real time by agents with limited pro-
cessing resources. Considerations about computational complexity
have guided theoretical work on a number of phenomena in cogni-
tive science, including, for instance, analogical reasoning (e.g. Veale
& Keane, 1997), Bayesian inference (e.g. Cooper, 1990), motion plan-
ning (e.g. Joseph & Plantings, 1985 or Reif, 1985), intentional commu-
nication (e.g. van Rooij et al., 2011) and parsing (e.g. Barton, Berwick,
& Ristad, 1987, Ristad, 1993 or Wareham, 1999). In line with this
type of considerations, Frixione proposed the following heuristic for
cognitive science:
[T]o build a theory of competence for a certain cognitive
task, a computationally tractable function modelling such
a task should be singled out. (Frixione, 2001, p.17)
The term computationally tractable function is used here to refer to
functions that can be computed in polynomial time by a deterministic
Turing machine (see Definition 2:17), a class of functions called P
(see Arora & Barak, 2009 and also section 2.4, Definition 2:21). Iris
van Rooij (2008) analyzed the proposal of Frixione and similar work
as embracing a two-part hypothesis. Firstly, there is the informal
tractable cognition hypothesis which states the following.
1 This chapter is a modified version of Schlotterbeck and Bott (2013). Parts of it were
also presented at the “Workshop on Logic and Cognition” at ESSLLI 2013, in Opole.
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Hypothesis 3:1 (Tractable cognition hypothesis, van Rooij, 2008). Hu-
man cognitive capacities are constrained by the fact that humans are finite
systems with limited resources for computation.
Secondly, the more specific P-cognition thesis (PCT) explicitly restricts
cognitive capacities to a precisely defined class of functions, namely
the just mentioned P.
Hypothesis 3:2 (P-cognition thesis, PCT, van Rooij, 2008). Human cog-
nitive capacities are polynomial-time computable.
Contrary to other areas of cognitive science – also including other
areas of linguistics – computational complexity has only recently be-
gun to receive attention in formal semantics. Notable examples in-
clude the work of Mostowski (1998), Mostowski and Szymanik (2007,
2012), and Szymanik (2009, 2010, 2016). In line with the classical idea
that the meaning of a sentence is characterized by its truth conditions,
these authors identify the meaning of a natural language sentence
with the class of its models, i.e. situations in which the sentence is
true. They investigated the computational complexity of the decision
problem whether a model belongs to this class or not.
What predictions for semantic processing follow from these con-
siderations? It is clear that, according to the strictest reading of
the PCT, deciding about the truth or falsity of computationally in-
tractable truth conditions should not be a possible cognitive function.
2 Alternatively, less strict variants of the PCT are conceivable as well
(see van Rooij, 2008, for an approach based on fixed parameter tractabil-
ity; see also section 3.3). These would basically predict that intractable
truth conditions can be evaluated as long as certain parameters of the
models stay within certain bounds.
In order to test these predictions, the present chapter investi-
gates the semantic interpretation of ambiguous sentences with one
intractable reading and tractable alternatives. In particular, the PCT
is applied to semantic processing by looking at a particularly inter-
esting test case that was originally discussed by Szymanik (2009). He
considered the interpretation of reciprocal sentences with generalized
quantifiers as antecedents. These sentences are of the form Det N V
each other, or a closely related one. What makes these sentences partic-
ularly interesting for the present purposes is the following. For some
quantificational Dets (e.g. the proportional most), the evaluation of
2Here, it is tacitly assumed that P 6= NP. Problems in P are called tractable. Problems
that are NP-hard are called intractable.
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one of their readings is NP-complete (see Definition 2:23) whereas
for others (e.g. all) all readings are known to be in P. Our experi-
ments tested whether the possible readings are limited to those which
are known to be in P (i.e. computationally tractable) as proposed by
Szymanik. In particular, it was investigated whether comprehenders
shift from a reading that is preferred under normal circumstances to
an otherwise dispreferred but computationally tractable one in order
to avoid having to deal with an intractable verification problem.
Beside the evaluation of truth conditions in a model, cognitively
plausible theories about semantic processing should encompass other
aspects of interpretation, too. These include the recognition of logical
relations – such as entailments or contradictions – between sentences
and also comprehension, which includes, for example, the deriva-
tion of a sentence’s the truth conditions from the meanings of its
parts. With regard to computational complexity, it is an open theo-
retical and empirical question how these different aspects are related
(see e.g. Kirousis & Kolaitis, 2001; Pratt-Hartmann, 2010, for related
theoretical investigations). Here, we focus on possible connections
between verification and comprehension. We assume that deriving
the truth conditions of a sentence is a prerequisite for its verification.
Therefore, comprehension has to be accounted for when we aim to
investigate the evaluation of truth conditions in detail.
In principle, comprehension could be unaffected by the compu-
tational tractability of the corresponding verification problem. This
would, however, lead to situations in which a comprehender may
face an intractable problem when relating the sentence to a concrete
state of affairs. It is plausible that the processing system is set up in
a way to avoid this kind of situation whenever possible. There are at
least two related avoidance strategies.
Hypothesis 3:3 (Avoidance Strategy A). The processor keeps track of par-
ticular instances of intractable sentences and, once they can be related to a
new instance of the same problem, tries to shift the meaning to a simpler
interpretation. Specifically, we may expect to see these shifts if a comprehen-
der encounters an ambiguity in which a tractable meaning exists besides an
intractable alternative.
Hypothesis 3:4 (Avoidance Strategy B). The internal language in which
sentence meaning is represented is restricted in such a way that intractable
meanings are excluded automatically.
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In the following, investigations of both, verification and compre-
hension are reported. Verification was studied in a sentence-picture
verification task experiment where participants had to decide whether
a sentence matches a graphically depicted model or not. Compre-
hension was studied in a picture completion experiment in which a
model had to be drawn for a given sentence.
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. The
next section provides the necessary theoretical background and dis-
cusses related empirical work. Section 3.4 presents a pretest estab-
lishing that the materials to be tested in the main experiments fulfill
certain semantic requirements. The picture completion experiment
which was conducted to elicit the preferred interpretation of quan-
tified reciprocal sentences with or without an intractable reading is
reported in section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents the picture verification
experiment that tested effects of computational complexity during
verification. In section 3.7, we conclude with a discussion of whether
the findings are compatible with the PCT and related hypotheses.
3.1 quantified reciprocals and the strongest
meaning hypothesis
The sentence in 3:5 exemplifies quantified reciprocals. Glossing over
syntactic details, they follow the schema Det A R each other, where
Det is a quantificational determiner, A denotes a unary relation (e.g.
a noun) and R stands for a binary relation (e.g. a transitive verb). In
constructions of this kind, we call Det the quantificational antecedent,
A the restriction and R the reciprocal relation.
(3:5) All dots are connected to each other.
As was analyzed thoroughly by Dalrymple, Kanazawa, Kim,
McHombo, and Peters (1998), a sentence like 3:6 may receive one of
several readings. Some of these are captured by the following logical
formulas. In 3:6-b, the formula f[x, y] is meant to expresses that x is
reachable from y, i.e. there is a path between them (see Ajtai & Fagin,
1990, for the details of this lengthy formula).
(3:6) a. 8x

dot x !

8y dot y ! (x 6= y ! connected xy) 
b. 8x

dot x !

8y dot y ! (x 6= y ! f[x, y]) 
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(a) graph reading (b) path reading (c) pair reading
Figure X. Possible models for the quantified reciprocal in example 3:5.
The vertices in the graphs represent elements of the restriction, A. The
edges represent the reciprocal relation, R. The graph in a is a model
of the formula in 3:6-a, b is a model of 3:6-b and c of 3:6-c.
c. 8x

dot x !

9y dot y! (x 6= y ! connected xy) 
The formula in 3:6-a states that any two members of the restriction
(dots) participate in the reciprocal relation (to be connected to). By con-
trast, 3:6-b states that any two members of the restriction are con-
nected by a path. In the present example, such a path would amount
to an indirect connection. Quantified reciprocals like the example 3:5
may also exhibit a third reading given in 3:6-c, which states that for
any member of the restriction there is some other member and both
participate in the reciprocal relation. We refer to the first reading,
3:6-a, as complete graph reading, the second, 3:6-b, as path reading and
the third, 3:6-c, as pair reading. Figure X shows possible models for
each of the formulas in 3:6.
As noted by Dalrymple et al., reciprocal expressions like each other
can be analyzed as generalized quantifiers (GQs) of type (1, 2) (see
section 2.2, Definition 2:1). Moreover, concerning quantified recipro-
cals, the truth conditions in 3:6 can be considered a special case of
the second order formulas in 3:7 (adopted from Szymanik, 2009 with
slight modification). If we assume that in these formulas Q stands for
the type (1, 1) quantifier corresponding to all, then 3:7-a–c would be
equivalent to 3:6-a–c, respectively.
(3:7) a. 9X  A
 
Qv Av,Xv
 ^  8x, y 2 X (x 6= y! Rxy) 
b. 9X  A
 
Qv Av,Xv
 ^  8x, y 2 X (x 6= y! f[x, y]) 
c. 9X  A
 
Qv Av,Xv
 ^  8x 2 X 9y 2 X (x 6= y ^ Rxy) 
Each of these formulas defines a GQ of type (1, 2) obtained from
Q via an operation called Ramseyfication (Hella, Va¨a¨na¨nen, & West-
50 easy solution to a hard problem?
ersta˚hl, 1997; Szymanik, 2009). They are equivalent to what Szymanik
(2009, p. 238) called
 
RamS(Q)

M(A,R), 
RamI(Q)

M(A,R) and 
RamW(Q)

M(A,R), respectively,
where RamS(Q), RamI(Q) and RamW(Q) are the mentioned type
(1, 2) quantifiers. The subscript S stands for strong; I stands for inter-
mediate and W stands for weak.
There are various approaches to reciprocals in general and quanti-
fied reciprocals specifically (among others: Langendoen, 1978; I. Heim,
Lasnik, & May, 1991; Sternefeld, 1998; Beck, 2001; Sabato & Winter,
2012). An advantage of some other approaches is that they derive
truth conditions compositionally, e.g. by means of logical machinery
that is independently motivated by the syntax and semantics of plu-
rals. Compositionality is, however, irrelevant for our present purpose
because we are mainly interested in the truth conditions of complete
sentences and how difficult they are to verify. There seems to be
general agreement that 3:8-a–c are possible readings of quantified re-
ciprocals.
The labels on RamS, RamI , RamW already indicate the logical
dependencies between these readings. In fact, if Q is upward en-
tailing (UE, see Definition 2:8), then the complete graph reading is
the logically strongest interpretation which implies all the others.
3 To account for interpretation preferences of sentences like these,
Dalrymple et al. have put forward the strongest meaning hypothesis
(SMH).
Hypothesis 3:9 (Strongest meaning hypothesis, SMH, Dalrymple et
al., 1998). Quantified reciprocals receive the logically strongest interpreta-
tion consistent with the reciprocal relation and relevant background informa-
tion.
For example, the SMH captures the intuition that the complete graph
reading is the preferred reading of the example 3:5, above. Moreover,
it also captures the difference in interpretation between the following
two sentences.
3More precisely, this is the case if there are at least two elements in the quantifi-
cational restriction. Dalrymple et al. stated this condition explicitly in their truth
conditions. With UE quantifiers, this is, however, often irrelevant, because the quan-
tificational antecedent requires a restriction of at least two elements – either because
of its semantics or on pragmatic grounds.
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(3:10) a. All the students knew each other.
b. All the students followed each other into the room.
The preferred interpretation of 3:10-a is the complete graph read-
ing, whereas 3:10-b receives a path interpretation. The SMH is not
undisputed, however. Kerem, Friedmann, and Winter (2011) have
presented empirical evidence that it does not hold in general. Instead,
they argued, comprehenders will choose the most typical interpreta-
tion. This is stated in their Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (yet another
related hypothesis is due to Sabato & Winter, 2012).
3.2 computational complexity of quantified
reciprocals
Szymanik (2009, 2010, 2016) studied the computational complexity of
the decision problem (see sections 2.3 and 2.4) whether the truth con-
ditions of quantified reciprocals are satisfied in finite models. Each
of the possible readings (e.g. complete graph, path and pair read-
ings) corresponds to a different decision problem. The input to the
computational problem is some relational structure and the output
is the decision whether it satisfies the truth conditions or not. Some
of Szymanik’s results, which are relevant below, are briefly discussed
here. One is that path and pair readings of quantified reciprocals
with tractable quantifiers as antecedents are tractable. For these cases,
Szymanik sketches simple polynomial time algorithms.
Proposition 3:11. Let Q be an UE quantifier of type (1, 1). If the decision
problem associated with Q is in P, then RamW(Q) and RamI(Q) are in P.
With regard to complete graph readings, the quantificational an-
tecedent determines computational complexity. The complete graph
reading of quantified reciprocals like 3:5 with all as antecedent can be
decided in polynomial time.
Proposition 3:12. RamS(All) is in P.
The same holds for the quantificational antecedents more than one,
more than two, more than three, etc. The complete graph reading of
these reciprocals can be expressed in first order logic, as is also the
case for reciprocals with all as antecedent (cf. 3:6-a). This implies
polynomial time computability (e.g. Immerman, 1999). However, as
Szymanik noticed, positing a different quantifier for each numeral
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may not be cognitively realistic. It seems more plausible to assume
one common semantic mechanism that computes the meanings and
truth values for every more than k instead of distinct mechanisms for
distinct k. To illustrate, it would be highly implausible that compre-
henders would still have to learn the meaning of more than 100 after
they already had learned the meaning of more than 99 and of the nu-
meral 100. To model this we introduce the counting quantifier CN :
Definition 3:13. CN := f(M,R1,R2) : jR1 \ R2j  jNjg.
As it turns out, verification of the complete graph reading is NP-
complete if we consider a single semantic process that computes the
decision problem for all possible k. This is a consequence of the fact
that RamS(CN) is essentially a reformulation of the CLIQUE problem
(see Definition 2:24 or Garey & Johnson, 1979 problem GT19).
Proposition 3:14. RamS(CN) is NP-complete.
Furthermore, for reciprocals with proportional quantifiers like most
(cf. Example 2:2, section 2.2 ), verification of the strongest meaning
is also NP-complete. To proof this proposition, Szymanik describes
a polynomial-time reduction of CLIQUE to RamS(Most) and other
proportional quantifiers. Therefore, an effective solution would also
imply an effective solution for the CLIQUE problem.
Proposition 3:15. RamS(Most) is NP-complete.
Szymanik noted that the SMH and the PCT stand in conflict. While
the SMH predicts a general preference for complete graph readings
in case the quantificational antecedent is UE, the PCT predicts that
complete graph readings should not be possible for reciprocals with
proportional or counting quantifiers as their antecedents. Thus, com-
bining the SMH and the PCT yields specific predictions about the in-
terpretation of quantified reciprocals. Similar predictions could also
be derived by combining the Maximal Typicality Hypothesis with the
PCT. We can think of computational complexity as a filter acting on
the possible meanings of reciprocal sentences: As long as all readings
are computationally tractable, the logically strongest (or most typical)
reading should be preferred. However, if the logically strongest (or
most typical) reading is intractable, we should observe a shift towards
tractable interpretations.
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3.3 related work
The PCT (Hypothesis 3:2) is an interesting claim because it severely re-
stricts theories in cognitive science. Although it seems plausible that
intractable problems cannot be mastered by cognitive agents with
limited processing resources, matters may be more complicated. For
example, a less strict variant of the Tractable Cognition Thesis was
put forward by van Rooij (2008). This hypothesis is based on fixed
parameter tractability. Fixed parameter tractable FPT problems are
tractable as long as certain aspects, called parameters, of the problem
instances are fixed. An intractable problem may well be FPT. Intu-
itively speaking, this is the case when the complexity of the problem
only stems from specific aspects of the input. The FPT-Cognition hy-
pothesis states that even functions that are intractable may be realistic
cognitive functions as long as (i) certain parameters of the input can
be identified that are responsible for the intractability and (ii) these
usually stay within certain bounds.
3.3.1 Theoretical work on computational complexity in semantics
As stated in the introduction to the present chapter, computational
complexity has not received much attention in semantics thus far.
However, it has started to attract some attention lately. A recent
review of this line of research was given by Isaac, Szymanik, and
Verbrugge (2014, Section 4). We will shortly discuss some of the rele-
vant work here. Besides quantified reciprocals, Szymanik (2009, 2010,
2016) also investigated the computational complexity of other kinds
of quantified sentences. In a nutshell, the results of Szymanik’s the-
oretical work in this area can be summarized as follows (see also
Mostowski, 1998; Sevenster, 2006; Mostowski & Szymanik, 2007; Kon-
tinen & Szymanik, 2008; Szymanik & Zajenkowski, 2010). Usually,
the assumed meanings of natural language sentences with quantifiers
are computationally tractable, but there are also a few intractable ex-
ceptions. Another example of intractable meanings, in addition to
reciprocals, are so-called Hintikka sentences.
Besides the verification of quantifiers, two other areas of semantic
competence have also been analyzed in terms of computational com-
plexity. In both cases, the analysis has identified intractable problems
that arise directly from standard assumptions in semantic theory. The
first is anaphora resolution. Ristad (1993) has shown that, under stan-
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dard linguistic assumptions, the computational problem of determin-
ing antecedents for anaphora, what he calls the ‘anaphora problem’,
is NP-complete. Examples he discusses include sentences like Mary
said John saw himself and John hates his neighbors and so does Max. Sen-
tences of the latter kind turn out to introduce considerable complexity
because of the contained ellipses. The second area is the satisfiablil-
ity problem for different fragments of English (e.g. Pratt-Hartmann,
2004; Pratt-Hartmann & Third, 2006; Pratt-Hartmann, 2008). This
problem is also closely related to the computation of entailments.
Pratt-Hartmann (2004) has shown that, assuming simplified versions
of Montague grammar, determining satisfiability of a set of sentences
easily becomes intractable. For example, we run into intractable prob-
lems if we enrich the traditional syllogistic fragment with relative
clauses. For the latter fragment – which allows sentences like ev-
ery philosopher who is not a stoic is a cynic – the decision problem is
NP-complete. The approach of Pratt-Hartmann (2004) has been ex-
tended to more fragments of English by Pratt-Hartmann and Third
(2006) and Pratt-Hartmann (2008). An overview can be found in Pratt-
Hartmann (2010, Section 4).
The limited amount of existing theoretical work on computational
complexity in semantics suffices to show that under common seman-
tic assumptions several seemingly innocuous aspects of semantic com-
petence involve computationally intractable problems. Under the
PCT, this would, however, be unexpected. If intractable problems
do indeed occur in semantic processing, it would pose a theoretical
and empirical challenge to understand how people achieve solving
these problems within reasonable time. One way of approaching this
challenge would be in terms of the above-mentioned FPT-Cognition
Hypothesis. In particular, we would have to look for aspects of the
computational problems that have to be size-bounded in order for
the processor to succeed within reasonable time. Another interest-
ing perspective on this issue was proposed by Mostowski and Szy-
manik (2012). They argue on the basis of theoretical considerations
that “everyday language” is restricted to meanings that can be ex-
pressed in the existential fragment of second-order logic, i.e. S11.
Since verification of S11-sentences coincides with the problems in NP
(Immerman, 1999), their thesis provides us – just like the PCT and
the FPT-Cognition Hypothesis – with an upper bound on the com-
putational complexity of meanings in everyday language. Similar
to the FPT-Cognition Hypothesis, the S11-thesis constitutes a relax-
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ation of the PCT and would, in principle, allow for ‘intractable’ prob-
lems. To explain how people deal with these problems, Mostowski
and Szymanik (2012) suggest that the most difficult verification prob-
lems within everyday language are verified indirectly by means of
strategies that may involve inference from known facts or guessing
strategies. To conclude our discussion of theoretical work on compu-
tational complexity in semantics, we want to mention one interesting
application of the S11-thesis. Kontinen and Szymanik provide a theo-
rem which renders it implausible that a type-lifted, collective reading
of most is definable in S11 because, otherwise, the counting hierarchy
would collapse at its second level. As (Szymanik, 2009, Section 5.5)
pointed out, the S11-thesis would, therefore, predict that this reading
is impossible.
3.3.2 Empirical work on computational complexity in semantics
Empirical work on computational complexity in semantics is still
scarce. Building upon the analysis of Pratt-Hartmann and Third
(2006), Thorne (2012) has found initial but, as he notes himself, still
inconclusive evidence that computational complexity is negatively
correlated with how often sentences of certain types occur in a text
corpus. He used automatic deep semantic annotation in order to map
natural language sentences to different language fragments which
differed in the computational complexity of the corresponding satis-
fiability problem. Moreover, evidence that points in the same direc-
tion was reported by Szymanik and Thorne (2015), who correlated
the frequency of occurrence of quantified sentences with the com-
putational complexity of the corresponding verification (or model-
checking) problem.
A similar case as quantified reciprocals has been investigated by
Gierasimczuk and Szymanik (2009). In particular, they studied the
semantics of Hintikka sentences like the one in 3:16. Just like quan-
tified reciprocals, these sentences have multiple potential readings of
different logical strength. Furthermore, and also similar to the case
of quantified reciprocals, it has been proposed in the semantic litera-
ture that the strongest reading of these sentences is the preferred one.
Hintikka (1973) even claimed that this is their only possible reading.
Again, the strongest reading corresponds to an NP-complete verifica-
tion problem.
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(3:16) More than 3 villagers and more than 5 townsmen hate each
other
In line with the PCT, Gierasimczuk and Szymanik predicted that the
strongest reading of Hintikka sentences is avoided due to its compu-
tational intractability. They used a sentence-picture verification and
an inference task experiment to test whether Hintikka sentences al-
low for weaker readings than the strongest NP-complete one. Their
findings indicate that this is in fact the case. They are thus in conflict
with Hintikka’s original hypothesis, but in accordance with the PCT.
What serves as the reference study for the following experiments
is a first empirical study on the computational complexity of quan-
tified reciprocals. In that study, Bott, Schlotterbeck, and Szymanik
(2011) attempted to test the predictions from Szymanik (2009) ex-
perimentally. Their first experiment employed a picture completion
task where participants had to construct situations that satisfied the
preferred reading of German quantified reciprocals like Det Punkte
sind miteinander verbunden (‘Det dots are connected with each other’).
They tested the quantifiers alle (‘all’), vier (‘four’) and die meisten
(‘most’). They expected that, due to computational complexity, the
choice of the quantificational antecedent should affect the preference
for complete graph vs. path and pair readings. Reciprocals with all
should receive a complete graph reading, but reciprocals with most
and four should receive a path or pair reading. In contrast to what
would be expected according to the SMH, participants overwhelm-
ingly drew pictures not satisfying a complete graph reading. In the
all condition, complete graph and path/pair interpretations were bal-
anced. For the quantifiers most and four, path readings were strongly
preferred, but complete graphs were hardly produced. Thus, the PCT
received initial support. The second experiment employed a sentence-
picture verification task in order to find out whether complete graph
readings of intractable cardinal and proportional reciprocals were
judged as impossible. Contrary to the expectations of Bott, Schlotter-
beck, and Szymanik, complete graph readings were overwhelmingly
rejected for all three types of quantifiers and there were no differences
between them. At first glance, this lack of effect seems to contradict
the PCT.
However, there are two potential problems with the study. Firstly,
we cannot exclude the possibility of a floor effect covering potential
differences because the complete graph readings were hardly avail-
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able. Secondly, it is possible that the results were skewed towards
general acceptance of path pictures and rejection of graph pictures be-
cause of the logical properties of the reciprocal relation to be connected
to: it could have been interpreted as a transitive relation. As pointed
out by Dalrymple et al. (1998), in reciprocals with a transitive relation
the complete graph reading cannot be distinguished from the path
reading. If this was the case in the study of Bott, Schlotterbeck, and
Szymanik, nothing can be concluded from their picture verification
results. To avoid these problems, a different – clearly intransitive – re-
ciprocal relation was used in the present study. Next, we come to the
empirical part of the present chapter which starts with a pretest that
addressed the question whether to be connected really is interpreted
transitively and compared it to another relation that seems clearly
intransitive, intuitively.
3.4 pretest : the reciprocal relation
Example 3:10 (repeated below as 3:17) shows that the reciprocal re-
lation (e.g. to follow into the room or to know) imposes important con-
straints on the available readings of reciprocal sentences. The predi-
cate to follow into the room can only denote asymmetric relations; i.e.,
if a follows b into the room, b cannot follow a. The predicate to know,
on the other hand, can also denote symmetric relations. Lexical re-
strictions like these can be encoded as meaning postulates (Carnap,
1952; Montague, 1973). In contrast to know, the lexical meaning of
follow into the room is incompatible with the complete graph reading
of quantified reciprocals.
(3:17) a. All students followed each other into the room.
b. All students know each other.
Another important property is transitivity. The predicate to follow into
the room arguably denotes transitive relations; i.e., if a follows b into
the room and b follows c into the room, then a does also follow c into
the room. In case the reciprocal relation is transitive, models contain-
ing a path of the relevant size are always compatible with both the
path and the complete graph reading of quantified reciprocals. Take,
for example, the picture in Figure Xb. If we assume that the (partly)
depicted relation is transitive, this picture is compatible with the path
as well as the complete graph reading of quantified reciprocals. For
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Figure XI. Diagram used to test for (in)transitivity of the relations
denoted by to be connected to and to be directly connected to.
our test case, it is thus crucial to choose a relation that is not biased
towards a transitive (or asymmetric) relation.
3.4.1 Methods
In a pretest, two candidate relations were compared. These were
to be connected and to be directly connected. The goal was to find a
relation that is interpreted intransitively. The pretest was a sentence-
picture verification experiment with non-quantificational reciprocal
sentences. The picture in Figure XI together with one of the sen-
tences in 3:18 was presented to 80 native German speakers recruited
at the University of Tu¨bingen. Each of them provided only one truth
value judgment. This way, it was ensured that the data were unbiased
because there was no earlier exposure to another condition. Each sen-
tence was tested in a subgroup of 20 participants. The test was carried
out using paper and pencil.
(3:18) a. A
A
und
and
D
D
sind
are
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘A and D are connected to each other.’
b. A
A
und
and
D
D
sind
are
nicht
not
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘A and D are not connected to each other.’
c. A
A
und
and
D
D
sind
are
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘A and D are directly connected with each other.’
d. A
A
und
and
D
D
sind
are
nicht
not
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘A and D are not directly connected with each other.’
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The proportion of yes, true judgments in reaction to sentence 3:18-a
were taken as an estimate of how easily to be connected can be inter-
preted transitively. By contrast, judgments of the negated sentence in
3:18-b were informative about how easily the relation to be connected
can be understood intransitively. The same holds with regard to to be
directly connected: 3:18-c probed for the transitive interpretation and
3:18-d for the intransitive interpretation. In order to decide whether
the transitive or intransitive interpretations are possible, it was statis-
tically analyzed whether an observed level of acceptance significantly
differed from complete rejection, i.e. null acceptance. One trial in
both of the conditions in 3:18-b and 3:18-c was excluded from the
statistical analysis because no judgment had been given.
3.4.2 Results and discussion
Judgments were distributed as follows: 3:18-a was accepted in 80% of
the cases, 3:18-b was accepted in 42%, 3:18-c in 11% and 3:18-d in 80%
of the cases. Fisher’s exact test revealed that the proportions of yes,
true judgments in the conditions 3:18-a, 3:18-b and 3:18-d were signif-
icantly different from 0% (p < .01, in all cases), whereas condition
3:18-c didn’t differ significantly from 0% (p = .487). With respect to
to be connected to the results show that the relation is in fact ambigu-
ous. There was a preference for the transitive reading as indicated by
the higher proportion of yes, true judgments of sentence 3:18-a than
3:18-b. This shows that the objections raised in connection with the
study by Bott, Schlotterbeck, and Szymanik (2011) were well taken
and to be connected to can indeed be interpreted transitively. Regard-
ing to be directly connected to, there is a strong preference to interpret
this relation intransitively as indicated by general rejection of 3:18-c.
Furthermore, it seems to be clearly symmetric on intuitive grounds:
if a is directly connected to b, b certainly is to a. Therefore, this re-
lation fulfills all semantic requirements to be used in the two main
experiments.
3.5 experiment 1 : picture completion
In order to investigate whether the computational complexity of sen-
tence verification affects comprehension processes, interpretation pref-
erences were surveyed in a picture completion experiment. Partici-
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pants were asked to draw connections between dots in a picture in
such a way that the picture matched their preferred interpretation.
As outlined above, the complete graph readings of the following sen-
tences differ in computational complexity.
(3:19) a. All of the dots are directly connected to each other.
b. Four of the dots are directly connected to each other.
c. Most of the dots are directly connected to each other.
The complete graph reading of the reciprocal with all is computation-
ally tractable whereas it is intractable for the other two quantifica-
tional antecedents. Under the above-mentioned assumption that in-
tractable meanings are generally avoided by the comprehension sys-
tem (Avoidance Strategies A and B, Hypotheses 3:3 and 3:4), the PCT
and the SMH make conflicting predictions. The SMH predicts that
complete graph readings are generally preferred whereas the PCT
amended with Avoidance Strategy A or B only allows for complete
graph readings if they are computationally tractable. How to apply
the maximal typicality hypothesis of Kerem et al. (2011) to these cases
is not obvious because it is unclear what the most typical scenario
for to be directly connected to looks like. Probably, the different read-
ings do not differ in typicality and should hence be equally likely.
Again, computational complexity could act as a filter on the possible
interpretations.
3.5.1 Methods
3.5.1.1 Materials, Procedure and Participants
Twenty-two native German speakers (mean age 22.2 years; 13 female)
participated in the experiment for course credit in a third semester
syntax class. Participants were naı¨ve to the purpose of the study. The
test was conducted using paper and pencil. Participants received a
series of sentences, each paired with a picture of yet unconnected
dots. Their task was to connect the dots in a way that the resulting
picture matched their interpretation of the sentence. The following
German sentences were used.
(3:20) a. Alle
All
Punkte
dots
sind
are
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘All dots are directly connected with each other.
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b. Vier Punkte sind direkt miteinander verbunden.
Four dots are directly with-one-other connected.
‘Four dots are directly connected with each other.’
c. Die
The
meisten
most
Punkte
dots
sind
are
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘Most dots are directly connected with each other.’
Sentences with alle (‘all’) were always paired with a picture contain-
ing four dots, whereas vier (‘four’) and die meisten (‘most’) had pic-
tures with seven dots. There were fifteen experimental trials, five
per condition, which differed with respect to the arrangement of the
dots. In addition, 48 filler sentences were included. These were of
two types. Half of them clearly required a complete graph (e.g. only
one dot is not directly connected to all of the other dots). The other half
was only consistent with a path (e.g. six dots are connected to each other
and form the letter S). Four pseudo-randomized lists were constructed,
in which two adjacent items were always separated by at least two
fillers and each condition was as often preceded by a complete graph
filler as it was by a path filler. This was done to prevent biases to-
wards either complete graph or path interpretations. Two of the four
lists were inverted versions of the other two lists. This way, effects of
presentation order were controlled for.
The completed pictures were annotated with respect to the cho-
sen interpretation. We classified a picture to represent a complete
graph reading if it satisfied the truth conditions in 3:7-a. Pictures
were taken to indicate a path reading if a sufficiently large subgraph
was connected by a continuous path (3:7-b), but there was no com-
plete graph connecting the nodes. Finally, it was taken to indicate
a pair reading if the required number of nodes were interconnected
(3:7-c), but there was no path connecting them all. One participant
did only return 14 out of the 15 experimental trials because one page
of the questionnaire was missing. Thus, 329 productions were ana-
lyzed in total.
3.5.1.2 Predictions
According to the SMH complete graph readings are generally pre-
ferred for reciprocals with UE quantificational antecedents. Thus, it
predicts high proportions of complete graph readings across the three
tested quantifiers (granted that four has an UE interpretation, namely
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as four or more). The PCT in combination with one of the above-
mentioned avoidance strategies predicts that complete graph read-
ings are dispreferred if they are computationally intractable. Thus,
reciprocals with four or most as antecedent should receive a low pro-
portions of complete graph interpretations. As far as these hypothe-
ses are compatible, there combined prediction would be that the all
condition overwhelmingly receives complete graph interpretations
whereas the conditions with four or most receive a path or a pair read-
ing in the majority of the cases.
3.5.1.3 Statistical Analysis
In order to test the predictions logit mixed effects models were com-
puted (see Ja¨ger, 2008 for a plea to use this kind of model to analyze
categorical data and Gelman & Hill, 2007 for an introduction). The
model included the factor quantificational antecedent (levels: all, four
and most) as fixed effect and by-participant random intercepts and
random slopes (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013 Bates, Kliegl,
Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015 for discussion of random effect structures).
Random effects of items were not included because participants al-
ways received the same sentence within each condition, the only thing
that varied were the dot pictures. The models were computed using
the lme4 package (Bates, Ma¨chler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) of the R
software (R Core Team, 2016). As test statistic, Wald’s Z, provided
by lme4 package, was used. Dummy coding was used in order to
compare factor levels all and most to four, which served as reference
level.
3.5.2 Results
Overall, complete graphs (57.3%) and paths (41.8%) were produced
rather frequently whereas pairs were only produced two times, both
in the most-condition (0.6%). The proportions of complete graphs
in each of the three conditions are provided in Table XII. In the all-
condition, participants chose complete graph readings 74.6% of the
time. By contrast, in the four-condition, there were only 53.6% com-
plete graphs. The number of complete graphs was even lower in the
most-condition with only 44.0%.
The estimated parameters for the fixed effects are presented in
Table XII. The logit mixed effects model analysis revealed that all
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Table XII
Descriptive and inferential statistics of Exp. 1.
(a) proportions of complete
graphs
proportion
all .746
four .536
most .440
(b) parameters of the logit mixed effects model
estimate Z p
(intercept) 0.08 0.09 .928
all vs. four 2.53 4.03 < .001
most vs. four  0.72  1.20 .230
led to a significantly higher proportion of complete graphs than four
as reflected by the significant fixed-effect of all. However, the 9.4%
difference between most and four was not significant.
3.5.3 Discussion
The preference for complete graph readings in the all-condition is in
line with the SMH. Furthermore, the lower proportions of complete
graph readings for most and four than for all reciprocals matched the
predictions of the PCT. The complete graph interpretations of both
most and four reciprocals constitute intractable meanings and – in
line with our considerations in the introduction to the present chap-
ter – should hence be avoided. This result is particularly interesting
because the experiment did not involve solving an intractable veri-
fication problem, but instead focused on comprehension processes.
Constructing a complete graph is not intractable even for most and
four reciprocals since any large enough subset of vertices could be
randomly chosen.4 The observed effect can thus be taken as an indi-
cation that the comprehension system in fact tries to avoid intractable
meanings.
In the introduction of this chapter, we sketched two alternative
scenarios in order to explain how avoidance of intractable meanings
can be achieved. According to Avoidance Strategy B (Hypothesis 3:3),
intractable complete graph readings should never occur. This is be-
cause the comprehension system is assumed to be restricted in a way
that it cannot represent intractable natural language meanings. The
data do not fit this theoretical option. For intractable antecedents, we
observed complete graphs in approximately half of the cases. The
data are, however, fully consistent with Avoidance Strategy A (Hy-
4We would like to thank Iris van Rooij for pointing this out.
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pothesis 3:4). There, we assumed that the comprehension system
would avoid intractable meanings on the basis of prior experience. It
is, therefore, fully expected that intractable meanings occur in some
of the trials, in case comprehenders fail to identify the computational
intractability of a meaning.
3.6 experiment 2 : sentence-picture verification
The second experiment tested verification of quantified reciprocals
which were presented together with pictures that disambiguated com-
plete graph from path readings. To achieve clear disambiguation,
different quantificational antecedents had to be used than in the pre-
vious experiment. This is because the quantifiers tested in the previ-
ous experiment were all UE and, therefore, complete graphs are also
compatible with a path reading. In the present experiment, we used
reciprocals with all but one and exactly k, as in 3:21. All but one and ex-
actly k are clearly non-monotone (see Definition 2:8), and hence none
of the readings entails the others (see Dalrymple et al., 1998, p. 206,
proposition 4).
(3:21) a. Alle
All
Punkte
dots
bis
up
auf
to
einen
one
sind
are
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘All but one dots are directly connected to each other.’
b. Genau
Exactly
drei/fu¨nf
three/five
Punkte
dots
sind
are
direkt
directly
miteinander
with-one-other
verbunden.
connected.
‘Exactly three/five dots are directly connected to each other.’
In order to capture the possible meanings of quantified reciprocals
with non-monotone quantificational antecedents, we have to use dif-
ferent formulas than in 3:7 above (section 3.1). Otherwise, complete
graph readings would still entail path readings, which is what we
want to avoid because it does not correspond to the intuitive interpre-
tations of these sentences. Szymanik (2010) restricted the operators
RamS, RamI and RamW to upward entailing quantifiers. Dalrymple
et al. (1998) suggested a somewhat involved uniform treatment for all
type (1, 1) quantifiers that can be used regardless of their monotonic-
ity. For the present purpose, it is, however, sufficient to formalize
the relevant readings as follows. The path readings of all-but-one and
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exactly-k reciprocals are formalized as in 3:22-a and 3:22-b, respec-
tively. The complete graph readings are formalized analogously, as
in 3:22-c and 3:22-d. The result is truth-conditionally equivalent to
the suggestion of Dalrymple et al.
(3:22) a. RamI(AtLeastAllButOne) ^ :RamI(All)
b. RamI(CN) ^ :RamI(CM)
c. RamS(AtLeastAllButOne) ^ :RamS(All)
d. RamS(CN) ^ :RamS(CM)
The quantifier AtLeastAllButOne is defined as fM : 1  jA n Bjg.
The sets N and M in 3:22-b and 3:22-c are meant to be such that
jMj = jNj + 1. Conjunction and negation of GQs are defined as
usual (e.g. Szymanik, 2016, p. 30).
The complexity results of Szymanik (2010) do not apply directly
to the conjunctions in 3:22. Note, however, that these are tractable
if their conjuncts or the negations thereof are (cf. Immerman, 1999).
In combination with Szymanik’s results, this implies that 3:22-a–c are
tractable.
Proposition 3:23. The decision problem associated with the GQs in 3:22-a–c
are in P
Crucially, although intuitively more complex than simple all, the com-
plete graph reading of all-but-one reciprocals is also in P. A brute force
algorithm requires approximately n-times as many steps as an algo-
rithm to verify all reciprocals. In order to verify a model of cardinality
n, at most the n subsets of cardinality n  1 have to be considered.
By contrast, the complete graph reading of exactly-k reciprocals
is intractable since it is equivalent to the MAXCLIQUE problem (see
e.g. Garey & Johnson, 1979, p. 164 or Definition 2:25, in section 2.4)
which is NP-hard (see proposition 2:26). This problem consists in
deciding whether the maximum complete subgraph in a graph is of
size k. In particular, exactly-k reciprocals are intractable because k is
not a constant, but a variable (see Section 3.3 and Szymanik, 2010, for
discussion). In the present experiment all-but-one was kept constant
and exactly k was presented as exactly three and exactly five.
Proposition 3:24. Let N and M be two finite sets such that jMj = jNj+ 1.
RamS(CN) ^ :RamS(CM) is NP -hard.
We assume that a quantifier like all but one is represented as an
atomic lexical item, i.e. as an idiom, and is thus different from exactly
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Figure XIII. Absolute frequencies of German all but k and exactly k in a
Google search. Note: values were log-transformed with a base of 10.
three and exactly five which are instances of exactly k with a compo-
sitionally derived meaning. Since this assumption is crucial for the
present experiment, it was qualified by a small corpus study in which
the absolute frequencies of strings of the form alle bis auf k (‘all but k’)
and genau k (‘exactly k’) were googled. The search covered the follow-
ing values of k: 1 to 20 in steps of 1, 20 to 100 in steps of 10 and
100 to 1000 in steps of 100. The results are shown in Figure XIII. In
line with our assumptions, there were hardly any instances of all but
k for k  13 (51 hits in total), whereas exactly k had more than 480, 000
instances for numbers between 13 and 1000. The two types of quan-
tifiers in 3:21-a and 3:21-b thus are, in fact, fairly different from each
other. Exactly k is compatible with variable k, but all but k seems to
be limited to a small set of constants. To assume that all but one is
an idiomatic expression may be an overstatement. However, it seems
reasonable to assume that, in contrast to exactly k, no single mecha-
nism that computes the meanings and truth-values of all the different
all but k is readily available.
The sentences in 3:21 were paired with diagrams disambiguating
towards the complete graph or the path reading. Sample diagrams
are shown in Figure XIVa/e and XIVb/f, respectively. As for com-
plete graph pictures, the PCT let us expect lower acceptance of 3:21-b
than of 3:21-a. On the strictest interpretation of the PCT, we may
even expect null acceptance of complete graphs given 3:21-b. In or-
der to be able to find out whether the complete graph readings of
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n = 4
(a) complete
subgraph
(b) continuous
path
(c) false baseline
for complete
subgraphs
(d) false baseline
for continuous
paths
n = 6
(e) complete
subgraph
(f) continuous
path
(g) false baseline
for complete
subgraphs
(h) false baseline
for continuous
paths
Figure XIV. Sample diagrams presented in the picture verification ex-
periment. The upper row presents graphs and paths with four dots.
Graphs and paths with six dots are shown in the bottom row.
3:21-b are possible at all, the sentences in 3:21 were also paired with
false diagrams which served as baseline controls (see Figure XIVc/g).
The controls differed minimally from the complete graph pictures in
that a single line was removed from the completely connected sub-
set. If the complete graph reading is possible, we should observe
more yes, true judgments in the complete graph conditions than in
the false controls. The true and false path diagrams (e.g. XIVb/f and
XIVd/h, respectively) were included to control whether participants
did understand the quantificational antecedents.
Additionally, the size of the models was manipulated. It is con-
ceivable that people can verify intractable complete graph readings
given small graphs, but fail to do so for larger ones due to compu-
tational complexity. Therefore, besides having the two quantifiers all
but one and exactly k, another manipulation consisted in the size of the
graphs, i.e. the number of vertices. Small graphs always contained
four dots (see Figure XIVa-d) whereas large graphs contained six dots
(see Figure XIVe-h). This way, it was possible to keep the quantifier
all but one constant and compare it to exactly k with variable k. Exactly
k was instantiated as exactly three and exactly five, respectively. In to-
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tal, this yielded 16 conditions according to a 2 (quantifier)  4 (picture
type)  2 (graph size) factorial design.
3.6.1 Methods
3.6.1.1 Materials, participants and procedure
Nine experimental items in 16 conditions like the sample item in 3:21
and Figure XIV were constructed. A Latin square was used to make
sure that each picture only appeared once for each participant, but
that the same picture appeared with both quantifier types. 5 Each par-
ticipant provided three judgments per condition resulting in a total of
48 experimental trials. Sixty-Six filler trials were added to the experi-
ment and, for each participant, trials were individually randomized.
Thirty-four native German speakers (mean age: 27.5y, 20 female)
read quantified reciprocal sentences on a computer screen. After read-
ing the sentence, they had to press a button which made the sentence
disappear and a dot picture appear for which they had to provide a
truth-value judgment.
3.6.1.2 Predictions
Under the strictest reading of the PCT and likewise under Avoidance
Strategy B (Hypothesis 3:4), complete graph interpretations of recip-
rocals with exactly k should not be possible. In contrast, all-but-one
reciprocals should allow for complete graph interpretations if our as-
sumptions concerning their meaning are correct. In combination, this
predicts that acceptance of complete graph diagrams (e.g. panels a
and e of Figure XIV) and their respective false controls (e.g. panels
c and g, respectively) do not differ in conditions with exactly-k re-
ciprocals, but that there is a clear difference within conditions with
all-but-one reciprocals. Path interpretations are always tractable and
therefore participants are expected to be able to distinguish correct
path diagrams from their corresponding false controls (e.g. panels
5 The experiment included eight more conditions. These were reciprocal sentences
with the antecedent most. Originally, it was expected that most would trigger the
scalar implicature not all, which would have allowed us to compare it to all but one
and exactly k. The results indicated that this was not the case, or rather, that the
implicature could easily be canceled. In the false graph condition with four dots, for
instance, more than 60% acceptance was observed, making it impossible to properly
analyze most-reciprocals. Therefore, these conditions are not reported here. For
future research, it would be interesting to test non-monotone quantifiers of the type
most but not all or exactly half which would obviously constitute excellent test cases
for the PCT.
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panels b and f vs. panels d and h, respectively), regardless of the
quantificational antecedent. This is expected to lead to higher accep-
tance of the former as compared to the latter type of pictures.
If we assume, in line with Avoidance Strategy A (Hypothesis
3:3), that intractable interpretations are not ruled out in general, but
lead to substantial difficulty during verification, a more graded pat-
tern of results is expected. In particular, the acceptance of complete
graph pictures in conditions with exactly-k reciprocals is expected to
be higher than the acceptance of the false baseline controls. In ad-
dition, participants are, however, also expected to give a substantial
amount of erroneous responses when evaluating exactly-k reciprocals
against complete graph diagrams. In conditions with all-but-one re-
ciprocals, the proportions of erroneous responses is expected to be
comparatively low. This predicts a two-way interaction of the factors
picture type (true vs. false) and quantifier if we restrict ourselves to the
complete graph conditions, i.e. conditions with diagrams as shown
in panels a/c and e/g of Figure XIV. Within the continuous path
conditions (e.g. panels b/d and f/h), no such interaction is expected.
Under Avoidance Strategy A, where intractable interpretations are
not ruled out in general, the number of dots in the pictures may also
affect experimental results. Specifically, we may observe little or no
difference between the two quantificational antecedents in conditions
with only four dots but find results that clearly reflect the just de-
scribed interaction in conditions with six dots. Together, this would
lead to a significant three-way interaction between the factors quanti-
fier, picture type and graph size within the complete graph conditions
whereas the quantifier is not expected to have any effect within the
continuous path conditions.
3.6.1.3 Statistical analysis
The path and complete graph conditions were analyzed separately,
performing logit mixed effects model analyses on proportions of ac-
ceptance. The fixed effects of quantifier (levels: all but one and ex-
actly k), graph size (levels: four and six) and truth (levels: true and
false) and their interactions were included in the models as well as by-
participant random intercepts and random slopes. Random effects of
items were not included because, as in Experiment 1, the experimen-
tal sentences were the same across conditions. 6 The purpose of these
6No interactions were included into the random slopes of subjects because these mod-
els failed to converge.
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(a) continuous paths (b) complete graphs
Figure XV. Proportions of acceptance in the picture verification exper-
iment (small: pictures with 4 dots; large: pictures with 6 dots). Panel
a shows judgments for the path conditions; panel b for the complete
graph conditions.
analyses was to test whether quantifier – possibly in interaction with
graph size – affected the proportions of errors. Proportions of errors
are reflected in the frequencies of how often the true conditions are
accepted relative to the false conditions. Thus, the statistical analysis
tested for effects involving quantifiertruth-interactions. More specifi-
cally, it was tested whether the effect of truth is larger within exactly-k
than within all-but-one conditions, as predicted.
In order to break down significant interactions, it was planned
to compute logit mixed effects models on subsets of the data. This
is relevant in the discussion of the complete graph conditions below,
where we report separate models for the true and the false complete
graph conditions.
3.6.2 Results
Proportions of acceptance are depicted in Figure XV. In the following,
the results of the path conditions shown in Panel XVa are described
first. The complete graph conditions in Panel XVb are described after-
wards. The estimated parameters for the fixed effects are presented
in Table XVI.
path diagrams : The path reading was generally accepted (true
path conditions: mean acceptance of 67.7%) and led to almost no
errors (false path conditions: mean acceptance of 4.2%) with both
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Table XVI
Estimates for fixed effects, Wald’s Z statistics and p-values of the logit mixed
effects analyses of complete graphs in Exp. 2.
estimate Z p
Global analysis
(intercept) -0.26 -0.70 0.48
quantifier 0.81 2.00 <.05
truth 2.07 4.31 <.01
graph size -2.34 -4.49 <.01
quantifiertruth -0.99 -1.85 0.06
quantifiersize -0.92 -1.42 0.16
truthsize 0.91 1.52 0.13
quantifiertruthsize 1.60 1.92 0.06
True conditions
(intercept) 1.78 3.26 <.01
quantifier -0.25 -0.48 0.63
graph size -1.34 -3.05 <.01
quantifiersize 0.81 1.51 0.13
False conditions
(intercept) -0.30 -0.85 0.39
quantifier 0.78 2.29 <.05
graph size -2.51 -4.66 <.01
quantifiersize -0.72 -1.15 0.25
quantifiers and graph sizes. The statistical analysis revealed that only
the main effect of truth was significant (p < .01). Thus, with respect
to their tractable interpretation, both quantificational antecedents be-
haved similarly.
complete graph diagrams : As expected, the true complete
graph diagrams (Figure XIVa/e) were accepted across the board
(66.3%). Furthermore, true complete graph diagrams were accepted
significantly more often than false ones (p < .01). In the false com-
plete graph conditions (Figure XIVc/g), there were, however, clear
differences between diagrams with four and six dots. In the former
conditions, participants made relatively few errors (9.9%) whereas
proportions of errors were substantially higher in the latter condi-
tions (52%).
This led to a reliable effect of graph size (p < .01). Moreover,
exactly-k reciprocals were accepted more often than all-but-one recip-
rocals as reflected by a significant main effect of quantifier (p < .05).
Finally, two interactions were marginally significant. Firstly, the two-
way interaction between truth and quantifier was marginally signifi-
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cant (p = .06), reflecting the fact that the difference in acceptance
rates between the two quantificational antecedents was bigger in the
false than in the true complete graph conditions. Secondly, the three-
way interaction was marginally significant (p = .06).
In order to break down the three-way interaction, separate mixed
effects models for the true and false complete graph conditions were
computed. In the false complete graph conditions, the main effect
of graph size was significant (p < .01) because participants made
more errors in graphs with six dots than in graphs with four dots.
Furthermore, exactly k led to more erroneous responses than all but
one. This effect was consistent across graph sizes as indicated by a
significant main effect of quantifier (p < .05) and a non-significant
graph sizequantifier interaction (p = .25). Thus, exactly k lead to
more errors than all but one consistently across both graph sizes. In
the separate analysis of the true complete graph conditions, the only
significant effect was the main effect of graph size (p < .01). This effect
indicates that acceptance rates were higher in the larger graphs than
in small graphs.
3.6.3 Discussion
The results show that quantified reciprocals allow for complete graph
readings. The true complete graph conditions were overwhelmingly
accepted and participants were able to distinguish them from the
false controls. As opposed to the predictions made by the strictest
reading of the PCT, this was the case for both all-but-one and exactly-k
reciprocals. In the false conditions, we did, however, find indications
of effects of semantic complexity. In these conditions, proportions
of errors were higher for intractable exactly-k- than for tractable all-
but-one reciprocals. This is what we may expect according to a less
strict interpretation of the PCT. Based on this interpretation, it was ex-
pected that an increase in graph size would lead to a steep increase in
error rates. In fact, in the false conditions, graph size did lead to an in-
crease in the number of erroneous responses. However, we expected
a larger effect for intractable exactly-k than for tractable all-but-one re-
ciprocals. Despite this trend being present numerically, it was not
reliable. It, thus, remains an open question, whether for larger graph
sizes the effect of graph size on the verification of exactly-k reciprocals
is stronger than it is on the verification of all-but-one reciprocals.
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Why did computational complexity affect only the false condi-
tions? This might be due to the specific verification procedures par-
ticipants were able to use. In the true complete graph conditions,
the complete subgraph was visually salient and could thus be imme-
diately identified (Figure XIVa/e). This, in turn, may have reduced
the computational resource demands of the decision problem partic-
ipants had to solve. A reasonable procedure to verify the complete
graph reading of the exactly-k reciprocals in 3:22-d consists of two sub-
routines. In a first step, participants could decide whether there is a
complete subgraph of size k. In a second step, they would then have
to ensure that there is no complete subgraph of size k+1. The first
step would consist in solving the CLIQUE problem. Once participants
have identified the relevant subgraph, the first step can be completed
in polynomial time because the completely connected subgraph is a
certificate for the CLIQUE problem (the term certificate was discussed
in connection with the class NP in Section 2.4). In the picture material
we used, the second step would be trivial because there was only one
vertex in addition to the completely connected subgraph (see Figure
XIVa/e). As a consequence, participants really had to solve an in-
tractable problem only in the false conditions with one edge removed
from the graph. Apparently, this was still possible when the relevant
subgraph consisted of only three dots, but already started to exceed
cognitive capacities when it consisted of five dots.
3.7 conclusions
We started with hypotheses that made rather strong predictions. Lin-
guistic work on reciprocal sentences by Dalrymple et al. (1998), who
introduced the SMH, led us to expect that ambiguous reciprocals
should receive their logically strongest interpretation. Therefore, a
complete graph interpretation should be chosen for reciprocals with
UE antecedents. Szymanik (2010), on the other hand, employed the
PCT to predict shifts in interpretation in case the quantified reciprocal
has an intractable complete graph reading.
For tractable reciprocals with all as antecedent, the predictions
of the SMH were borne out. In the picture completion experiment,
participants overwhelmingly drew complete graphs in reaction to re-
ciprocal sentences with the antecedent all. Furthermore, results of
the picture completion experiment were in line with the predictions
of the PCT for comprehension. The quantificational antecedent influ-
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enced interpretation preferences. For most and four reciprocals, partic-
ipants produced fewer complete graphs than they did for all recipro-
cals. This indicates that comprehenders avoid intractable meanings.
In the introduction, we have outlined two scenarios in order to
explain how the sentence processor can avoid interpretations involv-
ing intractable verification problems. In the first scenario (Avoidance
Strategy A) we assumed that, on the basis of earlier exposure, com-
prehenders will stay away from interpretations that have in the past
turned out to be too complex to verify. To do so, however, they have
to be able to decide beforehand whether a meaning leads to an in-
tractable verification problem or not. The decision may depend on
simple heuristics which can sometimes fail and which may also dif-
fer between quantificational antecedents. One conceivable example
of such a heuristic would be to memorize types of linguistic expres-
sions that do in certain constructions lead to intractable verification
problems. The second scenario outlined in the introduction (Avoid-
ance Strategy B) rested on the assumption that the language faculty
is set up in such a way that comprehenders never face an intractable
verification problem, e.g., by constraining the formal properties of the
language in which humans may internally represent natural language
meanings.
These two scenarios gave rise to slightly different predictions. In
the first scenario, it would be expected that – at least sometimes –
comprehenders do not notice that they are running into an intractable
problem. It would, therefore, be expected that intractable meanings
do occur, although less frequently than their tractable counterparts.
Furthermore, intractable reciprocals with different quantificational
antecedents may differ in how easy it is to identify that verification of
the complete graph reading poses an intractable problem. Therefore,
the resulting shift in meaning may be stronger with one quantifica-
tional antecedent than with another one. Thus, the first scenario let us
expect gradient shifts in preference. According to the second scenario,
intractable interpretations should not occur and the shift should thus
be absolute. The findings of the picture completion experiment are
only compatible with the first scenario. The drop of graph readings
was far from absolute. Instead, we still observed approximately 50%
complete graph pictures for intractable antecedents. Even though we
have to be careful not to over-interpret this result – due to the logical
entailments between readings — it seems highly plausible that par-
ticipants had complete graph interpretations in mind when drawing
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a complete graph picture. Complete graphs required drawing more
connections than the alternative readings and we find it implausible
that participants would systematically draw more connections than
necessary.
The results of the picture verification task experiment complement
the picture. Intractable readings were clearly available to our partic-
ipants. As far as our assumptions concerning exactly-k reciprocals
are correct, this result provides evidence against the PCT under its
strictest reading. Nevertheless, we observed effects of semantic com-
plexity. Participants performed close to chance level when they had
to reject pictures which did not satisfy the complete graph reading
because of one missing connection. In these conditions, the number
of errors was slightly higher for intractable exactly-k than for tractable
all-but-one reciprocals.
A word of caution is in order here. Based on the limited amount of
data presented here, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that
participants derived approximate interpretations which differ from
the assumed truth conditions. Apart from this caveat, the findings
from the picture verification experiment indicate that intractable inter-
pretations are not ruled out in general, but computational complexity
effects only emerge with certain problem instantiations. The results of
the experiment indicate that comprehenders (at least sometimes) ar-
rive at intractable interpretations during comprehension, but depend
on strategies that reduce complexity in a verification setting. In partic-
ular, we speculated that the salience of the completely connected sub-
graph in a subset of our stimulus materials provided a cue to guess
the relevant subgraph via visual pattern recognition. This would con-
siderably simplify the verification task and could, on the other hand,
explain why error rates increased up to chance level when the num-
ber of vertices was slightly increased and visual salience provided no
cue. Since the presence of visual cues is not guaranteed, this line of
reasoning suggests that the verification of intractable complete graph
readings does, in fact, exceed cognitive capacities. It would be inter-
esting to systematically manipulate the visual salience of the relevant
subgraph in order to test whether this explanation is on the right
track. As exemplified by the work of Pietroski et al. (2009), Lidz et al.
(2011) and Tomaszewicz (2013), among others, studying the concrete
verification procedures that are used for verification of a sentence’s
truth conditions is interesting in its own right.
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To conclude, Avoidance Strategy B seems to provide the best ex-
planation for our findings. That is, despite a general tendency to
avoid them, the comprehension system sometimes derives intractable
interpretations. These interpretations do, however, lead to severe dif-
ficulties during verification and can only be properly dealt with by
relying on guessing strategies, or other indirect methods. Taken to-
gether, our findings suggest that restricting the semantic processor to
verification problems in P is too strict. This interpretation is in line
with considerations of Ristad (1993) and Mostowski and Szymanik
(2012). The latter also argue that intractable verification problems are
indirectly verified employing guessing strategies. 7 A relaxation of
the PCT has also been suggested by van Rooij (2008) with regard to
other cognitive capacities. A potentially interesting route to pursue
would be to apply an analysis as outlined by van Rooij (2008) based
on fixed parameter tractability. This, however, has to be left to future
research.
7 In connection to this consultation of Halpern (2003) might be instructive.
4
EX IST ING PROCESS ING MODELS OF QUANTIF IER
VER IF ICAT ION : THE AUTOMATA MODEL ,
INTERFACE TRANSPARENCY AND THE
APPROXIMATE NUMBER SYSTEM
In the previous chapter, abstract considerations of computational com-
plexity enabled us to predict some aspects of the comprehension
and verification of quantified sentences that would not have been
expected otherwise. But at the same time, it became evident that a
dichotomous distinction between computationally tractable and in-
tractable problems does not suffice to account for all aspects of the
obtained experimental data. It seems that the specific processes at
play have to be studied for this. Especially since candidates for in-
tractable natural language meanings, in the above sense, are rare (e.g.
Szymanik, 2016, parts 2 & 3), it seems important to understand which
mechanisms are employed to tackle the tractable ones.
That good progress can be made in studying the processes un-
derlying the truth evaluation of quantified sentences is reflected in
an increasing number of publications during the last decade or so.
The present chapter discusses two common approaches to this issue.
The first is the semantic automata model (originally proposed by van
Benthem, 1986): a computational model of quantifier verification and
falsification that allows us to study the processing requirements of
individual quantifiers or subclasses thereof. The second can be sum-
marized under the idea of interface transparency (explicitly formulated
by Lidz et al., 2011): the hypothesis that the compositional encoding
of truth conditions to some degree determines the verification process
associated with a quantified sentence.
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4.1 the automata model: theory and experiment
A link between the semantics of quantifiers and computation was pro-
posed by van Benthem (1986) (referring to informal ideas of Suppes)
and further developed, for example, by Mostowski (1998), Szymanik
(2009), Steinert-Threlkeld and Icard (2013) and Steinert-Threlkeld
(2016). In a nutshell, the basic idea is, again, to conceive of quantifiers
as languages or, equivalently, decision problems (in the sense of section
2.3, Definition 2:14) and study these from a computational perspec-
tive. A crucial difference to above, is that all the quantifiers discussed
below correspond to functions that are computable in polynomial
time. But still, there are differences in computational recourses that
are needed to recognize the languages associated with these quanti-
fiers. Furthermore, we will see below that some of these distinctions
also have psychological relevance, as was confirmed in psycholinguis-
tic experiments.
4.1.1 Theory
The semantic automata model is best explained using generalized
quantifiers of type (1, 1). Recall from section 2.2 that these are classes
of models of a vocabulary with two unary predicates, say A and B.
Recall further that for CE-quantifiers, i.e. GQs of type (1, 1) that are
conservative (CONS) and domain independent (EXT), the cardinalities
jA n Bj and jA \ Bj completely determine whether a model M be-
longs to that class or not. We captured this by assigning to every
such quantifier Q its unique relation RQ, such that:
M 2 Q , RQ(jA n Bj, jA \ Bj). (4:1)
It was recognized by van Benthem (1986) that we can encode the
relevant aspects of such models using strings over an alphabet of two
symbols. One symbol encodes elements of A\ B; the other stands for
a elements in A n B. Concretely, this works as follows (cf. Szymanik,
2009; Steinert-Threlkeld & Icard, 2013; we are still assuming finite
models).
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Definition 4:2. LetM be a model of a vocabulary (A, B),~a an enumeration
of A and n = jAj. The function t maps the pair (~a, B) to a string t(~a, B) 2
f0, 1gn such that:
 
t(~a, B)

i :=
8<:0, if ai 2 A n B1, if ai 2 A \ B.
With this encoding in place, every CE-quantifier can be assigned
a language LQ in the following way.
Definition 4:3. Let Q be a CE-quantifier, RQ the corresponding numerical
relation and #0, #1 functions that map strings to the number of zeros and
ones they contain, respectively. We define:
LQ :=

s 2 f0, 1g : RQ
 
#0(s), #1(s)
	
.
A corollary of the equivalence 4:1 (cf. Proposition 2:11) is that Q can
be identified with LQ:
Corrolary 4:4. Let Q,M, A, B,~a, n be as before and s = t(~a, B). Then,
s 2 LQ ,M 2 Q.
As above in chapter 3, the question whether M 2 Q, or in this case
also QM(A, B), is a standard decision problem and it can be asked
what computational resources this problem requires.
4.1.1.1 Automata theoretic characterizations of some CE-quantifiers
To give a simple example, the quantifier Every (see section 2.2 for a
formal definition) corresponds to the language
LEvery := fs : #0(s) = 0g.
This is just the language 1 from section 2.3 and it is recognized by the
deterministic finite state automaton (DFA) described there and shown
again in Figure XVIIa. There are also other automata that recognize
LEvery, but this is the simplest one. Interestingly, all the quantifiers in
Aristotle’s square of opposition, namely Every, No, Some and NotEv-
ery, are recognized by automata that are just as simple. One only
needs to relabel the states and transitions. Moreover, these are the
only quantifiers that are recognized by such simple devices. All other
quantifiers need more states or transitions, at least.
This simple example already indicates that there is regularity;
and, in fact, it is possible to characterize the computational require-
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q0 q10
1 0
1
(a) Every
q0 q1
1
0
1
0
(b) AnEvenNumberOf
q0 q1 q21
0
1
0 0
1
(c) AtLeastTwo
Figure XVII. The minimal DFA corresponding to some of the dis-
cussed quantifiers.
ments of quantifiers in terms of their definability (see Definition 2:4).
Moreover, there are interesting connections to the Chomsky hierarchy.
The following theorem identifies definability in first-order logic with
recognition by acyclic permutation invariant DFA. This implies that
the first-order definable GQs all correspond to regular languages (see
section 2.3 and Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979 for details concerning the
correspondence between classes of languages and automata).
Theorem 4:5 (van Benthem, 1986, pp. 156-157). A quantifier Q is de-
finable in first-order logic iff LQ is recognized by a permutation-invariant
acyclic DFA.
Another example of a first-order definable quantifier is
AtLeastTwo (see section 2.2, example 2:2). The simplest automa-
ton that corresponds to this quantifier is shown in Figure XVIIc. The
language recognized by this automaton is fs 2 f1, 0g : #1(s)  2g.
The automaton can be considered an extended version of the one that
recognizes Some, with one extra non-accepting state.
The automaton shown in Figure XVIIb, on the other hand, corre-
sponds to a quantifier that cannot be defined in first order logic. It
recognizes the language fs 2 f0, 1g : 9n 2 N(#1(s) = 2n)g. The
automaton is hardly more complex than those in panels a and c of
the figure. However, it contains a non-trivial loop and such loops are
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excluded by the above theorem. In order to be able to define An-
EvenNumberOf, we have to enrich first-order logic (see Definition
2:3). This can be done using the divisibility quantifier D2 := f(M, A) :
9n 2 N(jAj = 2n)g. More generally, the following theorem holds,
which provides a logical characterization of all monadic quantifiers
that are recognized by DFA.
Theorem 4:6 (Mostowski, 1998). DFA accept exactly the class of quanti-
fiers of type (1, ..., 1) definable in first-order logic enriched with all Dn for
n 2N.
There are also expressions in natural language that correspond
to quantifiers not recognized by any DFA. The standard example is
the determiner most (Barwise & Cooper, 1981) usually assumed to
denote the GQ Most (defined in 2:2), which, in turn, corresponds to
the non-regular, context-free language fs 2 f0, 1g : #1(s) > #0(s)g.
A pushdown automaton (PDA) that recognizes this language was
already described in section 2.3 and a slightly different variant of this
automaton is shown in Figure XVIIIa. What this automaton does, is to
compare two cardinalities. Because it is not known beforehand how
large these will be, no finite automaton can perform this task. Instead
some kind of memory, like the stack of a PDA, is needed. Other
similar examples are comparative proportional determiners like more
than half, less than a third or more than two thirds. A characterization
of the entire class of quantifiers that are recognized by PDA is given
below. It is based on definability in the so-called Presburger arithmetic
(cf. van Benthem, 1986 or Steinert-Threlkeld & Icard, 2013).
Definition 4:7. A quantifier Q is first-order additively definable if there is
a formula f in the first-order language with equality and an addition symbol
+ such that RQ(a, b) , (N,+, a, b) j= f[a, b].
For example, the quantifier AnOddNumberOf, corresponding to the
language fs 2 f0, 1g : :9n 2 N(#1(s) = 2n)g, can be defined using
the formula (:9x(a = x+ x)) ^ 9x(x = b) and Most can be defined
by (9x(a = b+ x)) ^ :(a = b).
Theorem 4:8 (van Benthem, 1986, pp. 163-165). A quantifier Q is first-
order additively definable iff LQ is recognized by a PDA.
There is more interesting work on automata theoretic characteriza-
tions of natural language quantifiers. For example, Steinert-Threlkeld
and Icard (2013) studied iterated quantifiers that correspond to promi-
nent readings of multiply quantified sentences and Kanazawa (2013)
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q0 q1 q2
e,1/e
1,Z0/1
0,Z0/0
1,1/11
0,0/00
1,0/e
0,1/e
e,Z0/Z0
e,1/e
1
(a) accepts by
state
q0
1,Z0/1
0,Z0/0
1,e/1
0,e/0
1,1/11
0,0/00
1,0/e
0,1/e
e,1/e
1,Z0/e
(b) accepts by
empty stack
Figure XVIII. Two alternative PDA recognizing Most.
characterized the monadic quantifiers that are recognized by determin-
istic PDA. But the theoretical distinctions that we focused on so far
suffice for the present purpose. These have guided psycholinguistic
research on the processing of quantifiers. This is what we turn to
next.
4.1.2 Link to psycholinguistics
Recently, researchers have started to ask whether the computational
distinctions just introduced are also reflected in how natural language
quantifiers are processed by humans. Before we summarize some
of the relevant experimental work, we briefly consider what links
could exist, in principle, between theoretical considerations of the
mentioned kind and psycholinguistic studies. In particular, we dis-
tinguish three types of links. The first is captured in the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4:9. Computational distinctions between different types of de-
vices needed to recognize natural language quantifiers have psychological
relevance.
This hypothesis is somewhat vague and thus calls for further specifi-
cation. In order to derive predictions for a concrete test case, it has
to be spelled out in more detail. To give an example, it was hypoth-
esized in the literature that quantifiers which cannot be recognized
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by DFA but need PDA instead should depend heavily on working
memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Thus, enhanced involvement of
working memory was predicted to be detectable in experiments (e.g.
McMillan et al., 2005, R. Clark & Grossman, 2007 and Zajenkowski,
Szymanik, & Garraffa, 2014; see below for more details).
The second potential link is provided by the hypothesis that the
discussed automata are – at an appropriate level of abstraction – re-
alistic descriptions of the procedures used by humans to verify or
falsify quantified sentences. Obviously, the few examples from above
are not sufficient to provide us with a useful hypothesis: their empir-
ical coverage is insufficient by any measure. We need to generalize
the approach. One possibility is to specify ‘canonical’ devices for a
wide range of quantifiers. This can be motivated, for example, by
optimality consideration along the lines of Anderson’s (1989) Ratio-
nal Analysis (see section 2.1.2; cf. Szymanik, 2016, pp. 51-54). With
regard to DFA, this is straightforward: for every regular language a
simple recipe (Hopcroft & Ullman, 1979, pp. 67–71) can be used to
construct the minimal DFA that recognizes it. With regard to PDA,
things are more complicated. Consider the automaton shown in Fig-
ure XVIIIa, which recognizes Most (cf. section 2.3). In addition to
this three-state automaton, there is also a one-state automaton that
accepts exactly the same strings (shown in panel b of the figure). The
one-state automaton has two states less, but the list of stack instruc-
tions is somewhat longer. The procedures defined by these two de-
vices may be rather similar. Nevertheless, the canonical procedure
has to be specified unambiguously in order to make our second ap-
proach workable.
Hypothesis 4:10. As far as it is specified unambiguously, the ‘canonical’
automaton is – at some level of abstraction – a realistic description of the
procedure used to perform quantifier verification or falsification. In the case
of DFA, the minimal automaton is the canonical one. In the case of PDA,
the canonical automaton strikes a balance between simplicity with regard to
state transitions, on the one hand, and stack operations, on the other.
As a third alternative, we may associate each natural language
quantifier with a small set of automata that recognize it. We may posit
that the best performing one is chosen in each instance. For example,
Szymanik (2016) noted that a DFA can decide whether (M, A, B) 2
Most as long as elements of A and B are presented in pairs (see
also Steinert-Threlkeld, Munneke, & Szymanik, 2015). Under these
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special conditions a DFA suffices for the task, although none does
in general. This kind of flexibility may be considered an advantage
of the third over the second approach. In contrast to the first one,
which is only concerned with types of computing devices, the third
approach still requires detailed descriptions of the individual verifi-
cation procedures within the range of possibilities.
Hypothesis 4:11. Natural language quantifier are associated with small
sets of automata that are realistic descriptions of possible procedures used to
perform verification or falsification.
Among these three hypotheses, the weakest claim is made in 4:9,
a stronger claim is made in 4:11 and the strongest claim is made
in 4:10. In the next section, experimental studies are discussed that
tested predictions of the automata model concerning the processing
of natural language quantifiers. It may not always be obvious which,
if any, of the three approaches was taken in these studies. Neverthe-
less, the three approaches give the discussion some structure. This is
important because, as we will see, the automata model itself is nei-
ther unequivocally supported by the experimental data nor can it be
refuted. Rather, the interesting question seems to be what an appro-
priate linking hypothesis is.
4.1.3 Experimental investigations
A number of psycholinguistic experiments have tested predictions
derived from the automata model. The following two theoretical dis-
tinctions play a major role in these studies. Firstly, quantifiers that are
recognized by DFA were compared to others that require PDA. Espe-
cially the need for a memory device received attention in this regard.
The second distinction is that between Aristotelian quantifiers and
other more complex ones, e.g. numerical quantifiers. Recall from sec-
tion 4.1.1 that the quantifiers in the Aristotelian square of opposition
exhaust the simplest possible DFA.
4.1.3.1 PDA and working memory
As far as I know, the first experiment that tested predictions derived
from the automata model was an fMRI study conducted by McMillan
et al. (2005). They compared first-order to higher-order definable
quantifiers during sentence-picture verification. They reasoned that
both types of quantifiers would recruit brain regions in the parietal
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cortex that are associated with number knowledge and the processing
of numerosity. In addition, higher-order quantifiers were predicted to
activate regions in the frontal and prefrontal cortex that are associated
with working memory. The idea was, of course, that the theoretically
derived discintion between DFA and PDA should be reflected in the
mechanisms actually utilized by their participants. Thus, McMillan et
al. took the approach of Hypothesis 4:9, stating that the distinctions
between different classes of automata are psychologically relevant.
This is reflected clearly in the following quote:
We, thus hypothesize that the qualitative differences be-
tween the first-order and higher-order classes of quanti-
fiers, formally reflected in a difference in the computa-
tional machinery needed to simulate them, will also be
reflected in brain anatomy. (p. 1730)
These predictions were confirmed. In particular, by subtraction
of the fMRI signals obtained from the two classes of quantifiers,
McMillan et al. found a significant increase of activity in the pre-
dicted regions. These results lend support to the linking hypothesis
in 4:9. They were supplemented by McMillan, Clark, Moore, and
Grossman (2006), who compared the performance of healthy indi-
viduals to that of patients diagnosed with a range focal neurodegen-
erative diseases. The experimental task was similar to that of the
first study. The main findings were that (a) patients diagnosed with
corticobasal degeneration, a disease that is known to impair num-
ber knowledge, performed poorly across both classes of quantifiers
(cf. also Troiani, Clark, & Grossman, 2011); and that (b) patients di-
agnosed with Alzheimer’s disease or with frontotemporal dementia,
both known to involve working memory deficits, had greater diffi-
culty with higher-order than with first-order quantifiers. However,
higher-order quantifiers led to worse performance than first-order de-
finable ones across all groups of participants. Thus, support for the
distinct role of working memory in the processing of the latter class is
not as clear as in the fMRI study. In addition to these results, the au-
thors also report a positive correlation between a measure of working
memory capacity and performance in the higher-order but not the
first-order condition across all participant groups. We conclude with
the authors that both studies in combination provide experimental
evidence for Hypothesis 4:9.
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In a comment, Szymanik (2007) highlighted that the distinction
between first- and higher-order definable quantifiers is not exactly
congruent with the distinction between DFA and PDA (see section
4.1.1, specifically Theorem 4:6). In particular, McMillan et al. (2005,
2006) included parity quantifiers (an even number of and an odd num-
ber of ) into their sample of the latter class of quantifiers. These do
not require PDA but are recognized by DFA with loops. Differences
between higher-order quantifiers that do vs. do not require PDA are
not reported in these studies. Therefore, it seems possible that, in
comparison to the first-order definable ones, parity quantifiers also
require an enhanced amount of working memory. This would dis-
accord with Hypothesis 4:10, stating that the minimal DFA are used
to verify or falsify these quantifiers. It seems equally likely, how-
ever, that the reported effects simply would have been larger had the
experimental manipulation coincided exactly with the two types of
computing devices that are required to solve the task according to
the automata model (for further discussion see also Troiani, Peelle,
McMillan, Clark, & Grossman, 2009).
Zajenkowski, Styła, and Szymanik (2011) compared a healthy con-
trol group to patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. They compared
the performance of these two groups in a sentence-picture verification
task involving Aristotelian quantifiers, parity quantifiers, modified
numerals and proportional quantifiers. Since schizophrenia has been
shown to involve working memory impairments (see references in the
paper), it was predicted that, especially with proportional quantifiers,
the patient group would perform significantly worse, in terms of ac-
curacy and RT, than the control group. The results confirmed these
predictions. It is noteworthy in the present context that parity quanti-
fiers did not differ from modified numerals at all but behaved clearly
different from the proportional ones. Specifically, the two groups of
participants did not differ significantly in accuracy with regard to
numerical and parity quantifiers. Moreover, there was no significant
difference between these two types of quantifiers. In contrast, propor-
tional quantifiers led to more errors than numerical and parity quan-
tifiers and this effect was reliably larger in the patient group than in
the control group. Finally, patients had longer RTs than the control
group across all quantifier types, but this effect was extraordinarily
large within the proportional quantifiers.
In two further studies, Zajenkowski and Szymanik (2013) and
Zajenkowski et al. (2014) correlated several measures of cognitive ca-
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pacity with performance in sentence-picture verification. These stud-
ies provided a detailed picture of the cognitive capacities that are
involved in the verification of different types of quantifiers and, more-
over, the results are generally compatible with the automata model.
Specifically, they provide more evidence for the distinct role of work-
ing memory in the verification of proportional quantifiers. However,
as far as I can tell, they go beyond what can be predicted from the
model in combination with linking hypotheses of the kind discussed
here. In particular, how capacities in short term memory, cognitive
control and intelligence affect performance in quantifier verification
and what role the type of quantifier plays in this regard does not
follow from the above considerations. To predict such associations
from the automata model, more sophisticated linking hypotheses are
necessary. While the authors discuss some possibilities, these are not
worked out in detail.
A finding that is somewhat disturbing was reported by Szymanik
and Zajenkowski (2011), who investigated the involvement of work-
ing memory in quantifier verification in a dual-task experiment. Par-
ticipants performed a verification task that involved parity and pro-
portional quantifiers. Before each trial of the verification task, they
had to memorize a sequence of either four or six digits that had to be
recalled afterwards. As expected, the difficulty of the memory task
had a larger effect on performance with proportional than with par-
ity quantifiers. However, performance with proportional quantifiers
was better in the condition with six than with four digits. That higher
memory load would facilitate the verification task was unexpected.
To explain these results, Szymanik and Zajenkowski assume that the
six digit condition was so difficult that participants gave up on the
memory task, which set free memory resources. If this explanation
was correct, one would expect opposite effects in a quasi-replication
with lower memory load (with regard to proportional quantifiers
Steinert-Threlkeld et al., 2015 show the expected effect of memory
load).
Altogether, the mentioned studies provide evidence that quanti-
fiers that require PDA also require an enhanced amount of working
memory during sentence-picture verification. All of the above men-
tioned linking hypotheses would predict this. However, one impor-
tant issue was glossed over, so far. The difficulty of the proportional
quantifiers showed itself in relatively high proportions of errors. The
automata model does not predict mistakes nor does it explain differ-
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ences in proportions of errors between different quantifiers. Because
of this, the data cast doubt on the linking hypotheses 4:10 or 4:11,
stating that the automata are realistic descriptions of the verification
procedures that are actually used by humans. These hypotheses re-
ferred to realistic descriptions at some appropriate level of abstraction.
And so, they may be amended accordingly in order to align the theory
with the data. However, if empirical support to the model is sought
in accuracy data, it needs to be spelled out how errors emerge. A
first step in this direction, based on probabilistic automata, was taken
by Dotlacˇil, Szymanik, and Zajenkowski (2014). In their model, tran-
sitions between states are probabilistic events. Estimation of transi-
tion probabilities from experimental data provided a good model fit.
However, at this point, neither the predictions of this proposal nor
its relation to the original automata model are obvious. So, when it
comes to proportions of errors, we are left with the linking hypothesis
formulated in 4:9, for now. A final point that should be kept in mind
is that the proportional quantifiers tested in the mentioned studies
were almost exclusively more than half or less than half. An interest-
ing open question is whether the findings generalize to other types
of quantifiers that require PDA or do instead reflect idiosyncrasies of
these quantifiers.
4.1.3.2 Aristotelian vs. other quantifiers recognized by DFA
The second theoretical distinction of the automata model that has re-
ceived attention in experimental work is between different kinds of
DFA, in particular, between those that recognize Aristotelian quanti-
fiers and more complex ones. Troiani, Peelle, Clark, and Grossman
(2009) compared Aristotelian to “numerical quantifiers.” The latter
class included modified numerals (e.g. at least three) as well as parity
quantifiers (an even/odd number of ). In an fMRI experiment, partic-
ipants evaluated these quantifiers against serially presented visual
stimuli, e.g. a series of pictures of balls of different colors. The
authors reasoned that the Aristotelian quantifiers can be evaluated
based on an “elementary logic system” which consists in a network
involving rostral medial prefrontal cortex, responsible for “decision-
making about dichotomous events [...] such as attending to [...] ex-
ceptional” ones (p. 105), and posterior cingulate cortex, which sup-
ports selective visual-spatial attention. With regard to the numerical
quantifiers, activation in the intraparietal sulcus, reflecting process-
ing of numerical or magnitude information, and in the dorsolateral
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prefrontal cortex, responsible for retention of numerical criteria, was
expected. These predictions were borne out. Moreover, activation of
the predicted regions was correlated within but not across the two
types of quantifiers. Furthermore, these results, which were obtained
from healthy individuals, were compared to results obtained from a
group of patients diagnosed with corticobasal degeneration. The pa-
tients exhibited atrophy of parietal cortex, including the intraparietal
sulcus. As predicted, they were selectively impaired on the process-
ing of numerical quantifiers.
In connection with the discussion in the previous section, it is
noteworthy that Troiani, Peelle, Clark, and Grossman did not find
any differences in neural activity between modified numerals and
parity quantifiers. A difference to the fMRI study of McMillan et al.
(2005) is that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, associated with work-
ing memory, was found to subserve the processing of both, modified
numerals and parity quantifiers. The authors speculate that the dis-
crepancy may be due to the different modes of presentation of the
visual stimuli in the two experiments (i.e. serial vs. parallel).
While Troiani, Peelle, Clark, and Grossman refer to the automata
model when motivating their experimental design, it is not obvious
what linking hypothesis they assume. The distinction between cyclic
and acyclic DFA is disregarded in their research and this seems to be
justified by the results. Thus, the authors would presumably not sub-
scribe to linking hypothesis 4:9 in every instance. At the same time,
they differentiate between Aristotelian quantifiers, on the one hand,
and modified numerals and parity quantifiers, on the other. In terms
of minimal automata, this experimental manipulation corresponds
to a comparison between the simplest possible DFA, containing just
two states, and minimally more complex automata containing addi-
tional states or transitions (possibly forming cycles, cf. Figure XVII).
This may be taken as endorsement of linking hypothesis 4:10, stating
that minimal DFA are realistic descriptions of truth-evaluation proce-
dures. In particular, the description of the “elementary logic system”
matches the minimal DFA for Aristotelian quantifiers rather closely,
albeit embedded into neural architecture. However, the approach of
these authors seems to be more of a mixed one, where predictions are
derived from computational considerations in combination with em-
pirical findings. This is reflected in the following quote from Troiani,
Peelle, McMillan, et al. (2009):
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[The automata model] thus is not inconsistent with our
model, where we emphasize the importance of magni-
tude processing regions in support of quantifier compre-
hension. It is clear that both experimental and theoretical
approaches can provide complementary evidence regard-
ing the role of quantifier representation in the brain, par-
ticularly when computational models are able to furnish
concrete predictions about human data. (p. 2685)
Empirically, the distinction between the most simple two state
DFA and others seems to have clear consequences. In contrast, the
distinction between DFA with and without cycles appears to be less
relevant. This is also in accordance with a sentence-picture verifica-
tion experiment reported by Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2010) (cf.
also Szymanik, 2009, 2016), who found that Aristotelian quantifiers
were evaluated much faster than parity quantifiers, modified numer-
als and proportional quantifiers, in the order of mention. The au-
thors conclude from these results that the computational resources
(i.e. number of states, loops or memory) needed to recognize a quan-
tifier affect the time needed to evaluate it. Moreover, they suggest
that the number of states in the minimal automaton is a more reliable
predictor of RT than the requirement of cycles. These conclusion re-
ceive additional support from replications reported by Zajenkowski
and Szymanik (2013), where modified numerals and parity quanti-
fiers did not differ in terms of RT and accuracy.
4.1.3.3 Summary and concluding remark
The experimental studies discussed in the previous two sections show
clear processing differences between different types of quantifiers
with regard to sentence-picture verification. Proportional quantifiers,
which require PDA, are generally more demanding than quantifiers
that are recognized by DFA. In particular, we saw evidence for en-
hanced working memory involvement in the former as compared to
the latter class. Moreover, among the quantifiers recognized by DFA,
the Aristotelian ones are a special case. They are evaluated relatively
fast and are subserved by a distinct network of neural activity. Other
distinctions within the group of quantifiers recognized by DFA, e.g.
between automata with and without cycles, have less clear effects on
processing.
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With regard to our linking hypotheses in section 4.1.2, conclusions
are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, the fact that the distinction
between PDA and DFA was reflected in processing data provides evi-
dence for the linking hypothesis in 4:9, which stated that such distinc-
tions are psychologically relevant. On the other hand, the distinction
between automata with and without cycles has only limited reflexes
in processing. Thus, the hypothesis has to be restricted accordingly.
At the same time, modified numerals differed from Aristotelian quan-
tifiers. Both of these are recognized by DFA. These differences can be
accounted for by making reference to their minimal automata. Aris-
totelian quantifiers correspond to the simplest possible DFA whereas
modified numerals need more states and transitions. In this case, a
linking hypothesis along the lines of 4:10 or 4:11 seems appropriate,
which are both based on canonical verification procedures. However,
if we take the minimal automata to be realistic descriptions of the
canonical verification procedures, differences in proportions of errors
remain to be explained and we have to think about the level of ab-
straction at which these descriptions are to be located (cf. sections
2.1.1 and 2.1.2).
Before we move on to discuss interface transparency in the next
section, I would like to highlight one aspect of the automata model
and its relation to empirical studies that was glossed over so far. Re-
call from section 4.1.1 what decision problem the semantic automata
compute. It is the decision problem whether some model belongs to
a specific class or not. Finite models are encoded as binary strings,
such that each CE-quantifier Q corresponds to a language LQ over
the alphabet f0, 1g. In the experiments, on the other hand, partic-
ipants saw visual stimuli and had to decide whether sentences are
true in that context or not. While it is easily conceivable that the vi-
sual stimuli are, in the process of verification, encoded as assumed
in the automata model, this (pre-)processing step has received hardly
any attention. We tacitly assumed that (i) the process of encoding
can be neglected; and that (ii) the truth evaluation process is based
exclusively on the information contained in the assumed encodings.
That these assumptions are not always appropriate was demon-
strated by Steinert-Threlkeld et al. (2015). As briefly mentioned above,
they noted that the decision problem whether (M, A, B) 2 Most can
be decided by a DFA if the elements of A and B are encoded as pairs
of As and Bs. In a dual-task experiment involving sentence-picture
verification of most and more than half in combination with a digit re-
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call task, they showed that working memory involvement is indeed
reduced if the objects shown are arranged in pairs. This shows that
the encoding of the models (or pictures) can affect experimental re-
sults, contrary to assumptions (i) and (ii). Moreover, it was mentioned
above that Troiani, Peelle, Clark, and Grossman (2009) speculated
that, with regard to working memory involvement in the verifica-
tion of modified numerals, differences between their experiment and
that of McMillan et al. (2005) may be due to how the visual stimuli
were presented. This explanation also takes into account encoding of
the stimulus materials. Finally, the confirmed prediction of Troiani,
Peelle, Clark, and Grossman (2009) that the verification of Aristotelian
quantifiers would involve posterior cingulate cortex because this re-
gion supports selective visual-spatial attention also seems to be based
on considerations regarding the encoding of the stimuli. There would
have been no need for visual-spatial attention, had the stimuli been
presented auditively, for example. However, these cases cannot be dis-
tinguished in the automata model. In conclusion, it should be kept
in mind what the automata model is a model of and what aspects of
quantifier verification it does not address in its current form.
4.2 interface transparency: from semantics to
psycho-physics
A second line of recent research also investigates the processes un-
derlying the verification and falsification of quantified sentences. The
general motivation behind these studies was to use sentence-picture
verification experiments as an additional data source that informs us
about representations of sentence meaning and thus complements
the classical introspective judgments. In particular, these studies aim
to differentiate specifications of truth conditions that are logically
equivalent – a task that may be hard to come by using introspective
judgments. Of course, this is only feasible if there is any connection
between the specification of truth conditions and verification proce-
dures at all. Whether this is the case was recently asked by Steinert-
Threlkeld et al. (2015), who distinguish the following two alternatives:
The relationship may be permissive: once a specification of
truth-conditions is “exported” to general cognition, any-
thing goes. There is no systematic connection between the
ways that truth-conditions are specified and judgments of
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truth in context are made. On the other hand, the re-
lationship may be constrained: the ways in which truth-
conditions are specified correlates with and constrains the
methods of verification of sentences in context. (p. 368)
One core hypothesis of the studies discussed in the present section
is that quantified sentences are associated with canonical verification
procedures which reflect the compositional encoding of their truth
conditions. The hypothesis was formulated most explicitly in the
interface transparency thesis (ITT).
Hypothesis 4:12 (interface transparency thesis, ITT, Lidz et al., 2011).
The verification procedures employed in understanding a declarative sen-
tence are biased towards algorithms that directly compute the relations and
operations expressed by the semantic representation of that sentence.
It will become obvious below that the fundamental idea behind the
ITT and related experimental work is that truth conditions alone, as
they are usually formulated in semantic theory, may under-determine
crucial aspects of sentence meaning. There is thus a connection to the
philosophical work hinted at briefly in the introduction, in chapter
1 that identifies sentence meaning with algorithms determining the
truth value of a sentence in context (see e.g. Moschovakis, 1994 for
discussion).
Experimental studies that provide evidence pertaining to the ITT
are discussed here more or less in chronological order. There is some
overlap with the discussion in section 4.1, especially regarding ques-
tions about canonical verification procedures. Given that the two ap-
proaches are concerned with similar questions, it is remarkable that
the studies discussed in the present section contain hardly any refer-
ence to the automata model. Cases where hypothesized verification
procedures correspond closely to one of the semantic automata from
above will be highlighted.
4.2.1 Verification profiles of ‘most’ and ‘more than half’
As we have seen, GQT provides the means to treat quantifying ex-
pressions as atomic (cf. section 2.2). Hackl (2000, 2009) famously ar-
gued that by this practice crucial aspects of their meanings are missed.
Concerning the quantificational determinermost, Hackl (2009) argued
that its semantic properties can only be described faithfully if it is
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analyzed as the superlative form of many (cf. Bresnan, 1973). As
compared to the standard GQT analysis, Hackl’s semantic analysis
assigns a logical form to the sentence in 4:13-a that is relatively com-
plicated. It involves a silent determiner, covert movement and decom-
position of most into many and the superlative morpheme -est. How-
ever, just as in the GQT approach, the truth conditions of 4:13-a come
out equivalent to those of 4:14-a: the two sentences are predicted to
be true in the same models.
(4:13) a. Most of the dots are blue.
b. jDot \ Bluej > jDot n (Dot \ Blue)j
(4:14) a. More than half of the dots are blue.
b. jDot \ Bluej > 1/2jDotj
Hackl argued that there is nevertheless a subtle, but empirically de-
tectable, difference in how the truth conditions of these two sentences
are specified. In particular, these specifications “mimic closely” the
relations and operations in 4:13-b and 4:14-b, respectively. Further-
more, he suggested that 4:13-b and 4:14-b correspond to two different
“natural algorithms.” These are described in the following quote:
A natural algorithm triggered by [4:13-b] might be a
form of vote-counting where subjects simply keep track
of whether for each [dot] that is [blue] there is also [a dot]
that is not [blue]. If at least one [dot] that is [blue] can be
found [without] a counterpart [...] the statement will be
true; otherwise it will be false. [4:14-b], on the other hand,
might trigger an algorithm that is more akin to checking
whether the number of [dots] that are [blue] is bigger than
some criterion n which represents half the total number of
[dots]. (p. 86)
Of course, the former description corresponds closely to the proce-
dure implemented in the two automata in Figure XVIII. The only
potential difference I see is in the type of memory device that is used.
This is left unspecified in the quote but defined as a stack in the PDA.
The hypothesis that the verification procedures of most and more
than half differ along these lines was tested using the self-paced count-
ing method. Participants first listened to recordings of sentences like
4:13-a and 4:14-a and then iteratively examined groups of colored
dots on successive pictures, called “frames.” By pressing a button,
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they initiated presentation of the next frame. They were instructed to
verify or falsify the sentences by pressing one of two response keys.
In the critical trials, correct judgments could only be made after the
last frame had been examined.
In the first experiment, dots of the two colors were distributed uni-
formly across frames. While accuracy did not differ significantly be-
tween the two quantifiers, RTs on individual frames were consistently
and reliably faster for most than for more than half. Hackl argued that
most led to faster RTs because the stimulus arrays were particularly
well-suited for the hypothesized “vote-counting” procedure. Further-
more, it was predicted that manipulating the distribution of the two
colors over the stimulus array would have a larger effect on most than
on more than half. The reasoning behind this prediction was based
on the idea that more than half, in contrast to most, “has a component,
namely counting (or estimating) how many half of the dots is, that is
constant across all frames, and so should not be affected by the distri-
butional asymmetries at all” (p. 92). This prediction was confirmed
in a follow-up experiment that manipulated whether objects of the
target color were presented late vs. early in the stimulus arrays.
Hackl drew a two-part conclusion from these experiments. The
first part is that, although truth-conditionally equivalent, most and
more than half are associated with different verification procedures.
The second is that the verification procedures are indeed as hypothe-
sized. Concerning the first conclusion, it should be noted that there
is evidence for differences in meaning between most and more than
half that is independent from the utilized verification procedures (e.g.
Ariel, 2004; Kotek, Sudo, Howard, & Hackl, 2011; Solt, 2016a). This
conclusion should thus be taken with a grain of salt. Nevertheless,
with regard to the ITT, this study was to my knowledge the first to
show that the operations and relations in the encoding of truth con-
ditions may constrain verification procedures in predictable ways.
4.2.2 Verification of ‘most’ and psychophysics
Pietroski et al. (2009) also investigated the verification procedures as-
sociated with the quantificational determiner most. In particular, they
asked whether a sentence like 4:13-a (repeated as 4:15-a) introduces
a bias towards verification in terms of comparison of set sizes, as in
4:15-b, or in terms of establishing a certain kind of mapping between
the blue and non-blue objects, as in 4:15-c.
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(4:15) a. Most of the dots are blue.
b. jDot \ Bluej > jDot n Bluej
c. OneToOnePlusM(Dot \ Blue,Dot n Blue)
The relation OneToOnePlus, which I treat here simply as a non-
conservative GQ of type (1, 1), holds of two sets iff there is a one-
to-one correspondence between a proper subset of its first argument
and its second argument. As above, the truth conditions in 4:15-b and
4:15-c are equivalent, but Pietroski et al. argue for a natural correspon-
dence to certain verification procedures. In particular, they stress that
verification procedures may differ with regard to “representational
resources” they involve: The former involves representation of cardi-
nality and the latter involves representations of one-to-one correspon-
dence.
Reasonable candidate procedures for establishing that OneToOne-
Plus holds between two sets are, again, provided by the semantic au-
tomata shown in Figure XVIII. Concerning 4:15-c, on the other hand,
Pietroski et al. hypothesized that – at least in an appropriate experi-
mental setting – it would involve the approximate number system (ANS,
see e.g. Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). The ANS and its rel-
evant predictions are briefly summarized in the next section, before
we discuss the experiment and results of Pietroski et al.
4.2.2.1 Numerical comparison in cogintive psychology and the ANS
Cognitive psychology offers a perspective on judgments of numeri-
cal inequality that differs from what is implemented in the automata
model (if not indicated otherwise, I follow Dehaene, 2007 in my expo-
sition of the ANS). Since the seminal study of Moyer and Landauer
(1967) it is assumed that the mental representations of numerical in-
formation are noisy and use an analog format. The main motivation
for this assumption was to explain so-called size and distance effects on
proportions of errors and RTs in number comparison or discrimina-
tion tasks that were observed by Moyer and Landauer and replicated
often since:
• Distance effect: Distant numbers are easier to compare than closer
ones;
• Size effect: For constant numerical distance, large numbers are
more difficult to compare than smaller ones.
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It is often argued that size and distance effects are incompatible with
typical digital, computer-like encodings of numbers – or at least un-
expected (e.g. Dehaene, 1997, ch. 9).
The hypothesis of noisy and analog mental representations has
two prominent formulations. Both share the core assumption that
a number or numerosity (an alternative term for the cardinality of a
set) n is represented by a normally distributed random variable Xn.
The log-Gaussian model (Dehaene & Changeux, 1993) assumes that
the mental representations of numerosities resemble Gaussian proba-
bility distributions over a logarithmically compressed mental number
line.
Hypothesis 4:16 (Log-Gaussian model). A numerosity n is mentally rep-
resented as a random variable Xn which is distributed normally with mean
log(n) and variance w2, for some constant w: Xn  N
 
log(n),w2

.
The variance w2 does not differ between the different n. In contrast,
the scalar variability model (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992) assumes that the
number line is not compressed, but the variance increases proportion-
ally with n2.
Hypothesis 4:17 (Scalar-variability model). A numerosity n is repre-
sented as Xn  N
 
n, (nw)2

, for some constant w.
On the basis of these hypotheses, proportions of errors in various
tasks that involve comparison or discrimination of numerosities can
be predicted using signal detection theory (SDT, see section 2.5). Specif-
ically, we may determine the optimal behavior given our assumptions
(cf. the Rational Analysis of Anderson, 1989, section 2.1.2). For the
case at hand, we consider the task to decide which of two numerosi-
ties, n and m, drawn from some set of possible numerosities, is larger.
Assuming equal priors and a uniform cost assignment (cf. section 2.5.1),
optimal behavior, in terms of minimizing Bayes risk (see Definition
2:30) and thus the probability of error, would be to choose n if the
“internal representation” of n is larger than that of m and to choose
m otherwise. Consequently, we predict the probability of a correct
response to simply be Pr(Xn   Xm > 0), where n is the larger nu-
merosity (cf. Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004; Dehaene, 2007, p.
538). Since according to both the log-Gaussian and the scalar variabil-
ity model Xn and Xm are normally distributed random variables, Xn
  Xm also has a normal distribution.
As in many other tasks the predictions of the log-Gaussian and
scalar variability model are so similar that they are difficult to dis-
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Figure XIX. Sketch of numerosity comparison in the log-Gaussian
model at Weber ratio 7:6. The probability density function p of the
difference Y = Xn   Xm is shown. The free parameter w is chosen
such that Pr(Xn   Xm > 0) = .75, i.e. correct responses are expected
in 75% of the cases. It is assumed that Xn and Xm are independent.
tinguish empirically. In both models comparison of numerosities is
subject to Weber’s law, which essentially states that discriminability
is ratio dependent. A measure for discriminability is the Weber ratio:
the ratio at which discrimination reaches some fixed level of perfor-
mance, e.g. 75% correct discriminations. A Weber ratio that is typical
for the comparison of numerosities using the ANS is 7:6 (cf. Piazza,
Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; Pica et al., 2004). This case
is sketched in Figure XIX. In both models, the Weber ratio, and per-
formance in general, are determined by the free model parameter w.
4.2.2.2 Comparison of numerosity vs. one-to-one (-plus) correspondence
Pietroski et al. (2009) conducted a picture verification experiment to
test whether there is a bias to verify the quantifier most using one
of the two verification procedures outlined above. In each trial of
the experiment, a picture of yellow and blue dots was shown to the
participants for a duration of 150ms. Their task was to answer the
question are most of the dots yellow on 360 successive trials. The ratios
of yellow to blue dots and their spatial arrangement was manipulated.
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(a) “scattered random” (b) “scattered pairs”
(c) “column pairs mixed” (d) “column pairs sorted”
Figure XX. Types of Visual Stimuli used by Pietroski et al. (2009) with
original labels.
There were nine ratios ranging from 2:1 to 10:9 and four different
types of arrangements. These four types are illustrated in Figure
XXa-d. In the first type, the dots were shown at random positions.
In the second, dots were presented in randomly positioned pairs of
one yellow and one blue dot in addition to a few remainders of one
color. In the third type, two columns of dots were presented and
dots of both colors appeared in both columns. Finally, in the fourth
type, two columns were presented that were sorted by color. The
dependent variable were proportions of correct responses.
It was reasoned that, if participants would tend to answer the
question by establishing one-to-one correspondence, the first type
of picture (cf. Figure XXa) should be the most difficult one and
should lead to the highest amount of errors. From the second through
the fourth type of picture (Figure XXb-c) difficulty should decrease.
Contrary to this prediction, all conditions except the sorted columns
(Figure XXc) led to comparable performance without any significant
differences. Furthermore, performance for these conditions was de-
scribed well (R2  .92) by the psychometric function derived from the
scalar variability model of the ANS. The best model fit was achieved
for w  .32. Additionally, the sorted columns led to performance
that would be expected for line length comparisons, which involve a
smaller parameter value, w  .04.
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The authors concluded that most is predominately verified via
comparison of cardinality and that this is its canonical verification
procedure. Subsequently, Lidz et al. (2011) explicitly formulated the
ITT (Hypothesis 4:12) and conducted a follow-up experiment to de-
cide between the specifications of truth conditions in 4:18-b-d.
(4:18) a. Most dots are blue.
b. jDot \ Bluej > jDot n Bluej
c. jDot \ Bluej > jDotj   jDot \ Bluej
d. jDot \ Bluej > åX2C jDot \ Xj
Yet again, all these truth conditions are equivalent but involve differ-
ent operations and thus conceivably may correspond to different ver-
ification procedures. All of them involve comparison of cardinalities.
But in addition, 4:18-b involves set complementation (A n B); 4:18-c
involves subtraction of cardinalities (jAj   jBj); and 4:18-d, lastly, is
based on summation of the cardinalities of the different non-blue
color sets of dots (C denotes a partition of the non-blue objects ac-
cording to color).
The experiment was designed to differentiate between a proce-
dure that corresponds to 4:18-d and the other two possibilities. To
achieve this, up to three additional colors were shown on the pictures
(cf. Figure XXIb). The procedure was identical to that of Pietroski et
al. (2009) except that the question was about blue instead of yellow
dots this time. It was predicted that performance should decrease
as the number of colors increases if the verification procedure would
involve estimation of multiple numerosities, as in 4:18-d. This predic-
tion followed from the observation that it is impossible to estimate
the numerosities of more than three sets of objects after observing a
picture for a time period as short as 150ms (Halberda, Sires, & Feigen-
son, 2006). Contrary to this prediction, performance was not affected
significantly by the color manipulation. Instead, the scalar variability
model explained the data well across conditions (w  .3,R2  .96).
Furthermore, Lidz et al. showed that a procedure that corresponds
to 4:18-c is an especially plausible candidate because it is compati-
ble with previously observed values of w for numerosity comparison.
Usually, adults performance in such tasks yields a value of w in the
range 0.1  0.2. Lidz et al. explain their larger estimate of w by ar-
guing that the cardinality of the entire restriction set, i.e. the set of
dots, enters the computation in the canonical verification procedure,
cf. 4:18-c. Since the cardinality of the restriction set is always larger
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(a) “2-Colors” (b) “5-Colors”
Figure XXI. Types of Visual Stimuli used by Lidz et al. (2011) with
original labels. They also used pictures with three and four colors.
than all the individual color sets, w is predicted to be larger than if
the numerosities of the two color sets would be compared directly.
If correct, this implies that the quantifier most does indeed introduce
a bias to use a suboptimal verification procedure, very much in line
with the ITT.
The data of Pietroski et al. (2009) and Lidz et al. (2011) support
the ITT. However, one may ask whether it was really the quantfier
most that introduced the bias to use the sketched verification proce-
dure or whether this bias was, at least to some degree, due to the
experimental procedure. In order to address this question, it is cru-
cial to compare different quantifiers. A few studies did this. Firstly,
Tomaszewicz (2013) compared different proportional quantifiers in
Polish and Bulgarian. Both languages have a proportional quantifi-
cational determiner that is equivalent to English most, referred to as
Most1. In Polish, this quantifier is written wi ,ekszos´c´; in Bulgarian, it
is povec˘eto. In addition these languages have a relative proportional
quantifier which is written najwi ,ecej in Polish and naj-mnogo in Bul-
garian. The latter is referred to as Most2. Its truth conditions can be
described as in the following equivalence, where C is again a partition
of the non-blue objects according to their color.
(4:19) Most2M(Dots, Blue) , 8X 2 C
 jDot \ Bluej > jDot \ Xj
In several experiments, Tomaszewicz investigated the verification
of these quantifiers using a similar experimental design as Lidz et al.
The finding that is most important for the present discussion was that,
as expected, in both languages verification of Most2 was affected by
the color manipulation whereas Most1 was not. When more than
two colors were shown on the pictures, performance dropped signif-
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icantly for Most2 but not for Most1. These results show clearly that
the meaning of a quantifier can affect verification procedures and, fur-
thermore, that verification procedures that depend on cardinalities of
multiple color subsets can be executed in these kinds of experiments.
4.2.3 Back to ‘most’ vs. ‘more than half’: “modified interface transperency”
Kotek, Sudo, and Hackl (2015) studied the verification procedures of
the Englisch quantifiers most and more than half in a sentence-picture
verification experiment. The starting point of their experiment was
the hypothesis that most but not more than half allows for a latent,
dispreferred relative reading akin to Most2 in Polish and Bulgarian
(Kotek, Sudo, Howard, & Hackl, 2011; Kotek, Sudo, Hackl, & Howard,
2011). They manipulated the ratio of blue to non-blue objects and the
number of non-blue colors on a picture. In contrast to the above
experiments, there was no time pressure. Although the relative read-
ing was expected to be strongly dispreferred it was reasoned that it
should be detectable in the picture verification data. The prediction
was that, without time pressure, the color manipulation should affect
the processing of most but not that of more than half. This predic-
tion was confirmed. In the critical conditions, less than half of the
objects had the target color. In these conditions more than half was
overwhelmingly judged as false. With regard to most, proportions of
judgments depended on the color manipulation. If there were more
objects in the target color than in any other color, sentences with most
were judged as true in a substantial number of trials. This is compati-
ble with the hypothesis that most is sometimes interpreted as Most2.
In order to reconcile their results with the seemingly conflicting
results of Lidz et al., Kotek et al. argue that the specific processing
demands of an experiment may constrain the readings and verifica-
tion procedures that are amenable to the participant. They propose a
modified version of the ITT in which both the specification of truth
conditions and the experimental task may constrain verification pro-
cedures (see, however, also Hunter, Lidz, Odi, & Wellwood, 2016 for
a very recent response arguing that Kotek et al. (2015) mistakingly
conflated the possible truth conditions a sentence can have with the
possible verification procedures that can be used to verify these truth
conditions):
Hypothesis 4:20 (Modified interface transparency thesis, mITT, Kotek
et al., 2015). When determining the truth or falsity of a statement in a given
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situation, speakers exhibit a bias towards using verification procedures that
employ operations specified as part of the truth-conditional import of the
statement, as supported by the task demands brought about by that situation.
The final study we discuss in the present section is a sentence-
picture verification experiment conducted by Steinert-Threlkeld et al.
(2015), who came to a similar conclusion. They compared the veri-
fication of most and more than half against the two types of pictures
Pietroski et al. labeled “scattered random” and “scattered pairs” (e.g.
XXa-b). As mentioned in section 4.1, Steinert-Threlkeld et al. noted
that Most can be recognized by a DFA if objects are presented in pairs
of targets and non-targets, as in Figure XXa. In the general case, DFA
are however insufficient to recognize Most. PDA are needed if ob-
jects are presented randomly and no pairing is provided, as in Figure
XXb. It was therefore predicted that there should be more working
memory involvement in the random than in the paired conditions.
This prediction was tested using a dual task experiment: While solv-
ing the verification task, participants had to memorize a sequence of
digits that was probed at the end of the trial. There were trials with
high and with low memory load.
RTs and proportions of errors were lower in the paired than in
the random conditions. Moreover, interactions of the memory load
and picture type manipulations were found for more than half but
not for most. These results are somewhat difficult to interpret be-
cause separate statistical analyses are reported for subsets of the data,
but it is not mentioned how multiple comparisons were controlled
for. The authors take their findings as evidence for a “constrained
relationship between specifications of truth conditions and verifica-
tion procedures.” Moreover, they challenge the claim of Hackl (2009)
that most is verified in terms of the above mentioned “vote-counting”
procedure. If it were, one would expect an interaction between the
memory load and picture type manipulations, as was the case for
more than half.
What may be added to their conclusions is that people can and
do make use of visually presented pairings when evaluating most
without time pressure. This complements the results of Pietroski et
al. (2009) who did not find this kind of facilitating effect when visual
stimuli were presented for short periods of time. Moreover, the study
provides further support for the mITT.
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4.2.4 Summary
There is accumulating evidence for a constrained relationship be-
tween specifications of truth conditions and verification procedures
and more specifically for the ITT. This evidence comes in two forms.
Firstly, it was repeatedly found that providing additional informa-
tion that could potentially facilitate or hamper sentence-picture ver-
ification (e.g. pairings of objects or additional colors) only shows
effects if it is relevant to the purported canonical verification proce-
dure associated with a quantifier (Pietroski et al., 2009; Lidz et al.,
2011; Tomaszewicz, 2013). Secondly, it was shown that quantifiers
with similar, or even identical, truth conditions may be affected dif-
ferently by these kinds of manipulations (Hackl, 2009; Kotek et al.,
2015; Steinert-Threlkeld et al., 2015). However, there are also some
unresolved issues. For example, there is a conflict between the con-
clusions of Lidz et al. (2011), who do not find an effect of the number
of colors in a picture on the verification of most, and those of Kotek et
al. (2015), who find such effects. Similarly, Pietroski et al. (2009) and
Steinert-Threlkeld et al. (2015) report conflicting results with regard
to the effect of visually salient pairings on the difficulty of verifying
most. To resolve such conflicts the mITT was introduced that takes
task demands into account beside specifications of truth conditions.
A goal for future research is to specify processing models of sentence
picture verification in such a way that task demands can be factored
in to derive specific predictions.
4.3 conclusions
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discus-
sion. Firstly, processing predictions concerning the verification of
quantified sentences against visual contexts can be derived by amend-
ing semantic theory with minimal processing assumptions. One ap-
proach we have seen was to conceive of quantified sentences and their
truth conditions as decision problems and use the theory of formal
languages and automata to derive processing predictions. In partic-
ular, this approach enables us to predict the minimal computational
resources that are needed to solve a verification task under standard
semantic assumptions. Another approach was to use probabilistic
models from cognitive psychology that are built upon the theory of
hypothesis testing and signal detection. In particular, the assumption
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that the ANS is involved in quantifier verification was used to predict
and model proportions of errors in verification tasks.
Secondly, we have seen that the verification procedures that are ac-
tually used are not always the optimal or most efficient ones. Instead,
how the truth conditions are specified seems to constrain the range
of possible procedures used to verify or falsify quantified sentences.
For example, Lidz et al. (2011) concluded from their experimental re-
sults that, in order to answer the question whether most of the dots
are blue a specific verification procedure is used. It involves estimat-
ing the cardinality of the non-blue dots. This cardinality is estimated
by ‘subtracting’ the cardinality of the blue ones from the cardinality
of the entire restrictor set, namely the dots. This results in worse
performance than if the cardinality of the set of non-blue dots was
estimated directly. Especially, in case where there are only two colors
of dots, this is a striking conclusion because a suboptimal procedure
to verify its truth conditions seems to be enforced by the quantifier.
Moreover, there seems to be some variation in what verification
procedures are used for a particular quantified sentence. Thus, while
the specification of truth conditions introduces a bias to use certain
procedures, additional factors seem to be at play that determine which
of the possible alternatives is actually used. In particular, task de-
mands may influence which procedures are possible or constrain the
available ones further. Two examples we have seen were whether the
task introduces time pressure and how the visual contexts are pre-
sented.
A number of interesting open questions can be singled out. Con-
cerning the automata model, it is an open question what a suitable
linking hypothesis is. We saw that some automata theoretic distinc-
tions are reflected in processing data whereas others are not. More-
over, it is an open question how erroneous performance can be incor-
porated into this model. Furthermore, it is an interesting question
whether and how the ANS and the auomata model can be integrated.
For example, what assumption do they share or where do their pre-
dictions diverge?
Another open question is how exactly verification procedures of
quantified sentences are constrained by truth conditions and task de-
mands in combination. For example: Which are possible verification
procedures for a given sentence and which are not? What do the
possible procedures have in common? How can task demands favor
one over the other? What is needed are explicit models that take
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compositional specifications of truth conditions and task demands
into account. Such models should identify what aspects of the possi-
ble verification procedures are fixed, where variation is possible and
what factors affect this variability.
In the following chapter we study a case that poses interesting
challenges to the hypotheses and models discussed in the present
section. An extension of existing models and a specific implementa-
tion of the ITT is proposed that addresses some of the questions just
posed.
5
COMPARATIVE MODIF IED NUMERALS : AN
EMPIR ICALLY MOTIVATED , INTEGRATED
PROCESS ING MODEL OF TRUTH-EVALUATION1
The present chapter is concerned with differences in processing diffi-
culty between UE and DE comparative modified numerals like more
than five and fewer than five in verification tasks (recall the definition
of direction of entailment from 2.2, Definition 2:8). As we will see, this
is an interesting test case to investigate the relation between seman-
tic theory, processing models and experimental data and also one
that is particularly informative regarding the questions discussed in
the previous chapter. A range of data from psycholinguistic exper-
iments indicate that the DE cases are more difficult to process than
the UE ones. While there are some studies that found effects dur-
ing online comprehension (Bott, Klein, & Schlotterbeck, 2013) or in
reasoning tasks (Geurts & van der Slik, 2005), most studies focused
on sentence-picture verification or falsification (Koster-Moeller, Var-
voutis, & Hackl, 2008; Geurts et al., 2010; Szymanik & Zajenkowski,
2013). These studies consistently found longer RTs for the DE condi-
tions than for the UE ones.2
How the increased difficulty of the DE versions comes about is not
well understood yet. From the perspective of the semantic automata
model (see section 4.1), the increased difficulty of fewer than n as com-
pared to more than n is completely unexpected. Without introducing
ad hoc auxiliary assumptions, the automata model does not explain
the observed effects. How about ANS models? If the log-Gaussian
model of the ANS (see section 4.2.2.1) is combined with models of the
1A compact version of the integrated processing model and Experiments 3 and 4 were
presented at the workshop “Experimental Approaches to Semantics” at ESSLLI 2015
(Schlotterbeck, 2015).
2 The processing difficulty of other UE and DE quantifiers, beside modified numerals,
during sentence-picture verification was also studied experimentally. We restrict
ourselves to comparative modified numerals here in order to keep the discussion
focused. The discussion is extended to other quantifiers in the following chapter, 6.
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processes underlying decisions under uncertainty (namely sequential
sampling models and most notably the drift diffusion model DDM; see
Ratcliff, 1978 and section 2.5.2), it accounts well for RTs and propor-
tions of errors in tasks that involve number comparison (e.g. Ratcliff,
2008; Dehaene, 2007). Concerning the processing difficulty of modi-
fied numerals, the DDM does, however, only explain the mentioned
findings if the model is interpreted somewhat liberally and is, fur-
thermore, enriched with additional assumptions.
In line with the ITT (Hypothesis 4:12), one potential explanation
of the mentioned effects would be that they are due to the complex-
ity of the involved semantic representations, or specifications of truth
conditions. For example, a range of theoretical proposals assume
that DE quantifiers contain covert negation while UE quantifiers do
not (e.g. Just & Carpenter, 1971; Jacobs, 1980; Keenan & Stavi, 1986;
Penka & Stechow, 2001). Covert negation could lead to enhanced RT
because it may correspond to an additional processing step (cf. Just &
Carpenter, 1971, Geurts et al., 2010 and also Kaup, Zwaan, & Lu¨dtke,
2007 for a review of studies on negation in non-quantificational sen-
tences). Similarly, recent proposals in the semantic literature assume
an order- or scale-reversing operator in fewer than but not in more than
(Rullmann, 1995; I. Heim, 2006; Bu¨ring, 2007a). However, these pro-
posals are generally not formulated as processing models and thus
do not make immediate predictions about the processing difficulty of
modified numerals. Again, auxiliary assumptions have to be made.
Below, a modified version of the latter proposals is formulated
that incorporates minimal and well-motivated processing assump-
tions. In particular, this integrated processing model (IPM) is based
on the following hypothesis (cf. R. Clark & Grossman, 2007; Pietroski
et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 5:1. The representation and processing of numerical quanti-
fiers is built upon the representations of approximate numerosity and the
processes that operate on them.
The starting point in devolping the integrated processing model
(IPM) are the semantic building blocks usually assumed in theories
of comparatives (e.g. von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 1997) and com-
parative quantifiers (e.g. Hackl, 2000). The latter are extended as to
incorporate lexical decomposition involving a scale reversing opartor
(e.g. Rullmann, 1995). Next, noisy representations of numbers and
numerosities are ‘plugged in.’ This step is similar to what Pietroski
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et al. (2009) proposed regarding the quantifier most, but the current
proposal goes beyond that of Pietroski et al. in two respects. Firstly, it
is formulated in a compositional fashion: As a result of introducing
noisy representations, other lexical items also receive non-standard
interpretations to achieve compatibility. In addition, non-standard
computations are used to combine the lexical items. Secondly, verifi-
cation and falsification processes are described in terms of the sequen-
tial sampling models alluded to above (e.g. Ratcliff, 1978). Thus, RTs
are modeled in addition to proportions of errors. This is obviously
crucial to explain the time required to verify or falsify the modified
numerals.
The proposed model also makes novel predictions. These were
tested in two experiments. The first (Experiment 3a, section 5.4) col-
lected RTs and proportions of errors in an ordinary sentence-picture
verification task. It was designed to disentangle effects of how nu-
merical information is processed from effects due to the direction of
entailment – specifically of an additional processing step in the DE
conditions. The second (Experiment 4, section 5.5) used the response-
signal speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) procedure (Dosher, 1979) in or-
der to substantiate conclusions drawn from the first experiment and
to decide between alternative explanations. The experimental results
provide support for the proposed IPM.
Towards the end of the chapter, the following theoretically rele-
vant points are discussed. Firstly, the essential components of the
IPM were motivated independently. This increases credibility relative
to other alternatives, at least in the absence of further information.
Secondly, because it can be seen as an implementation of the ITT,
it provides an interface to classical semantic theory and also to the
automata model. Finally, it is embedded in a theoretical framework
(see Bogacz et al., 2006, and references therein) that makes reference
to all three levels proposed by Marr (1982) (see section 2.1.1) for the
analysis of cognitive information processing systems. Thus, it can be
extended at different levels.
5.1 proccessing difficulty of ue vs . de comparative
modified numerals during truth evaluation
In several experiments, it was found that sentences with DE compar-
ative modified numerals of the form fewer than n take longer to verify
or falsify than sentences with their UE counterparts of the form more
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than n. The first experiment I am aware of was conducted by Koster-
Moeller et al. (2008, experiment 1) who used the self-paced counting
method (described in section 4.2.1; see also Hackl, 2009) and had par-
ticipants evaluate sentences like the following.
(5:2) a. More than seven of the dots are blue.
b. Fewer than eight of the dots are blue.
In addition to these, Koster-Moeller et al. also included superla-
tive modified numerals into their experiment, e.g. at least eight and
at most seven. The question they were mainly interested in is closely
related to the ITT. They asked whether alternative specifications of
equivalent truth conditions (e.g. using more than seven vs. at least
eight or fewer than eight vs. at most seven) correspond to different veri-
fication procedures. From today’s perspective, partly due to the data
reported by Koster-Moeller et al., the assumption that comparative
and superlative modified numerals are semantically equivalent at any
level of representation seems questionable (e.g. Geurts & Nouwen,
2007; Geurts et al., 2010; Nouwen, 2010b; Kennedy, 2015), however.
The second question Koster-Moeller et al. investigated was whether
and how the direction of entailment influences verification proce-
dures. They derived specific predictions about processing difficulty
of UE and DE quantifiers during verification and falsification from a
hypothesis that was put forward by Barwise and Cooper (1981, pp.
191–193). We will consider these predictions briefly below, in section
5.1.1. What’s important for now is that DE modified numerals were
found to be more difficult to evaluate than UE ones, something that
does not follow from Barwise and Cooper (1981). In particular, sen-
tences as in 5:2 were evaluated against visual contexts that always
contained seven or eight objects in the target color. In each experi-
mental trial, correct decisions could only be made after the last frame
was examined. RTs on the final frame were significantly longer for
DE less than eight than for UE more than seven. On average, the DE ver-
sions took roughly 200ms longer to evaluate than the UE ones which
led to a significant main effect of the direction of entailment.
In another experiment, Geurts et al. (2010, experiment 3) had their
participants verify and falsify sentences like there are more than two /
fewer than three As. In each experimental trial, a complete sentence
was first read self-paced. Afterwards, an array of letters, e.g. As,
was examined. Across experimental trials, the number of presented
letters was distributed uniformly between the numbers one through
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four. The participants’ task was to provide a truth-value judgment
as fast as possible by pressing one of two response keys. As Koster-
Moeller et al., Geurts et al. were also mainly interested in differences
between comparative and superlative quantifiers. Again, we focus on
the comparative ones here. The direction of entailment did not affect
sentence reading times or the proportions of errors, but, crucially, the
DE quantifiers did take significantly longer to judge than UE ones.
On average, there was a difference of about 250ms between fewer than
three and more than two. These results are impressive because they
are based on only two judgments per condition by 32 participants;
and, furthermore, the experimental task does not seem to pose any
particular difficulty.
Finally, Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2013) presented Polish sen-
tences that translate as more than seven / fewer than eight cars are blue
to their participants (see also Szymanik, 2016, pp. 69–74). These were
combined with pictures of parking lots showing cars in two different
colors. There were always seven or eight target objects, e.g. blue cars.
3 Sixty-nine participants provided four judgments per condition each.
Again, the DE and the UE conditions did not differ in sentence read-
ing times or proportions of errors, but the DE conditions did take
significantly (about 750ms) longer to judge than the UE conditions.
5.1.1 A note on interactions with truth values
In the present chapter, the main focus is on the enhanced difficulty of
fewer than n as compared to more than n. In addition to this main ef-
fect, both Koster-Moeller et al. (2008) and Szymanik and Zajenkowski
(2013) also found that the direction of entailment interacted with
truth-values (superficially similar to effects found in studies on nega-
tion, cf. Kaup et al., 2007). However, the form of the interaction
differed between the two studies. A short comment is in order here
on how to reconcile these seemingly incompatible findings (cf. also
Szymanik, 2016). This short digression also provides additional mo-
tivation for the reflection on potential processing models in the next
section.
Koster-Moeller et al. found that within the conditions that re-
quired a “yes, true” response, UE quantifiers were judged faster than
the DE ones, but in the false conditions the opposite pattern was
3 I use the term target object to refer to objects that have both the property expressed
in the restriction and the scope of a modified numeral.
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observed. These results had been predicted based on Barwise and
Cooper (1981). In contrast, Szymanik and Zajenkowski found that,
within the false conditions, the DE modified numerals were judged
considerably slower than UE ones whereas RTs did not differ within
the true conditions.
In accordance with the mITT (Kotek et al., 2015, Hypothesis 4:20),
these discrepancies are plausibly due to divergent task demands of
the self-paced counting and the ordinary picture verification task (cf.
Szymanik, 2016, pp. 74–76 for an explanation in terms of task de-
mands within the automata theoretic framework). In particular, self-
paced counting presumably involves relatively high memory load (cf.
the discussion by Troiani, Peelle, Clark, & Grossman, 2009 concern-
ing different modes of presenting visual stimuli that was referred to
in section 4.1.3). Moreover, repeated motor responses have to be pre-
pared and executed taking into account anticipation of yet unseen
visual information. Importantly, these factors may affect the UE and
DE quantifiers differently in the true and false conditions. For exam-
ple, compare the case in which more than seven is true to that where
fewer than eight is true. In the latter, extra time may be spent before
the truth-value judgment is given in a self-paced counting trial in
order to ensure that all target objects have indeed been taken into ac-
count. If some are not remembered or have not yet been uncovered,
an erroneous judgment would be the result. In the false cases, the sit-
uation is exactly reversed. In ordinary sentence-picture verification,
such effects are not expected or should at least be much smaller be-
cause target objects are easily accessible. On the other hand, RTs in
ordinary sentence-picture verification reflect at least two processing
components: the process of deciding between “yes, true” and “no,
false” and the process of cardinality estimation or counting. The lat-
ter is most likely responsible for the interaction effect observed by
Szymanik and Zajenkowski. The self-paced counting method allows
for separation of these two processing components.
What’s crucial to recognize here is the importance of explicit pro-
cessing models. In the absence of an explicit model that takes into ac-
count the specific demands of the experimental tasks, the mentioned
findings may appear incompatible. But a completely natural explana-
tion may be found once such a model is specified. Obviously, explicit
models are for similar reasons also a prerequisite to sound interpre-
tations of the experimental data with regard to the hypotheses one
aims to investigate .
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5.2 candidate processing models
The present section discusses potential processing models of the truth
evaluation of modified numerals. It is asked whether and how these
models can explain the experimental results discussed in the previous
section. Furthermore, ways of amending existing models to accom-
modate the experimental result are highlighted.
5.2.1 Automata model
Under the automata model, the mentioned results are surprising. Fig-
ure XXII depicts and explains the minimal DFA for the quantifiers
more than two and fewer than three (see also section 4.1). They exe-
cute certain counting procedures. The minimal automata for other
modified numerals work completely analogous. Under none of the
linking hypotheses discussed in section 4.1.2, namely hypotheses 4:9
through 4:11, are any differences in RTs expected between the DE
and the UE modified numerals. If we adopt the strongest of the three
linking hypotheses, i.e. 4:10, which states that the minimal DFA are
realistic descriptions of verification procedures, the time needed for
verification or falsification is predicted by the number of processing
steps the automata take. Obviously, the automata for the DE and
UE modified numerals need the same number of steps. How many
are needed only depends on the number of presented objects. As this
was counterbalanced across conditions in the mentioned experiments,
the prolonged processing time of the DE conditions is incompatible
with this linking hypothesis. Moreover, since the minimal DFA im-
plement the simplest possible verification procedures for modified
numerals under their standard semantics, another conclusion can be
drawn: Either the assumed semantics of the modified numerals are
not accurate or they are not verified or falsified using the simplest
possible procedures. This may be considered indirect evidence for
the ITT: How truth conditions are specified determines how they are
verified or falsified.
To explain the enhanced difficulty of DE vs. UE modified nu-
merals, Szymanik (2016) suggested the following ad hoc hypothesis:
“‘passing through accepting states’ is more difficult than ‘passing
through rejecting states”’ (p. 73). This hypothesis predicts that the
effect of the direction of entailment should increase with the numeral
because larger numerals require more states. Whether this prediction
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(a) MoreThanTwo
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(b) FewerThanThree
Figure XXII. Semantic automata for the modified numerals more than
two (top) and fewer than three (bottom). To explain how they work: If
there is one target object and no other objects, both automata would
read 1 and move to q1. Thus, after two steps, the upper automaton
would return false and the lower one would return true. If there are
three target objects and no other restrictor elements, the computation
would take six steps. The upper automaton would return true and
the lower one would return false.
is correct remains an open question. Apart from this empirical ques-
tion, the explanation also faces a conceptual problem. If we combine
multiple DE quantifiers, difficulty seems to increase. For example,
compare 5:3-a to 5:3-b. Intuitively, the latter sentence seems to be
more difficult to understand than the former, but they are logically
equivalent.
(5:3) a. Every boy tickled some girl.
b. No boy tickled no girl.
Assuming the observed intuitive difference in quantificational com-
plexity is empirically valid (cf. Bott et al., 2013; Bott, Schlotterbeck, &
Klein, n.d.), how can this difference be accounted for in the automata
model? Even if the model is augmented with the just mentioned hy-
pothesis, this seems non-trivial because the simplest DFA for the two
sentences are identical (see Steinert-Threlkeld & Icard, 2013, p. 169).
5.2 candidate processing models 115
5.2.2 Sequential sampling models of number comparison
As was described in section 4.2.2.1, cognitive psychology offers mod-
els on the processing of numerical information that allow us to pre-
dict performance in tasks that involve comparison of numerosities.
In particular, it is assumed in these models that the ANS is based on
analog and noisy representations of numerosity (see Moyer & Lan-
dauer, 1967). Based on this assumption, we can use SDT (see section
2.5) to determine optimal behavior in numerosity comparison tasks
and thus derive predictions about performance (e.g. Dehaene, 2007).
Moreover, we saw in section 4.2.2 that performance in verification of
certain natural language quantifiers can also be modeled successfully
this way (Pietroski et al., 2009; Lidz et al., 2011; Tomaszewicz, 2013).
For the case at hand, we aim to describe RTs in addition to pro-
portions of errors. Interestingly, similar considerations that allow us
to derive predictions about proportions of errors in terms of SDT,
namely what would be the optimal response strategy given our as-
sumptions, can also be used to derive a processing model that pre-
dicts RT. One assumption that is added to this end is that decisions
are based on a sequence of observations sampled repeatedly from a
noisy representation. This naturally leads to a description of the de-
cision process as a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) (see section
2.5.2 and also Bogacz et al., 2006). The general idea behind using the
SPRT as a model of decision making is that people start out uncertain
about their decision – although there may be response biases – and
then gradually move towards one of the response alternatives while
they accumulate a noisy signal during the decision process. The rate
of accumulation (or drift rate or step size) is determined by the log
likelihood ratio (LLR, see section 2.5.1) of the two response alterna-
tives – or, more accurately, the two hypotheses – given the current
observation.
The decision is made as soon as the LLR crosses one of two prede-
fined response boundaries, i.e. a certain level of confidence is reached.
A famous implementation is the drift diffusion model (DDM, also ex-
plained and motivated briefly in section 2.5.2) of Ratcliff (1978), which
can be considered the continuous time analog of the SPRT. Because
the DDM implements the optimal response strategy, it can be consid-
ered a parsimonious and well-motivated processing model (cf. the
Rational Analysis of Anderson, 1989). Thus, it may not come as a
surprise that the processes described by the model, in particular, ac-
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cumulation of a noisy signal to form a decision variable, were identi-
fied in neural circuits involved in perceptual decision making (see e.g.
Gold & Shadlen, 2001 and also Forstmann et al., 2016 for a review).
In the DDM, the total response time is the sum of a non-decision
time including perception, motor processes, etc. and a decision time,
the time needed by the diffusion process for response selection. The
diffusion process is governed by the drift rate, the response bias (or rel-
ative starting point) and the decision boundaries, which specifies how
conservative subjects are in providing a response. The DDM was
successfully used to model various aspects of decision processes in
numerosity comparison tasks (for discussion see Dehaene, 2007, pp.
543–551 and references there). In particular, size and distance effects
(see section 4.2.2.1) on proportions of errors and on RTs can be ex-
plained jointly. Under the assumption of log-Gaussian representa-
tions, one general prediction concerning comparison of numerosities
is that the drift rate should be proportional to the log-ratio of the two
numerosities (Dehaene, 2007, pp. 548).
5.2.2.1 Application to modified numerals
How could the verification or falsification of modified numerals pro-
ceed given these assumptions? We may think of the evaluation of
more than n against a context with m target objects as follows. The se-
mantic interpretation of more than n introduces a numerical criterion
of n+ 0.5 to which m is compared. The mean step size or drift rate is
then predicted to be proportional to log((n+ 0.5)/m). 4 It is positive
if there are more than n target objects and negative otherwise. A pos-
itive drift approaches the decision boundary for the“yes”-response
while a negative drift approaches the “no”-response. The evaluation
of fewer than n against m target objects could proceed similarly. Here,
the decision criterion would be n  0.5 and the mean step size would
be  log((n  0.5)/m).
Applying this model to the discussed experimental data on com-
parative modified numerals (Koster-Moeller et al., 2008; Geurts et al.,
2010; Szymanik & Zajenkowski, 2013), we first note that the experi-
4Note that a drift rate of log(n/m), which would be predicted if the task was to
choose the larger of two numerosities, would not do the job. On the assumption of
this drift rate, participants would be purely guessing when they evaluate more than
n against n target objects. This is clearly inadequate. Note, however that adding (or
subtracting) a constant value of 0.5 to (or from) n is non-trivial when we operate
on the logarithmic scale (Dehaene, 2007, pp. 561ff.). This is problematic if we want
to derive the criteria n 0.5 compositionally from more than and n. An alternative
model that overcomes this problem is discussed below in section 5.3).
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ments share a similar, symmetrical design. In all three experiments,
quantifiers of the form more than n and fewer than n+1 (e.g. more than
seven and fewer than eight) had to be evaluated. Both introduce the
same numerical criterion c = n+ 0.5. The two quantifiers had to be
evaluated against pictures showing c  a target objects (e.g. seven
and eight target objects). The corresponding drift rates are predicted
to be proportional to log(c/(c+ a)) and log(c/(c  a)). Since ce-
teris paribus drift rates with larger absolute values produce faster deci-
sions, we see that more than n should be judged faster when it is false
(i.e. evaluated against c   a target objects) than when it is true (i.e.
evaluated against c+ a target objects) and that the opposite holds for
fewer than n. The overall decision times for the UE and DE conditions
should be symmetrical and no effect of the direction of entailment is
expected.
However, if we additionally take into account the uncontroversial
assumption that there is a general bias towards “yes”-responses in
verification tasks, the effect of the direction of entailment is accounted
for. In the DDM, response biases are modeled as diffusion processes
that start closer to one of the response boundaries than to the other. A
bias towards “yes”-responses implies that these are generally faster.
In consequence, the difference in drift rates between the two false
conditions has a larger effect than the difference between the two
true cases. In line with the experimental findings, the cases with more
than n are thus judged faster on average than the cases with fewer
than n. For fewer than n, the slower drift rate coincides with the more
difficult “no”-response which amplifies the relative difficulty of this
condition. In contrast, the relative difficulty of the true more than n
condition is not pronounced as much because, as an effect of the bias,
the boundary for “yes”-response is reached relatively fast.
a potential objection. At this point, the reader may object
that the model is implausible. In particular, it relies on the ANS
whereas the exact number system (see e.g. Feigenson et al., 2004) seems
to be at play in the reported experiments: In all three experiments, the
number of presented target objects was close to the decision criterion
and still there were only few errors. Furthermore, in the experiment
of Koster-Moeller et al. (2008), exact counting was invited by the self-
paced counting task; in the study of Geurts et al. (2010), the tested nu-
merals were so small that exact representations should be provided
by the subitizing system (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949;
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Feigenson et al., 2004); and, finally, the data of Szymanik and Za-
jenkowski (2013) may seem incompatible with approximation since
RTs were relatively long.
While this is a reasonable objection, we should bare in mind that
the distinction between exact and approximate representations is not
always clear-cut. With regard to subitizing, there have been lively de-
bates as to what its status is (e.g Balakrishnan & Ashby, 1992; Revkin,
Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008). Furthermore, the original
experiment of Moyer and Landauer (1967), which established the em-
pirical foundation for noisy representations of numbers in the first
place, employed a task where Arabic numerals had to be compared.
Contrary to fact, this may often be expected to trigger exact rather
than approximate representations. Finally, the DDM can – although
not the norm – produce long decision times with arbitrarily few er-
rors if the decision boundaries are spread apart sufficiently wide.
Putting these issues aside for now, the least we can say is the fol-
lowing. Given the just outlined model of how modified numerals are
evaluated, we should be able to design experiments almost identical
to the above-mentioned which produce apparent effects of the direc-
tion of entailment that are in fact due to number processing. This
should be possible just by forcing participants to rely on approximate
representations. For illustration, Figure XXIII sketches two sample
paths of the diffusion processes and the expected distributions of RTs
for the four conditions in such a hypothetical experiment. These con-
siderations suffice to motivate an experimental design that can disen-
tangle effects of the semantic complexity of modified numerals from
effects that are caused solely by the processing of noisy numerical
information (see Experiment 3a, section 5.4).
5.2.3 Application of the ITT: additional operators
Adopting the ITT, a potential explanation could be based on addi-
tional semantic operations that take part in the specification of truth
conditions of sentences containing fewer than but are not involved in
more-than constructions. Two examples of such operations, namely
covert negation and antonym operators, are discussed here.
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Figure XXIII. In the center of the figure two sample paths of a diffu-
sion process are sketched that correspond to the evaluation of com-
parative modified numerals in a hypothetical experiment. At the top
blue and red crosses show first passage times sample paths crossing
the “yes”-boundary when more than n (blue) or fewer than n+1 (red)
is evaluated. The blue (more than n) and red (fewer than n+1) curves
show the corresponding expected distribution of RTs for the “yes”-
responses. The vertical lines show the means. At the bottom the same
is shown for “no”-responses (blue: more than n, red: fewer than n+1).
The data were simulated using the Rwiener package (Wabersich, 2014)
for R (R Core Team, 2015). In addition to what is described in the
running text, it was assumed that a larger number of to-be-estimated
objects leads to longer non-decision times (Dehaene, 1997).
5.2.3.1 Covert Negation
Several theoretical proposals argue for covert negation in DE quan-
tifiers for a variety of reasons (e.g. H. Clark & Chase, 1972; Jacobs,
1980; Keenan & Stavi, 1986; Penka & Stechow, 2001). One famous
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example is the assumption that negative indefinites (e.g. German
kein) are composed of negation and an existential quantifier. Covert
negation may, in turn, correspond to an extra processing step in the
canonical verification procedure associated with a quantifier. That
such an additional step would cause observable difficulty is plausible
since numerous studies have found enhanced processing difficulty in
negated sentences (see e.g. the review by Kaup et al., 2007 and also
Just & Carpenter, 1971; H. Clark & Chase, 1972). In fact, this is how
Geurts et al. (2010) interpret their data.
Processing models that attribute enhanced difficulty of DE quan-
tifiers to covert negation may take various forms. For example, both
the automata model and the sequential sampling model described
above can be amended with an extra processing step that switches
“yes, true” to “no, false” and vice versa before the final truth-value
judgment. Generally, any processing model of quantifier verification
can be amended this way because (i), per definition, negation swaps
truth values, and (ii) any DE quantifier is equivalent to the negation
of a suitable UE counterpart (see e.g. Peters & Westersta˚hl, 2006,
ch. 5). For example, in terms of GQT, FewerThanThree is logically
equivalent to :MoreThanTwo.
Especially if they are based on the ITT, processing models of quan-
tification should be plausible with respect to classical semantic con-
siderations. It is noteworthy that Penka (2011, 2012), who endorses
decomposition of the German Aristotelian quantifier kein (no), con-
siders decomposition of fewer than n into not more than n-1 implau-
sible. Among other things, her reasoning is based on the fact that
this kind of decomposition is morphologically opaque. Furthermore,
decomposition of fewer than n into not at least n is implausible on em-
pirical grounds: It has been shown in reasoning and verification tasks
that comparative and superlative modified numerals like for example
more than five and at least six are neither semantically equivalent nor
interdefinable (e.g. Geurts et al., 2010).
5.2.3.2 Antonym operators
Recent semantic theory posits an operotar called few or little, re-
spectively, in constructions containing fewer than or less than. (e.g.
Rullmann, 1995; I. Heim, 2006, 2008; Bu¨ring, 2007a, 2007b; Solt, 2009,
2014; Beck, 2012b; Penka, 2015). When applied to gradable adjectives
(see section 2.6), these operators yield the respective anotnyms. Thus,
they are often referred to as antonym operators or antonymizers. They
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constitute an alternative to covert negation that is arguably more plau-
sible from a linguistic stand point. 5 In the present section, a short
summary is given of how antonym operators are motivated with re-
gard to ordinary comparatives, which involve gradable adjectives (see
section 2.6). After that, I sketch the application of the syntax and se-
mantics of ordinary comparatives to comparative modified numerals,
as suggested, for example, by Hackl (2000). Below, in section 5.3, a
processing model is developed that contains a processing step corre-
sponding to few.
little in comparatives. In her seminal syntactic analysis of com-
parative constructions, Bresnan (1973) proposed that fewer is the
phonological spell-out of -er few and less that of -er little. The mor-
pheme -er is called the comparative morpheme. Thus, -er little, pro-
nounced as less, is the comparative form of little; and -er few, pro-
nounced as fewer, is the comparative form of few. On the basis of this
assumption, Bresnan postulated identical morphosyntactic structure
for less as for expressions like very little, so little or as little. Like-
wise, fewer is completely parallel to very few, so few or as few. Today,
Bresnan’s assumptions are widely adopted. The following discussion
is restricted to less, but fewer works just the same in most respects
(for discussion of the differences between these two lexical items see
e.g. Solt, 2009). Moreover, the discussion is based on English, but
it applies equally to German, which was tested in the experiments
reported below.
Rullmann (1995) suggested that, once we acknowledge that less
spells out -er little, ambiguities in sentences like 5:4 are naturally ac-
counted for. He observed that sentences of this kind may receive one
of the two readings exemplified in 5:4-a and 5:4-b whereas the ambi-
guity disappears if less high is replaced with higher (see also Seuren,
1979; a collection of natural examples was provided by Bu¨ring, 2007b;
for a questionaire study using German materials see Beck, 2012b).
(5:4) The helicopter was flying less high than a plane can fly.
a. The height of the helicopter was below the maximum height
planes can reach.
b. The height of the helicopter was below the minimum height
planes can reach.
5Usually, no such operator is assumed in more-than constructions although in some
proposals a semantically vacuous identity function, much or many, is assumed to
be part of the semantics of more than (Bu¨ring, 2007a; Solt, 2014).
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Rullmann explains this ambiguity as follows. Phonologically, less high
is unambiguous and spells out -er little high. Semantically, however,
little has two compositional options. Firstly, it can compose with the
comparative morpheme -er to its left. Alternatively, it can compose
with the gradable adjective high to its right. The former option leads
to the reading in 5:4-a whereas the latter leads to 5:4-b. Thus, the
ambiguity in 5:4 lends support to the decomposition hypothesis.
To see how Rullmann’s explanation works concretely, we take a
look at the syntax and semantics of comparative sentences (see also
section 2.6). One common assumption is that sentences like 5:4 are
subject to comparative deletion (Bresnan, 1973), a generative rule that
elides material from the comparative clause, i.e. the clause spanning the
words from the immediate right of than until the end of the sentence.
The contrast between 5:5-a and 5:5-b illustrates the effect of this rule.
A key idea in Rullmann’s account is that there may sometimes be
multiple alternatives as to how the elided material can be recovered
when interpreting sentences that are subject to comparative deletion.
(5:5) a. Elin’s hands are wider than Simon’s feet are long.
b. Elin’s hands are wider than Simon’s feet are (*wide).
(cf. Kennedy, 2002)
Another common assumption is that comparative clauses con-
tain a silent operator related to a gap inside the clause. Specifi-
cally, Rullmann adopts an influential suggestion by Chomsky (1977)
that an instance of wh-movement is observed in comparative clauses.
Chomsky’s suggestion is supported by the observation that compara-
tive clauses are subject to similar constraints as constructions involv-
ing wh-movement, for example so-called island constraints. For brief
illustration, compare the wh-island in 5:6-a to the non-island comple-
ment clause in 5:6-b (for further discussion see also Kennedy, 2002).
(5:6) a. *The bag was heavier than I asked whether it was.
b. The bag was heavier than I claimed it was.
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure XXIV, which shows
two alternative structural representations that mediate between the
sentence in 5:5 and its possible semantic interpretations. Crucial to
Rullmann’s explanation of the ambiguity is the following. Depend-
ing, on whether little is combined with the comparative morpheme
-er, as shown in Figure XXIVa, or with the gradable adjective high,
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as shown in Figure XXIVb, the elided material is recovered as high
or little high, respectively. These two possibilities correspond to the
two possible readings of 5:4. Following a suggestion of von Ste-
chow (1984), op is semantically interpreted as a maximality opera-
tor (or supremum, if needed) and the comparative clause is thereby
interpreted as a maximal degree (which one can think of as real num-
bers, see section 2.6.1 for discussion). Furthermore, little is an order-
reversing operator, which can be implemented as a mapping from
degrees, d, to their inverse (with respect to addition),  d (see I. Heim,
2006). Skipping some detail for now, the two possibilities in 5:6-a,b
thereby encode the truth conditions of the two readings:
(5:7) a. 9d height(heli) =  d^ d >  maxfd : a plane can fly d highg
b. 9d height(heli) =  d^ d > maxfd : a plane can fly  d highg,
which are equivalent to the somewhat simpler:
(5:8) a. height(heli) < maxfd : a plane can fly d highg
b. height(heli) < minfd : a plane can fly d highg.
While agreeing with Rullmann’s (1995) basic idea, I. Heim (2006)
criticized his account as being non-compositional. Alternative, com-
positional accounts in the same vein have been suggested (I. Heim,
2006, 2008; Bu¨ring, 2007a; Solt, 2014) with a slightly different lexi-
cal semantics – referred to as “degree negation” – for little. I do not
share I. Heim’s (2006) concern that Rullmann’s account is “fundamen-
tally, and not just superficially, non-compositional” (p. 46). For exam-
ple, Bu¨ring’s (2007a) proposal can easily be adapted to Rullmann’s
original assumptions. In appendix A the ambiguity is derived com-
positionally from the two structures shown in Figure XXIV using
both Bu¨ring’s (2007a) proposal and an adapted one that incorporates
Rullmann’s assumptions.
Further arguments in favor of decomposition using little are also
given in the papers just referred to. Among them, Bu¨ring’s argu-
ment concerning cross polar nomalies may be the most impressive one.
He has shown that decomposition of antonyms using little accounts
naturally for surprising variation in the semantic well-formedness of
comparatives that involve adjectives of opposite polarity, as in 5:9.
The unacceptability of 5:9-b has been attributed to incommensurabil-
ity of such cross-polar adjectives (e.g. Kennedy, 2001). This leads
one to expect 5:9-d to also be inaccpetable. Bu¨ring suggested that,
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in 5:9-d, shorter spells out the same type of lexical sequence, -er little
long, as in the Seuren-Rullmann ambiguity above. Again, little may
compose with the compartive morpheme -er to its left or with the
gradable adjective long to its right. Thus, in contrast to 5:9-b, 5:9-d
has a well-formed reading (the one where little composes with er)
despite involving comparison of cross-polar adjectives at the surface.
(5:9) a. The rope is longer than the gap is wide.
b. #The rope is longer than the gap is narrow.
c. The rope is shorter than the gap is narrow.
d. The rope is shorter than the gap is wide.
(from I. Heim, 2008)
application to comparative modified numerals . How
can these assumptions about comparative constructions be applied
to the comparative modified numerals more than n and fewer than
n? Based on surface similarity, selectional restrictions and also split-
scope data, Hackl (2000, 2002) argued that these determiners are best
analyzed using the syntax and semantics of ordinary comparative
constructions – a plausible and today widely accepted view (excellent
overviews of this and related issues were given by Nouwen, 2010b
and Szabolcsi, 2010). Specifically, Hackl suggested that sentences
like the following have the structure in Figure XXV, where many is a
silent “gradable determiner” (cf. Solt, 2014; Kennedy, 2015).
(5:10) More than five dots are blue.
He defines many as shown in 5:11. That is, as a boolean function
that takes a degree, d, and two properties over pluralities, P and Q,
as arguments and returns 1 iff the number of atomic parts that have
both properties is at least d.
(5:11) Hackl’s denotation for many:
many := ld.lP.lQ.9x P x ^Q x ^ #(x)  d
Crucially, as was the case with ordinary comparatives, fewer can
be decomposed into -er few, also in comparative quantifiers. This was
worked out in detail by Solt (2009, 2014), for example (cf. also Penka,
2015; Beck, 2012a). A slightly different possibility that is based on
Rullmann (1995) and I. Heim (2006) is described in appendix A.2.
The integrated processing model that is presented in the next section
implements yet another possibility.
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
< max(ld.9x blue x ^ dots x ^ #(x)  d)
t
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dots<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>
<d,<<e,t>,<<e,t>,t>>>
many
d
t1
l1
<<d,t>,t>
-er five
QR
Figure XXV. Logical form proposed by Hackl for the sentence 5:10.
For simplicity, than is omitted in this tree as it is assumed to be se-
mantically vacuous. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as an iden-
tity function of the appropriate type. Moreover, while the auxiliary
are surely has semantic content (e.g. tense), we can also treat it as
vacuous for the present purpose.
We conclude that linguistic analysis gives reasons to believe that
there is a semantic operator, few, in fewer than n, which is absent
in more than n. Similar to covert negation, this operator may cor-
respond to an extra processing step which could, in turn, explain
that the DE modified numerals take longer to evaluate than the UE
ones. However, processing models of quantifier verification are not
as readily amendable with a processing step corresponding to few as
they are with covert negation. We noted above that the latter can be
added to any processing model describing truth evaluation. In con-
trast, application of the antonym operator few is more restricted. For
example, if we assume, with Rullmann (1995), that the semantic con-
tribution of few is scale-reversal, it is not obvious how to amend the
semantic automata (section 5.2.1) with an extra processing step corre-
sponding to few because they involve no scales. In conclusion, while
scale-reversal induced by few may be a semantically plausible and in-
tuitively appealing explanation of enhanced processing difficulty, we
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still have to formulate a processing model into which a corresponding
processing step can be integrated in order to make this explanation
explicit. To this end, a sequential sampling model like the one laid
out above seems appropriate as one of its basic assumptions was that
numerical information is represented on an analog scale.
5.3 an integrated processing model
The semantic theory just outlined can be combined with a sequential
sampling model akin to the one discussed in section 5.2.2. Thereby,
we derive semantic representations and, importantly, also verification
processes compositionally. In the present section, such an integrated
processing model (IPM) is developed step by step. First, it is shown
how the semantic theory outlined in the previous section allows us
to derive symbolic meaning representations for simple sentences con-
taining comparative modified numerals. Next, we walk through the
symbolic representation of the UE case, involving more than n, and
enrich it with semantic content. The resulting representations can be
thought of as snapshots of the verification process. After that, it is
shown how to combine these into a genuine process. Finally, we add
the operator few in the DE case, containing fewer than n. The contribu-
tion of few is an extra processing step corresponding to scale-reversal.
Theoretical and empirical motivation is provided throughout.
Before the IPM is developed, a general comment is in order. No-
tice that a large number of influential proposals were made within
the last fifty years or so that aimed at a unified analysis of compar-
atives (among many others: Bresnan, 1973; Cresswell, 1976; Klein,
1980; von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 1997; I. Heim, 2000; Lechner, 2001;
Schwarzchild & Wilkinson, 2002; Neeleman, Van de Koot, & Doetjes,
2004; Bhatt & Pancheva, 2004; Grosu & Horvath, 2006; Beck, 2011;
Wellwood, 2015). Some basic assumptions about syntax and seman-
tics differ greatly between the different proposals. The few detailed
derivations discussed thus far already hint at this diversity (e.g. sec-
tion 2.6). It is beyond the scope of the present work to evaluate or
compare the different proposals. Rather, the aim is to extract what
appear to be the minimally required building blocks for an adequate
semantics of comparative modified numerals and at the same time to
presuppose as little as possible of any particular syntactic or semantic
theory.
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Despite the diversity of approaches, the basic semantic building
blocks are strikingly uniform. In particular, the assumed lexemes and
morphemes are essentially the same across many theoretical propos-
als and their respective semantic contributions to sentence meaning
are also virtually identical. For comparative modified numerals, the
following lexical items seem to be required at the minimum, at least
in a degree-based approach:
R1: a numeral, which denotes a degree,
R2: some analogue of many that introduces a second degree,
R3: the comparative morpheme -er, which expresses a comparison
between degrees,
R4: an analogue of few for the DE case that has the effect of scale-
reversal;
In addition to these four requirements, there is arguably a fifth
one. This has to do with the fact that comparative sentences may
optionally contain further degree expressions. For example, the mea-
sure phrase at least six inches combines with taller than Simon in the
following differential comparative.
(5:12) Elin is at least six inches taller than Simon.
Similarly, comparative modified numerals can also contain further
degree expressions:
(5:13) a. Jogi invited a few more than 50 guests.
b. Many more than 100 students attended the lecture.
(from Solt, 2014)
Differential comparatives are clearly different from the other ex-
amples of comparatives, discussed so far. There are several approaches
how to accommodate both types of sentences. The standard solution
(within the relational approach, see section 2.6.2.1) is to provide the
comparative morpheme with an extra degree-argument position for
phrases like at least six inches. In case no such degree expression
is present, existential closure applies to bind this argument position
(e.g. von Stechow, 1984). Another, closely related solution is to as-
sume that the comparative morpheme is lexically ambiguous: One
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version of -er has an additional degree-argument position compared
to the other (for discussion see Beck, 2011). Kennedy and McNally
(2005a, 2005b) proposed yet a third solution, which is also the one
adopted here. They recognized that comparatives behave parallel to
what is observed with bare gradable adjectives. These may also op-
tionally combine with overt degree expressions like measure phrases,
for example. In case they do not – referred to as the positive form
– it is standardly assumed that they combine with a silent operator
called pos (Cresswell, 1976; von Stechow, 1984; Kennedy, 2007; see
also section 2.6 for technical details). This makes a uniform lexical
semantics for gradable adjectives possible. Kennedy and McNally
propose that the same mechanism is operative in comparatives. More
specifically, they propose that combining a gradable adjective, the
comparative morpheme -er and a than-phrase yields an expression
(e.g. taller than Simon) that again has the semantic type of a grad-
able adjective. In their own terminology: “(unmodified) comparative
constructions are semantically derived minimum-standard absolute
adjectives” (Kennedy & McNally, 2005a, p. 374; cf. also Svenonius &
Kennedy, 2006). This brings us to our fifth requirement:
R5: the pos operator if no overt degree expression is present.
As compared to the first four, there seems to be more room for debate
regarding this one. While the problem is an obvious one, the latter
solution is not the standard one. With regard to few and little, it is,
however, an attractive one because assigning identical semantic types
to both, bare gradable adjectives and bare comparatives allows for
these operators to compose with both types of expressions just in the
same way. In other approaches this needs complicated machinery.
5.3.1 Deriving symbolic meaning representations
Based on the introduced assumptions about the semantic building
blocks of comparative modified numerals, we can derive the sym-
bolic meaning representations in 5:14-b and 5:15-b for the sentences
in 5:14-a and 5:15-a, respectively.
(5:14) a. More than five dots are blue.
b. pos (er (many dots blue) five)
(5:15) a. Fewer than five dots are blue.
b. pos (few (er (many dots blue) five))
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This is demonstrated here using the combinatory categorial grammar
(CCG) formalism (Ades & Steedman, 1982; Szabolcsi, 1987, see also
section 2.7). The main reason that this formalism was chosen here
is that it allows us to derive the desired representations from the as-
sumed building blocks without the need for additional, construction-
specific assumptions. In the next section the derived representations
allow us to formulate a transparent interface to truth evaluation pro-
cesses – in line with the ITT.
A derivation of 5:14-b is shown in Figure XXVI. The top row cor-
responds to lexical retrieval. The dotted line stands for lexical decom-
position. In line with our assumptions, the word more is decomposed
into pos, -er and many. How lexical decomposition works in detail
is left open here. Some morphological mechanism is stipulated that
mediates between the surface form more and its possible semantic
decompositions. After decomposition, the involved lexemes can in-
teract with other parts of the sentence. However, derivation rules
only apply to adjacent items. The syntactic categories are in line
with our five requirements. There are different possibilities to derive
5:14-b from 5:14-a using these categories. The one shown here first
combines pos, -er and many yielding the syntactic category of the
word more. The derivation proceeds more or less incrementally. The
representation in 5:15-b is derived analogously to 5:14-b. The only
difference is that -er combines with few before it combines with many.
This sub-derivation is shown in Figure XXVII. The syntactic category
of few is DegadjjDegadj. The vertical slash is used to indicate that few
‘is looking’ for a degree expression to its left or to its right.
Two more comments are in order. Firstly, the derivation in XXVI
makes rudimentary use of features to rule out ungrammatical deriva-
tions. For example, the fact that the comparative morpheme selects
for a than-phrase is encoded in the category Degthan. Secondly, the
operator pos has a subscript. The idea is that the implicit standard
of comparison depends on the function in this subscript. This is dis-
cussed briefly in section 2.6. There, it is also explained that, in addi-
tion, the standard depends on a contextually determined comparison
class. These points are important for gradable adjactives in the posi-
tive form but less relevant for comparatives. Like in 5:14-b and 5:15-b,
the subscript of pos is therefore often omitted in what follows.
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5.3.2 Developing the truth evaluation process
Next, we map the symbolic meaning representations to a truth eval-
uation process. We start with the UE case: pos (er (many dots blue)
five)
5.3.2.1 Representation of many dots blue
In a situation in which, for example, m blue dots are visually pre-
sented, many dots blue encodes a representation of m. That is, many
is interpreted as a function that maps two properties to a represen-
tation of how many objects have both properties (cf. Hackl, 2000,
2002). This representation assigns real numbers to points on a scale.
In particular, m is represented by a function fm (cf. Dehaene, 2007)
with:
fm(x) :=
8<:amf

log(x) log(m)
s

, if x > 0
0, otherwise,
(5:16)
where x corresponds to the position on the scale, s and am are con-
stants, and f is the Gaussian function with:
f(x) :=
1p
2p
exp

 1
2
x2

.
This kind of representation has played an important role in the-
ories of numerical cognition. It was implemented in Dehaene and
Changeux’s (1993) influential connectionist model of basic numerical
abilities. Their model was based on ‘number detector neurons’ which
had activation functions as in equation 5:16 (see also Verguts & Fias,
2004, for an extension of the model). In particular, when the numeros-
ity m was presented to the network, the activation of detectors for k
was approximately fk(m). As a consequence, the numerosity m was
represented according to fm in the population of number detectors:
The activation over a sequence of detectors, (di)i2f1,...Ng, where each
di has activation function fqi , is captured by this function. If m is
encoded, then di = fqi(m) = fm(qi).
Empirical support for the existence of such detectors and the cor-
responding representations was provided by Nieder and Miller (2004)
and Nieder and Merten (2007) from single cell recordings in the pos-
terior parietal and prefrontal cortex of rhesus macaques. Number se-
lective neurons were identified which had average firing rates obey-
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ing the main characteristics of equation 5:16: They followed Gaus-
sian curves with constant width when plotted on a logarithmic scale.
Moreover, the fMRI study by Piazza et al. (2004) provides evidence for
the hypothesis that the same encoding of numerosities is employed
by humans.
The function fm may be thought of as a crude approximation of
a population code for m (i.e. a pattern of neural activity that encodes
some stimulus or quantity; for details see, e.g., Dayan & Abbott, 2001
or Mallot, 2013). The right panel of Figure XXVIII shows the repre-
sentations for m 2 f3, . . . , 8g. The maxima of the curves are equally
spaced, but the curves are asymmetric and their widths increase with
m. Realistically, population codes are noisy and thus, in one partic-
ular time window, may look more like is sketched in the right panel
of the figure. For simplicity, I ignore noise for now but come back
to this important point in subsection 5.3.2.5. Furthermore, I use func-
tions from R to R, which Dayan and Abbott (2001) refer to as contin-
uously labeled population codes. However, all of what follows can, in
principle, also be done with discrete sequences.
There is an indirect connection between these representations and
the log-Gaussian model of number representations discussed above
(subsection 4.2.2.1, especially Hypothesis 4:16). Dehaene (2007) sug-
gested to link the neuronal and the psychophysical level via a bridging
law: He assumes a population of detector neurons that have activation
functions as in 5:16 but are also subject to noise. The psychophysical,
log-Gaussian model is then derived via a statistical estimator that in-
fers the location on the mental number line from the population code.
Bridging laws like this are sensitive to a number of factors including
the assumed activation functions, the kind of noise, the used estima-
tor and assumptions about how the detectors are distributed over the
number line, so to speak (Snippe, 1996; Dayan & Abbott, 2001). Here,
I do not apply a bridging law of this kind but work directly with fm
as defined in 5:16.
5.3.2.2 Representation of the numeral
Next, we consider the representation of the numeral. We assume that
it is represented by a function gn with:
gn(x) :=
1
s0
f

x  n
s0

, (5:17)
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Figure XXVIII. Sketch of population codes for numerosity.
where f is the Gaussian function introduced above (e.g., five := g5).
The parameter s0 is assumed to be very small. In contrast to the nu-
merosity representations computed by many, the numerals are thus
represented by very narrow bell-shaped curves. This provides a pre-
cise and almost exact encoding. Another difference is that the rep-
resentations of symbolic numerals are symmetrical whereas the nu-
merosity representations are not.
These assumptions are in accordance with Dehaene’s (1997) hy-
pothesis that symbolic number representations reuse the representa-
tion format of approximate numerosities but have greater precision
(see also Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene & Cohen, 2007; Nieder & Dehaene,
2009).
Hypothesis 5:18. The meaning representations of number symbols and nu-
merals reuse representations of approximate numerosity. In addition, the
processes that operate on theses representations are also reused.
This hypothesis is supported by a number of empirical findings (for
discussion see Dehaene, 2007, p. 551–561). Additional evidence
comes from the simulation study of Verguts and Fias (2004), who
first trained an artificial neural network to represent numerosities
and then to represent symbolic numerals (see section 5.6.2, below
for discussion).
5.3.2.3 Contribution of er
Since the expressions discussed so far received non-standard seman-
tics, it does presumably not come as a surprise that the compara-
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tive morpheme -er also receives an unusual one: The operator er
computes a representation of the difference between the quantities
encoded by five and many dots blue. This is accomplished by the
following computation, called cross-correlation (symbolically, ?):
(er f g)(x) := (g ? f )(x) =
Z +¥
 ¥
g(t) f (x+ t)dt. (5:19)
If er is applied to gn and fm, for some n and m, we can think
of this computation as a translation of fm in the negative direction.
This is because we assumed s0 to be very small and the following fact
holds (see e.g. Amann & Escher, 2001; Weber & Arfken, 2003):
lim
s0!0
(gn ? fm)(x) = fm(x+ n). (5:20)
As s0 approaches 0, gn ? fm converges to a shifted version of fm
which is translated an amount of n in the negative direction. In that
sense, gn ? fm represents the difference between (an approximately
represented) m and (an almost exactly represented) n. I use cross-
correlation here instead of directly defining er as translation because
er should also be applicable to two approximate representations (e.g.
fn and fm). An obvious example application would be the case where
a comparative sentence like more dots are red than green is evaluated
under time pressure in situations with lots of dots (as was studied in
an experiment by Deschamps, Agmon, Loewenstein, & Grodzinsky,
2015, see section 6.2.2 for discussion).
Interestingly, Pouget, Deneve, and Duhamel (2002) proposed a
neural implementation of this kind of computation as a model of how
neural representations are transformed during multisensory integra-
tion (see also Dayan & Abbott, 2001; Pouget & Sejnowski, 1997). An
example is the transformation from eye-centred coordinates (visual
location) to head-centred coordinates (auditory location) given the
viewing angle of the eye. Such transformations shift the frame of ref-
erence. The model of Pouget et al. (2002) accounts for a range of em-
pirical data about neural activity involved in multisenory integration.
In consequence, the kind of computation that is used here to model
the contribution of the comparative morpheme -er is plausible from
a neurobiological perspective. Moreover, Lipinski, Schneegans, San-
damirskaya, Spencer, and Scho¨ner (2012) use similar computations in
their model of spatial prepositions like under or over. In their model,
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a representation of the relative position of a “located object” relative
to a “reference object” is computed.
Putting the components together, we have:
er (many dots blue) five = g5 ? fm,
which is a representation of m  5. Of course, this does not yet define
a truth value. However, truth-value judgments can be based on this
representation. This is where pos comes in.
5.3.2.4 The operator pos
The operator pos does two things. Firstly, it introduces a threshold
for the difference m  n to surpass (cf. Svenonius & Kennedy, 2006
for linguistic motivation). I assume this threshold to be set at 0.5
for the case of comparative modified numerals. Thus, the “yes, true”
response is favored in a verification task if the difference between m,
the number of target objects and n, the numeral mentioned in the
sentence surpasses 0.5. This thresholds seems reasonable for the case
were numbers and cardinalities are compared, especially since they
are assumed to be represented in an noisy and analog format.
Secondly, posweighs evidence for the “yes, true” response against
evidence for the “no, false” response. In particular, the following
quantity is computed:
pos(h) :=
Z ¥
0.5
h(x)dx 
Z 0.5
 ¥
h(x)dx. (5:21)
If the area under the graph of h that is to the right of 0.5 is larger
than the area to the left of 0.5, pos(h) is positive and a “yes, true”
response is favored. In contrast, a “no, false” response is favored if
pos(h) is negative. For large absolute values, one response alternative
clearly outweighs the other one. Based on the characteristics of gn ?
fm, specifically its asymmetry, we may expect size and distance effects
(see subsection 5.2.2). We did, however, not define a decision process,
yet. This is what we turn to next.
5.3.2.5 The decision process
Up to now, we have considered static representations. Now, it is
sketched how these can be combined into a dynamic verification pro-
cess. Imagine a situation in which, first, a sentence of the form more
than n dots are blue is read and then a picture with m blue dots is in-
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spected. The task is to decide as fast and accurate as possible whether
the sentence is true regarding the picture or not.
While the sentence already introduces the semantic representa-
tion of the numeral, the number of target objects cannot be processed
before the picture is first inspected. This point in time is denoted
by t0. Making a few simplifying assumptions, we can describe the
truth evaluation process from t0 onwards based on the introduced
representations and computations. In particular, we assume that af-
ter some time delay, tnum, the representation of the number of target
objects, m, namely many dots blue = fm, has ‘built up’. Earlier, it was
mentioned that, realistically, this representations and also that of the
numeral are corrupted by noise. For simplicity, we still ignore noise
at this point and postpone the addition of noise to the last step of the
process. Moreover, we assume that representations remain static once
they have built up.
The two representations five = g5 and many dots blue = fm
are fed to er. Again, some time, tcomp, passes for the representation
g5 ? fm to emerge. Afterwards, this representation is passed to pos.
To describe the decision process, we make two more assumptions.
Firstly, that the value computed by pos is accumulated over time in
order to form a ‘decision variable’ Xt. Secondly, we add noise to Xt.
A natural way to incorporate noise is to add a Wiener process W (see
section 2.5.2.2). For tstart := t0 + tnum + tcomp and c some constant that
determines the amount of noise, this yields a drift diffusion process
(also defined in section 2.5.2.2) which is described by the following
stochastic differential equation:
dX = (pos(er fm gn)) dt+ c dW, Xtstart = 0. (5:22)
This is an instance of Ratcliff’s (1978) DDM. A thorough analysis of
this process and of connectionist models implementing (or approxi-
mating) it was conducted by Bogacz et al. (2006). In section 2.5.2, it is
briefly discussed how the time continuous processes as in 5:22 relate
to time discrete sequential sampling models.
some theoretical justification Suppose we observe a se-
quence, (yi)i2N, of realizations of i.i.d. random variables (Yi)i2N.
Moreover, assume that the latter constitute the mental representation
of some stimulus in an experiment. Our task is to decide, based on
the sequence of realizations, from which of two sets the stimulus was
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drawn. We can in principle think of this task as the following hypoth-
esis testing problem (recall technical details from section 2.5.2):
H0 : Yk  P0, k = 1, 2, . . .
H1 : Yk  P1, k = 1, 2, . . . .
Then, as we have seen, given an appropriate stopping and deci-
sion rule, an optimal decision process can be described as a random
walk that accumulates the LLR. Moreover, this process converges to
a drift diffusion process as in 5:22 if more and more observations are
sampled per time interval. However, in order to carry out the optimal
decision procedure, the corresponding densities p1 and p2 have to be
known and, as discussed by Platt et al. (2008), this is a non-trivial
obstacle.
Interestingly, Gold and Shadlen (2001, 2002) have shown that in
2AFC tasks – with two alternatives A1 and A2 – neural computations
can, under several plausible circumstances, approximate the optimal
decision processes even without knowledge of p1 or p2. Suppose
that the y1, y2, . . . represent firing rates of some neural computing
unit that responds strongly if response alternative A1 is correct but
responds only weakly if the other alternative A2 is the correct one.
Furthermore, suppose that z1, z2 . . . represent the activity of an “op-
posing” computing unit with the opposite response profile, A1: weak
response, A2: strong response. Then, in several plausible scenarios
(in particular different types of conditional distributions of Yi and
Zi given A1 or A2 is correct), the difference yi   zi is proportional
to the change in the LLR. Therefore, accumulating the difference in
firing rate between two such units can approximate the optimal de-
cision process. Gold and Shadlen argue that this kind of heuristic is
exploited by neurobiological mechanisms that underly decision mak-
ing.
Concerning the truth evaluation of modified numerals, these con-
siderations can be taken as theoretical justification of the decision pro-
cess proposed here if we interpret the value computed by pos along
the lines just sketched, namely as the difference between two such
opposing computing units (or pools of computing units). Moreover,
notice that, if we interpret the value computed by pos along these
lines, only weak assumption are needed in order for the process in
5:22 to be an adequate description. In particular, if we assume that
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during the decision process samples from a distribution with mean
pos(er fm gn) and variance c2 are accumulated, then the process in
5:22 is an adequate description in the limit (cf. section 2.5.2 and refer-
ences mentioned there). This is the justification that we ignored noise
above.
5.3.2.6 The operator few
The operator few is defined as follows (cf. Rullmann, 1995 and
I. Heim, 2006) :
(few (h)) (x) := h ( x)
In the DE case, the drift (or rate of accumulation) in equation
5:22 would thus be pos (few (er fm gn)) . It is assumed that few
corresponds to an additional processing step. Some additional time,
t f ew, is needed for this step to complete. In consequence the decision
process starts with a delay, such that, in the DE case, tstart := t0 +
tnum + tcomp + t f ew.
5.3.2.7 Upshot
On the basis of symbolic meaning representations, we have charac-
terized truth evaluation processes. The processes for the UE and the
DE case are depicted in the left and right part of Figure XXIX, respec-
tively. Because an extra processing step is incorporated in the DE as
compared to the UE case, the model accounts immediately for the
observed prolonged RTs of the DE comparative modified numerals.
In addition, it is compatible with findings from numerical cognition
like the often observed size and distance effects.
In developing the model, a number of simplifying assumptions
were made. For example, a serial process was assumed, in which
one processing step has to complete before the subsequent one starts
(Sternberg, 1969). Of course, models with continuous, partial outputs
of processing stages are conceivable as well (cf. McClelland, 1979).
Furthermore, some aspects or parameters are left entirely unspecified.
For example, it is left completely unspecified how the representation
of the number of target objects is arrived at. Several alternatives are
conceivable in this regard. The two extremes are ‘pure approxima-
tion’ and ‘exact counting’. Moreover, there are a number of model pa-
rameters that are left unspecified here but would be crucial to derive
quantitative predictions. Because of all this underspecification, quan-
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Figure XXIX. Graphical representation of truth evaluation processes.
titative predictions are not possible or intended here. Nevertheless,
the model allows for some qualitative predictions. In the following
these will be discussed and tested.
5.4 experiment 3a : ordinary sentence-picture
verification
Two types of potential accounts for prolonged judgment times of
fewer than n as compared to more than n were identified in the pre-
vious sections. Under one type of account, the increased difficulty
is attributed to an additional semantic operation in the former as
compared to the latter case. Several alternatives of how this can be
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spelled out were sketched. The other type of account assumes no
additional operators and also no inherent difficulty of the DE case
but attributes the observed effects to the processing of numerical in-
formation involved in the verification task. It was shown in section
5.2.2 that, under defensible assumptions, such effects would indeed
be expected even if the direction of entailment is ignored completely.
The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. Firstly, it was
intended to replicate the prolonged RTs for fewer than as compared to
more than n in a slightly different experimental design than what was
employed in previous studies. Secondly, it was intended to decide
between the two types of accounts just mentioned. More specifically,
the experiment was designed in such a way that theories of numerical
cognition would – to the extent that they let us expect any difference
at all – predict more than n to take longer to evaluate than fewer than
n. As a consequence, longer RTs of the latter provide strong reason
to focus on the inherent semantic complexity of the DE conditions,
in particular, on theories that posit additional semantic operations in
these types of linguistic constructions.
Participants had to evaluate sentences containing more than n or
fewer than n against pictures showing n target objects. The number of
depicted objects and the correct judgment (namely “no, false” in both
cases) did not differ between the UE and the DE quantifiers and, at
the same time, identical picture materials were used with both types
of quantifiers. The only difference between the stimulus material in
the DE and UE conditions was the modifier: more vs. fewer.
5.4.1 Method
5.4.1.1 Participants
Fourty-eight participants were recruited at the University of Tu¨bin-
gen (30 female). Their mean age was 25.6 (ranging from 20 to 33
years). All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision.
Participants were naı¨ve to the purpose of the study. They received a
small financial compensation.
5.4.1.2 Materials
Sentence materials consisted of German sentences like in 5:23. The
factor modifier (two levels: more and fewer) was crossed with the factor
numeral (four levels: four, six, eight, ten) yielding the eight conditions
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exemplified in 5:23-a-h. Sentences in all eight conditions contained
a color adjective (blau (‘blue’), rot (‘red’), gru¨n (‘green’) or orange
(‘orange’)) and a noun describing a shape (Punkte (‘dots’), Quadrate
(‘squares’), Dreiecke (‘triangles’) or Kreuze (‘crosses’)). There was a
locative PP and an auxiliary between the noun and the adjective.6
(5:23) a. Mehr
More
als
than
vier
four
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
b. Weniger
Fewer
als
than
vier
four
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
c. Mehr
More
als
than
sechs
six
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
d. Weniger
Fewer
als
than
sechs
six
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
e. Mehr
More
als
than
acht
eight
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
f. Weniger
Fewer
als
than
acht
eight
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
g. Mehr
More
als
than
zehn
ten
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
h. Weniger
Fewer
als
than
zehn
ten
Punkte
dots
auf
on
dem
the
Bild
picture
sind
are
blau.
blue.
Sentences were paired with pictures that depicted randomly dis-
tributed shapes of two colors. Example pictures are provided in
Figure XXX. Each picture showed objects of the shape mentioned
in the corresponding sentence. One of the two colors in each pic-
ture matched the color adjective in the corresponding sentence. If
this color was blue, the remaining objects were orange; if it was red,
the remaining objects were green; and vice versa. Depending on the
numeral in the sentence, pictures showed four, six, eight or ten tar-
get objects (e.g. blue dots). The number of target objects always
matched the numeral mentioned in the sentence and sentences never
described their corresponding picture truthfully. One third of the pic-
tures showed a number of non-target objects that was smaller than
the number of target objects. Another third showed exactly as many
non-target as target objects. The remaining pictures had a number
of non-target objects that was larger than the number of target ob-
jects. Within the pictures that showed different numbers of target
6 Eye-movements during reading were recorded in order to test for increased process-
ing difficulty in sentences with DE as compared to UE quantifiers. These are not
reported here but in chapter 6. The locative PP served as a buffer region.
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(a) 4 targets, 2 non-targets (b) 6 targets, 4 non-targets
(c) 8 targets, 5 non-targets (d) 10 targets, 6 non-targets
Figure XXX. Example pictures from Experiment 3
and non-target objects, the ratio of the larger and the smaller number
was approximately constant.
In total, 320 such pictures were generated – 80 for each of the four
numerals. Each picture was paired once with a sentence containing
the modifier more and once with a sentence containing less. Thus,
there were 640 sentence-picture pairs in sum, which comprised 80 ex-
perimental items. Each item consisted of eight sentences combined
with four pictures. Within each item, sentences with the same nu-
meral also were paired with the same picture. In consequence, the
only difference between UE and DE conditions was the modifier, i.e.
the first word of the sentences.
The sentence-picture pairs were distributed over eight lists using
a Latin square design. This ensured that each participant saw each
item – and thus each picture – only once. Each list contained 80 ex-
perimental trials. In addition, 343 filler trials were included. These
were sentence-picture pairs similar to the experimental items but pos-
sibly containing different quantifiers or negation. About half of the
trials in each experimental list required a “yes, true”-judgment and
the other half required a “no, false”-judgment.
5.4.1.3 Procedure
The experiment was conducted using an Eyelink 1000 eye-tracker and
Eyelink’s Experiment Builder software. However, eye movements are
not reported here (they are discussed in chapter 7). Participants were
tested individually in a silent room. They sat about 70 cm away from
a 27 in computer screen and positioned their head on a chin and fore-
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head rest. While participants read the stimulus sentences, the posi-
tion of their dominant eye was sampled with a frequency of 1000Hz.
At the beginning of the experiment, they received written instructions
on the screen. After they had read the instructions, the eye tracker
was calibrated using a nine point grid. It was ensured that fixations
were tracked within 0.5° of visual angle across the entire area of the
screen. After the calibration, participants completed ten practice tri-
als, in which feedback was provided to them. The rest of the experi-
ment consisted of four blocks. Participants were told that they could
rest between blocks. An experimental session took around one hour.
At the beginning of each trial, there was a calibration check. Par-
ticipants had to fixate a cross in the upper left portion of the screen.
A recalibration was launched if no fixation was registered within a
radius of approximately 1.5° of visual angle around the fixation cross
for a time period of 10 s. After a fixation was registered, the fixa-
tion cross disappeared and a sentence was presented. The first word
of the sentence was centered where the fixation point had been pre-
sented. Three characters spanned approximately 1° of visual angle.
Participants read the sentence and afterwards fixated a cross in the
lower right portion of the screen. They were instructed to read fast
but at a pace that allowed them to understand the sentences.
After reading the sentence, a picture was presented to the partic-
ipants in central position on the screen, spanning approximately 30°
of visual angle. They provided a truth-value judgment by pressing
one of two buttons on a joypad. They were instructed to respond fast
and accurately. There was a time limit of 13 s. The response-key as-
signment was counterbalanced between participants. There were two
version of each experimental list with opposite response-key assign-
ments. RTs, i.e. the time between the onset of the picture presentation
and the judgment, were recorded.
5.4.1.4 Predictions
The automata model (section 5.2.1) amended with negation as an ad-
ditional processing step in the DE conditions (section 5.2.3.1) predicts
that these conditions take a constant amount of time longer to eval-
uate than the UE conditions. The extra time is needed to flip the
truth value. Apart from this effect, the RTs should increase with the
number of objects that have to be counted. In both the UE and the
DE conditions, the number of objects to count is determined by the
numeral in the sentence.
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Under the sequential sampling model based on log-Gaussian rep-
resentations (section 5.2.2), the RTs consist of two components: the de-
cision and the non-decision time. The mean decision time is predicted
to be proportional to log((n+ 0.5)/n) and log((n  0.5)/n) in the UE
and DE case, respectively. Since log(n+ 0.5/n) < log(n  0.5/n) and
non-decision time is not expected to differ, the mean RT is predicted
to be shorter in the DE than in the UE conditions (if the subtle dif-
ference is expected to produces any difference at all). Similarly, the
proportions of errors should also be higher in the UE case.
Just as the automata model, the sequential sampling model can
also be amended with an additional processing step corresponding
to negation. This predicts an increase in the non-decision times in
the DE conditions. In this scenario, predictions about mean RT are
ambiguous. The extra processing step prolongs the RTs of the DE
conditions since they have longer non-decision times. In contrast, the
decision times are predicted to be faster in the DE than the UE con-
ditions. Despite the ambiguity, longer RTs of the DE as compared to
the UE conditions would constitute evidence for an additional pro-
cessing step. The proportion of errors is not expected to be affected
by the additional step.
The IPM (section 5.3) combines a sequential sampling model of
the decision process with a compositional semantics for comparative
modified numerals. Its qualitative predictions are essentially identi-
cal to the ones just mentioned. Based on the decision component of
the model, the UE conditions are expected to be more difficult than
the DE ones. This prediction is derived from asymmetric representa-
tions of the number of target objects, which leads to a smaller drift
rate (or signal-to-noise ratio) in the UE than the DE conditions. Pro-
portions of errors are therefore predicted to be higher in the UE than
the DE conditions. Predictions about RTs are again not unequivocal
because an additional processing step is assumed in the DE condi-
tions, which may outweigh the faster decision process in these condi-
tions.
5.4.2 Results
Before statistical analysis, contaminated trials were identified and re-
moved. After visual inspection of the fixations during reading, all
trials with total reading times below 560ms (103 trials) or above 10s
(156 trials) were removed. In total, this affected 1.29% of the trials.
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Table XXXI
Descriptive statistics of Experiment 3
numeral mean proportions mean RTs (std. error)
of correct judgments (sd) in ms
fewer more fewer more
four 0.96 (0.07) 0.96 (0.08) 1445 (105.3) 1364 (111.4)
six 0.91 (0.10) 0.92 (0.11) 2124 (134.5) 2097 (165.0)
eight 0.93 (0.11) 0.87 (0.13) 2935 (220.3) 2864 (211.9)
ten 0.88 (0.15) 0.82 (0.16) 3514 (251.2) 3375 (274.7)
Note. All values calculated on the basis of by-subject means.
Moreover, for each condition, trails with RTs that were at least three
standard deviations above the mean RT in that condition were re-
moved. Furthermore, trials with RTs below 200ms were also removed.
The latter two steps affected 1.8% of the remaining trials.
Proportions of correct judgments are summarized in the left part
of Table XXXI. They were close to ceiling for the numeral four but
decreased with the size of the numeral. The decrease was steeper for
UE more than n than for DE fewer than n. A logit mixed effects model
analysis was conducted in order to analyze the proportions of correct
judgments. First, a saturated model was fit using the lme4 package
(Bates, Ma¨chler, et al., 2015) for the statistical software R (R Core Team,
2016). The factors numeral (levels: four, six, eight and ten ) and modifier
(levels: more and fewer) as well as their interaction were included
as fixed effects. In addition, a random intercept of participants was
included as random effect (addition of random slopes led to non-
convergence). After that, a model comparison procedure based on the
LRT was used to test for significant effects. A significant interaction
between modifier and numeral (c2(3) = 7.89, p = .048) was found by
comparing the saturated model to a simplified model without the
interaction term. The interaction may possibly be due to the fact that
the modifier fewer led to more errors than more in combination with
the numeral sixwhereas with the other three numerals UE more led to
more errors. Next, the procedure suggested by Levy (2014) was used
to test for the two main effects in the presence of the interaction. A
significant main effect of modifier (c2(1) = 4.625, p = .032) was found
by comparing the saturated model to a simplified one without the
factor modifier. In addition, the main effect of numeral also turned out
to be significant (c2(3) = 70.69, p < .001) by comparison between the
saturated model and a model that did not include this factor.
148 comparative modified numerals
As shown in the right part of Table XXXI, larger numerals re-
quired longer RTs on average. In addition, the DE conditions took
longer to evaluate than the UE conditions across all of the four nu-
merals. The RTs were statistically analyzed using linear mixed effects
models. As for the proportions of judgments, a saturated model was
computed first. The saturated model included the factors numeral
(levels: four, six, eight and ten ) and modifier (levels: more and less) and
their interaction. In addition, random intercepts and random slopes
of numeral and modifier were included for participants (addition of
random intercepts for the interaction led to non-convergence). Again,
a model comparison procedure was carried out. There were signifi-
cant main effects of the numeral (c2(3) = 112.7, p < .001) and modifier
(c2(1) = 3.911, p = .048). The former reflects the fact that RTs in-
creased with the numeral while the latter was due to longer RTs in
the DE as compared to the UE conditions. The interaction was far
from significant (c2(3) = 2.314, p = .510).
5.4.3 Discussion
Truth evaluation of DE weniger als n (fewer than n) took longer than
it took for its UE counterpart mehr als n (more than n). This repli-
cates previous findings. In addition, the UE conditions led to more
errors than the DE ones. For the specific design of the present experi-
ment, where the number of target objects was equal to the numeral in
the sentence, the latter effect was predicted by the IPM proposed in
section 5.3. Both the IPM and the log-Gaussian sequential sampling
model (subsection 5.2.2) amended with covert negation are compat-
ible with the experimental results. In both accounts, the increased
proportions of errors in the UE conditions are due to the drift rate
(or signal-to-noise ratio) of the decision processes. In addition, the
prolonged RTs of the DE conditions are accounted for by an addi-
tional processing step. In the IPM, this step consists in scale-reversal
induced by the semantic operator few whereas in the latter model
it corresponds to negation. The only unexpected result is that fewer
than six led to slightly more errors than more than six. I have no ex-
planation for this finding and consider it spurious. Especially since
proportions of errors were close to floor in these conditions, a small
number of ‘fast guesses’ may have caused it.
Even in an experimental design where the numerical comparison
should be more difficult in the UE conditions, the DE conditions took
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longer to evaluate than the UE ones. This supports theories that posit
inherent difficulty of fewer than as compared to more than. Specifically,
the experimental results support theories that assume an additional
semantic operation in the fewer than that does not take part in the
evaluation of more than. More generally, the results pose non-trivial
constraints on possible processing theories of the truth evaluation
of comparative modified numerals because such theories should ac-
count for both proportions of errors and RTs.
The semantic automata model is at odds with the experimental
results. Even if it is amended with an additional operation corre-
sponding to negation, the automata model does not account for the
increased proportions of errors in the UE conditions. In the semantic
automata model, no errors are predicted at all. A perspective that
may be interesting in this regard are the probabilistic automata pro-
posed by Dotlacˇil et al. (2014) that was already discussed briefly in
section 4.1. However, it is not clear to me what this model would have
predicted for the present experiment. Similarly, the log-Gaussian se-
quential sampling model also provides no immediate account of the
experimental results on its own, without an additional processing
step in the DE conditions.
However, there is a possibility to explain the findings without
the assumption of an additional processing step. Assume, for the
moment, that evaluation of fewer than n poses the same difficulty as
evaluation of more than n, but participants perceive fewer than n to be
more demanding. A potential reason why evaluation of fewer than n
could be perceived as demanding is its more complex compositional
structure. Under these assumptions, the results could be explained in
terms of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT): Because the DE conditions
are perceived to be more difficult, participants could have decided
to invest more time in these conditions, which, in turn, would have
resulted in higher accuracy. In a sequential sampling model, this
could be modeled by response boundaries that are spread further
apart in the DE as compared to the UE conditions.
In the following experiment the response-signal speed-accuracy trade-
off (SAT) (Reed, 1973; Dosher, 1976; Wickelgren, 1977; McElree &
Dosher, 1989) method was used to test for this possibility. Apart from
testing an alternative explanation, this method is attractive in its own
right because it provides a detailed picture of the truth-evaluation
process. In the predictions above, it was stated that judgment times
are ambiguous because they consist of two components, the decision
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and the non-decision time. By experimental manipulation of the to-
tal processing time in each trial, the following experiment provides
more direct access to the different components of the evaluation pro-
cess than ordinary sentence-picture verification.
5.5 experiment 4 : response-signal speed-accuracy
tradeoff procedure
In the present experiment, participants first read a question that con-
tained either more than n or fewer than n. Afterwards, they inspected
a picture showing a number of target objects for a short amount of
time. Finally, they provided an answer to the question. A response-
signal SAT procedure was used in which the time between the onset
of the picture presentation and the response was systematically ma-
nipulated: After a varying amount of time, a beep tone was played
which prompted the participants’ responses. After the beep, they had
to respond within 300ms. This time span is so short that they were ar-
guably forced to base their decision on the processing that had taken
place before the response signal. Because the amount of processing
time was under experimental control, this procedure allows us to test
whether the findings from the previous experiment can be explained
in terms of a SAT as sketched in the previous section.
5.5.1 Methods
5.5.1.1 Participants
Forty participants from the University of Tu¨bingen were recruited (29
female, mean age: 24.4 years). They were naı¨ve to the purpose of the
study. They received a small financial reward.
5.5.1.2 Materials
Example questions that were used in the present experiment are shown
in example 5:24. All questions contained either the modifier mehr
(‘more’) or weniger (‘fewer’) and one of the numerals sieben (‘seven’),
acht (‘eight’) or neun (‘nine’). Each question asked about the number
of shapes in a picture. Possible shapes were circles, squares, triangles
or crosses.
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Figure XXXII. Example of a picture used in Experiment 4.
(5:24) a. Sind
Are
das
those
mehr
more
als
than
sieben/acht/neun
seven/eight/nine
Kreuze?
crosses?
b. Sind
Are
das
those
weniger
fewer
als
than
sieben/acht/neun
seven/eight/nine
Kreuze?
crosses?
Questions were paired with pictures showing randomly distributed,
blue objects of the mentioned shape. An example picture is shown
in Figure XXXII. In one type of sentence-picture pair, the number of
objects matched the numeral in the sentence. In total, 120 pictures of
this type were generated – 40 for each of the three numerals. Each
of these was paired once with a sentence containing more than n and
once with a sentence containing fewer than n. This resulted in 240
sentence-picture pairs, which were the critical stimuli of the experi-
ment.
In addition to the critical pairs, 960 filler pairs were constructed.
The difference between the critical pairs and the fillers was that in
the latter the pictures showed a number of objects that deviated from
the numeral in the sentence. In particular, each question was paired
with four additional pictures that showed n  2, n  1, n+ 1 or n+ 2
objects of the mentioned shape. In total, 480 such additional pictures
were generated (120 per deviance, 40 per deviance and numeral) and
each of them was paired once with a question containing more than
n and once with a question containing fewer than n. As a result, half
of the fillers required a no response and the other half required a yes
response.
The sentence-picture pairs were presented with one of five re-
sponse signal lags: 0ms, 150ms, 350ms, 650ms or 950ms. The lag
determined the time frame in which the response had to be given (see
next section for details). The sentence-picture pairs were distributed
over 10 lists consisting of 600 trials each. In generating the experi-
mental lists, it was ensured that each of the pictures was presented
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Question self paced
200ms
40ms
lag of 0–950ms
300ms
too late
time
Figure XXXIII. Trial structure of Experiment 4. Note: The speaker
icon indicates that a 100ms beep tone was played. It was not shown
during the experiment.
only once per list and that each combination of modifiers, numerals
and deviances was presented four times per lag, per list. Across each
experimental list 60% of the trials required a no judgment.
5.5.1.3 Procedure
The experimental procedure is graphically sketched in Figure XXXIII.
Participants initiated each trial by pressing a button on a keyboard.
Next, they read a question self-paced. After reading the question,
they pressed a button that initiated the presentation of a picture
which lasted for 200ms. Afterwards, the picture was replaced with
image noise. This lasted for approximately 40ms and was intended
to prevent after images. After that, a lag period started, where a blank
screen was displayed. The length of the lag period was determined
by the experimental condition and ranged between 0 and 950ms. Af-
ter the lag period, a beep tone was played for 100ms. After the onset
of the tone, participants had to respond within 300ms by pressing
one of two buttons. If they did not respond in time, the message
too late was displayed and the next trial started automatically. If they
responded too early, the response was not counted.
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Assuming no further delays between the individual events in a
trial sequence, the total time from the onset of picture presentation
until the beep tone ranged between 240ms and 1190ms. Depending
on the lag, it could be 240ms, 390ms, 590ms, 890ms or 1190ms,
respectively. Realistically, there was some additional delay, however.
For example, misalignment of event timing and the refresh rate of
the monitor or loading of images or sounds prior to presentation,
may have caused extra delays.
An experimental session took about one hour. At the beginning
of the experiment, there was a practice session where participants
practiced to respond to the response signal in time. They performed
a memory task (the Sternberg task) with similar response signal lags
as in the main experiment. Before the experiment was started, par-
ticipants had to respond within the 300ms time window in 16 out of
15 practice trials. Otherwise, practice was reiterated. The experiment
consisted of four blocks. Participants could rest between blocks. At
the beginning of each block, two calibration stimuli were presented
(cf. Izard & Dehaene, 2008): Written instructions informed partici-
pants that a picture of seven or nine objects will be shown to them.
After they pressed a button, a picture of seven or nine objects, respec-
tively, was presented for 200ms.
5.5.1.4 Predictions
The IPM predicts that the decision process starts later in questions
with fewer than n than in questions with more than n. The reason for
this is that, in the former conditions, an additional operation corre-
sponding to scale-reversal has to take place to provide the represen-
tation on which the decision process is based. No such process is
assumed in more than n. Furthermore, it is predicted that, in the criti-
cal trials, where the number of presented objects matches the numeral
in the sentence, the accumulation of information during the decision
process is faster in question with fewer than n than in questions with
more than n. This prediction was derived from the assumed asymmet-
ric representations of the number of presented objects.
In order to test these predictions, it was planned to calculate d0
values (defined in equation 5:25) for the different lags, t , and fit
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the function defined in equation 5:26, which approximates how d0
develops over time, to these values.
d0(t) := Z(hitRate(t))  Z(falseAlarmRate(t)) (5:25)
bd0(t) :=
8<:l

1  e (t d)b

, i f t  d
0, otherwise
(5:26)
The sensitivity index d0 is a measure of accuracy adjusted for re-
sponse bias (see Green & Swets, 1966). In equation 5:25, Z is the
inverse cumulative distribution function of the standard normal dis-
tribution. The hit rate was calculated as the proportion of correct
judgments whereas the false alarm rate was estimated from a suitable
control condition that contained the same modifier (see next section).
The function in equation 5:26 has three parameters: The parameter
l determines the asymptotic accuracy; d determines the time intercept
at which d0 starts to differ from 0; i.e. chance performance; and b is
the growth rate, which determines how fast the asymptotic accuracy
is approached.
Data obtained in response-signal SAT experiments are usually an-
alyzed this way (cf. McElree & Dosher, 1989). Although there is,
in general, no one-to-one correspondence between the parameters of
equation 5:26 and the parameters of the DDM (see Ratcliff, 2006), the
first prediction mentioned above, namely that the decision process
starts later in the DE than the UE cases, can be translated into the
prediction that with fewer than the time intercept, d, is larger than in
conditions with more than. The second prediction, that the rate of
accumulation in the critical trials is faster with fewer than than with
more than, may affect the estimated growth rate, b, as well as the
asymptotic accuracy, l. In addition, the effect of the second predic-
tion is sensitive to the control conditions that are used to estimate
false alarm rates. It was expected that either of these two parameters
would be larger in critical trials with fewer than as compared to more
than n (for details concerning predictions of the DDM with regard
to response-signal SAT experiments see, e.g., Bogacz et al., 2006 and
Ratcliff, 2006).
The log-Gaussian sequential sampling model amended with nega-
tion can be spelled out in alternative ways in order to derive predic-
tions for the present experiment. At least under one of these, the same
predictions as just described can be derived. In particular, we may
assume that in the DE conditions the decision process continuously
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outputs partial information, i.e. the current value of the decision vari-
able, to the negation processing step. The latter simply maps the two
response boundaries to the opposite response alternatives. In this sce-
nario, predictions are identical to those of the integrated model. If we
assume, on the other hand, a strictly serial organization of processing
components where the negation processing step takes place only after
the decision process has terminated, predictions are more difficult to
derive (suggestions of how such a model can be specified were made
by Ratcliff, 2006, although in a different context).
5.5.2 Results
Overall, participants responded within the 300ms interval in 77.7%
of the cases. At longer lags, they responded in time more often than
at shorter ones. At the five different lags, they responded in time in
51.6%, 72.4%, 85.7%, 89.8% and 90% of the cases, respectively. This
was consistent across the two modifiers and the three numerals with
a maximal difference below 5% from these means. In almost all com-
binations of modifiers and numerals, conditions with fewer than led
to slightly fewer responses in the required time window than their
counterparts with more than (maximal difference: 5.9%).
Accuracy increased with processing time. Of all trials, 33.7%,
48.6%, 61.1%, 66.5% and 68.0% received a correct judgment at the
respective lags. Across all lags, conditions with fewer than were an-
swered correctly slightly less often on average than conditions with
more than. The mean difference in accuracy was 3.9%. Moreover, tri-
als in which the number of presented objects matched the numeral
in the sentences were the most difficult ones. At the longest lags,
these were judged correctly in 55.6% of the trials. Moreover, trials in
which the number of objects was below the numeral in the sentence
received fewer correct judgments (deviance of -1: 60.0%, deviance of -
2: 76.0% for longest processing times) than trials in which the number
of objects was above the numeral (deviance of 1: 70.9%, deviance of
2: 77.8% for longest processing times). Furthermore, conditions with
more than led to slightly more yes responses than conditions with fewer
than. In the former, 49.9% of all responses were yes responses. In the
latter, 41% of all response were yes responses.
For each combination of numerals, modifiers and lags, d0 values
were calculated (see equation 5:25). The proportion of correct judg-
ments was used as hit rate. To estimate the false alarm rate, the pro-
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portion of incorrect judgments in the easiest condition with the same
modifier that required an opposite judgment was used. Estimates of
false alarm rates always involved the smallest numeral, seven. For
instance, the false alarm rate for fewer than eight in combination with
a deviance of 0 was estimated from the proportion of no responses in
the condition with fewer than seven and a deviance  2.
The d0 values for the deviances  2, 0 and 2 are depicted in Fig-
ure XXXIV. The predictions for the present experiment were mostly
focused on a deviance of 0. In this case, d0 values of more than n and
fewer than n were close together at the shortest two lags, but at longer
lags, fewer than received higher values than more than. This pattern
is compatible with the predictions. In order to test the predictions,
goodness of fit of functions as in equation 5:26 was evaluated.
The following procedure was carried out for each of the three de-
viances shown in Figure XXXIV. First, the function in equation 5:26
with parameters d, b and l was fit to the data using the nls function
of R (R Core Team, 2016). Then, it was fit separately to the UE and
DE cases with three free parameters for each of the two modifiers.
Finally, for any subset of the three parameters, one model was fit in
which these parameters were constrained to be pairwise identical for
the two modifiers. For example, the data were fit assuming different
time intercepts and different growth rates but identical asymptotic
accuracy for the two modifiers. The model predictions of the lat-
ter combination of parameters are shown in Figure XXXIV along the
observed d0 values. To evaluate goodness of fit, adjusted R2 values,
which take into account the number of free model parameters, were
calculated (see McElree & Dosher, 1989). For each of the three de-
viances, the model with different time intercepts and growth rates
but identical asymptotic accuracy was among the models with best
model fit. Concerning deviance 0, it was the best model with an ad-
justed R2 of .944. For deviance  2, it was on par with the model with
different d and l but identical b: adjusted R2 = .984. For deviance 2,
it was the third best model with an adjusted R2 of .939 (superseded by
the model with different d and l but identical b: adjusted R2 = .941;
and by the model where only d differed between the two numerals:
adjusted R2 = .940).
In the best models, the time intercept differed between the two
modifiers and it was consistently longer in conditions with the mod-
ifier fewer as compared to the modifier more. In the curves depicted
in Figure XXXIV, the difference between time intercepts was 305ms,
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176ms and 98ms for the deviances  2, 0 and 2, respectively. To get
an idea which parameters contribute significantly to model fit, the
LRT was used to compare nested models. However, with only ten
data points per deviance, these statistics have to be interpreted cau-
tiously. Concerning deviance 0, reducing the best model to one with
identical b or with identical d led to significantly worse model fits
(c2(1) = 12.45, p < .0001 and c2(1) = 4.29, p < .05, respectively).
Moreover, the inclusion of separate asymptotes for the two modifiers
did not lead to a significant improvement (c2(1) = 1.24, p = .26).
For deviances 2 and  2, simplifying the best models such that the
two modifiers have identical time intercepts reduced model fit sig-
nificantly (c2(1) = 12.42, p < .0001 and c2(1) = 18.38, p < .0001,
respectively) .
5.5.3 Discussion
The motivation for the present experiment was to substantiate the
conclusions drawn from the previous experiment and to rule out an
alternative explanation based on a SAT. Two qualitative predictions
were made. Firstly, it was predicted that, in comparison to sentences
with more than n, the decision process starts delayed in sentences with
fewer than n. Secondly, it was predicted that, if the numeral in the
sentence matches the number of presented objects, the rate of accu-
mulation is faster for fewer than n than it is for more than n.
Both predictions were confirmed. Across deviances, the time in-
tercept was estimated to be longer for the modifier fewer as compared
to more. The estimated size of this effect is compatible with what was
observed in the previous experiment and it is also compatible with
previous studies (see section 5.1). In addition, for a deviance of 0,
the growth rate of d0 values was estimated to be larger for fewer than
n than for more than n. While the growth rate parameter, b, of the
function in 5:26 does not correspond directly to the drift rate in the
DDM, it was expected that either b or l or both would be affected (cf.
Ratcliff, 2006).
In the discussion of the previous experiment, an alternative ex-
planation in terms of SAT was discussed. In particular, the findings
of the previous experiment could be explained under the assump-
tion that participants take more time for the decision process if they
evaluate fewer than n than if they evaluate more than n. Because the
processing time was under experimental control in the present exper-
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(a) deviance of  2 (b) deviance of 2
(c) deviance of 0
Figure XXXIV. The plots show (1) d0 values for more than n and fewer
than n with deviances  2, 0 and 2 (2) curves fitted according to equa-
tion 5:26 with different time intercept d and growth rate b but identi-
cal asymptotic accuracy l for the two modifiers. The legend in panel
a applies to all three panels.
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iment, this kind of explanation appears implausible in the light of the
results.
The present experiment provides further support for the IPM and
the results are also compatible with the log-Gaussian sequential sam-
pling model with negation. As noted in the predictions, these two
models cannot be distinguished on the basis of the data presented
here. As before, the data are hardly compatible with the automata
model even if it is amended with an extra processing step. This is
because the automata model makes no predictions about the propor-
tions of errors and especially about how they depend on processing
time. Furthermore, the data also seem difficult to explain within the
log-Gaussian sequential sampling model (Dehaene, 2007) as long as
no additional processing step is assumed for fewer than n as compared
to more than n.
5.6 general discussion
The present chapter used the processing difficulty of comparative
modified numerals in sentence-picture verification as a test case to
investigate the relation between formal semantic theory, processing
models and experimental data. Recent models and hypotheses from
formal semantics, psycholinguistics and cognitive psychology served
as background. In addition, an IPM was proposed that combines
insights from these areas. In the present section we discuss the theo-
retical implications that follow from the present chapter and consider
how these relate to the bigger picture.
5.6.1 Theoretical implications
The experimental results are fully compatible with the IPM and thus
support it. Moreover, they are also compatible with a log-Gaussian se-
quential sampling model (e.g Dehaene, 2007) if it is amended with an
additional processing step in the DE case, corresponding, for exam-
ple, to covert negation. As discussed in the predictions above, these
two types of models cannot be distinguished on the basis of our data.
However, it was argued in section 5.2.3.1 that the integrated model is
a priori more plausible because of linguistic considerations. How to
accommodate the experimental findings in the other discussed theo-
retical alternatives is not obvious.
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In general, it seems that we need to take into account both the
compositional linguistic encoding of truth conditions and the process
of numerical comparison in order to model the truth evaluation of
modified numerals (see Deschamps et al., 2015 for similar conclu-
sions regarding other UE and DE quantifiers, which we discuss in
the next chapter). This is in line with the ITT (Lidz et al., 2011, Hy-
pothesis 4:12). According to this hypothesis, the general cognitive
architecture computes, in a transparent way, the operations that are
used to specify the truth conditions of a sentence.
As is usually the case, there are conceivable alternative explana-
tions that cannot be excluded ultimately. What the present exper-
imental results and the data discussed in section 5.1 show rather
clearly is that there is an additional processing step – or at least a
prolonged one – that takes place during the verification or falsifica-
tion of DE as compared to UE comparative modified numerals. The
experimental results are, however, not informative as to what this ad-
ditional step is. Two potential alternatives are commented on briefly
here.
Firstly, we cannot exclude the possibility that pragmatics play a
role. Pragmatic accounts of processing difficulty in verification tasks
have been discussed in connection with negated sentences and there
are some parallels to DE quantifiers. Similar to what is proposed
in the IPM, one prominent type of account of processing difficulty
during the verification of negated sentences assumes that negation
introduces an additional processing step (either in terms of ‘proposi-
tion matching’ or in terms of mental simulations; see e.g. H. Clark &
Chase, 1972; Kaup et al., 2007). In contrast, pragmatic accounts pro-
pose that negated sentences require specific contextual licensing and
cause difficulty if none is provided. Experimental evidence for prag-
matic accounts was reported by Nieuwland and Kuperberg (2008)
and Tian, Breheny, and Ferguson (2010), for example. One specific
pragmatic account claims that difficulty is due to the accommoda-
tion of a question under discussion (QUD) if negated sentences are
presented out of the blue (Tian, 2014). Moreover, considerations of
this kind have recently also been related to the online processing of
sentences with DE quantifiers (e.g. Urbach, DeLong, & Kutas, 2015;
Nieuwland, 2016). The latter studies show that contextual support
can in some but not in all cases annihilate delayed processing of such
sentences.
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I am not aware of a worked-out pragmatic explanation of the kind
of effects discussed in the present chapter. If such an account were
to be developed, a number of issues would have to be addressed (see
Deschamps et al., 2015 for related discussion). Firstly, one crucial jus-
tification for pragmatic accounts of processing difficulty induced by
negation does not carry over to DE modified numerals. In particular,
negated sentences are, without context, often relatively uninforma-
tive (i.e. their information content is low; cf. Oaksford & Chater, 2009,
who refer to Oaksford & Stenning 1992). This does not generally
apply to DE modified numerals. Therefore, alternative justification
would have to be given. Secondly, one would have to spell out what
the specific licensing conditions of the DE modified numerals are and
how they differ from the UE ones. Especially with regard to Experi-
ment 4, in which yes-no questions had to be answered, it is far from
obvious what a pragmatic account based on implicit QUDs could
look like. Moreover, there should be a plausible argument for preva-
lence of pragmatic effects in experimental tasks where participants
are asked to decide about the truth or falsity of sentences over many
trials in a repetitive fashion. Furthermore, it should be outlined how
pragmatics can account for processing difficulty of sentence-picture
verification that shows up during the verification stage, after reading
and comprehension are already completed. Finally, it would have to
be explained how UE more than n may lead to more errors than DE
fewer than n although it is pragmatically simpler to process.
The second alternative, I want to mention was proposed by Bott
et al. (n.d.), who presented a novel perspective on the semantics of
quantifiers (see also Bott et al., 2013). Their model is discussed in the
next chapter. Therefore, I will not go into details here. Let me just
note two things: Firstly, predictions of the Bott et al. model regarding
the cases studied in the present chapter depend on additional auxil-
iary assumptions or linking hypotheses. Secondly, as applies also to
a potential pragmatic explanation, the model of Bott et al. may poten-
tially explain the longer RTs we observed in the DE conditions, but it
does not explain the high proportions of errors in the UE conditions
of Experiment 3a or the slow rate of accumulation in Experiment 4.
On the other hand, it is shown in the next chapter that one charac-
teristic feature of Bott et al.’s model follows rather naturally from the
one proposed here.
One noteworthy aspect of the present proposal is its parsimony.
As discussed above, the essential components of the model were mo-
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tivated independently. The semantic building blocks of comparative
constructions are well-established in linguistics. The assumed repre-
sentations of numerical information, the way in which they are ma-
nipulated and the model of the decision process were motivated and
tested extensively in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In con-
sequence, the proposal comes essentially for free. This increases its
credibility relative to the just mentioned alternatives (Occam’s razor,
see e.g. MacKay, 2003, pp.343–354).
5.6.2 The bigger picture
How does the IPM apply to the range of different experimental pro-
cedures that were discussed so far? As we will see, short reflection on
this question provides us with a link to the automata model and leads
to a specific implementation of the mITT (Hypothesis 4:20, Kotek et
al., 2015). Although all the discussed experiments investigated com-
parative modified numerals, it is reasonable to assume that they did
in fact investigate a range of different processes. As already men-
tioned in section 5.2.2, one source of variation between these pro-
cesses may be how a representation of the number of target objects is
derived (cf. Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson et al., 2004). In Experiment 3a,
participants could freely choose whether to approximate or to count
exactly. Considering the substantial amount of errors in some of the
conditions, it seems likely that they relied on approximation at least
to some degree. By contrast, participants of Experiment 4were forced
to approximate because visual stimuli were presented for only 200ms.
Moreover, in the experiment of Geurts et al. (2010, exp. 3), numerals
were within the subitizing range (Kaufman et al., 1949). This allowed
for exact representations even in the absence of counting. The data
of Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2013), on the other hand, indicate
that participants relied on precise counting. Finally, in the self-paced
counting study of Koster-Moeller et al. (2008), counting was invited
by the experimental procedure.
The IPM is applicable to all these cases because it is compatible
with different mechanisms for deriving a representation of the num-
ber of target objects. When the assumed representations of numbers
and numerosities were introduced in sections 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.1, re-
spectively, reference was made to the connectionist models of Dehaene
and Changeux (1993) and Verguts and Fias (2004). What was not ex-
plained in any detail there, is that the network architecture of Verguts
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and Fias provides an explicit and plausible model of how to com-
bine exact and approximate number representations. To see how this
works, we take a look at their simulation study. In their first sim-
ulation, they trained a network that had an architecture as shown
in Figure XXXVb to represent numerosities in the range 1 through
5. The input to the location field represented objects at different loca-
tions.7 The summation field served as a hidden layer that summed up
the amount of activity in the location field. Both a supervised and an
unsupervised learning procedure led to representations of numeros-
ity as shown on the left hand side of panel a of the figure. This
accords with the type of numerosity representation assumed in the
present proposal. In a second simulation, the architecture in panel
c was used. This was a two-step simulation. In the first step, the
network learned to represent numerosity. In the second step, it was
trained to also represent symbolic number. Number symbols were
modeled as individual nodes of the symbolic field. These were pre-
sented to the network simultaneously with the corresponding non-
symbolic numerosities while it performed an unsupervised learning
procedure. After learning, symbolic input was represented as shown
on the right hand side of panel a whereas the representation of non-
symbolic numerosity was as before.
Two points are important here. Firstly, the representations that
emerged in the simulations of Verguts and Fias are completely com-
patible with the IPM. And in particular, they implement Hypothesis
5:18, which states that symbolic number reuses the representation
format of the ANS (for further discussion see e.g. Nieder & Dehaene,
2009). Secondly, and more importantly at this point, the model of
Verguts and Fias establishes a link to semantic automata. In particu-
lar, as far as automata like those shown in Figure XXII are reasonable
models of counting routines, it is conceivable that a similar device
receives input from the location field and feeds into the symbolic
field, cf. Figure XXXVc. Moreover, the resulting representation in the
number field can then feed into the IPM, as depicted in Figure XXIX.
Incorporating counting procedures along these lines, allows us to ap-
ply the model to all the experimental procedures discussed above.
On a more abstract level, we see that, even if verification of quanti-
fied sentences proceeds along these lines, semantic automata will still
be appropriate tools to reason about the minimally needed computa-
7 In the original model of Dehaene and Changeux this information was represented
in the second layer, after objects on a “retinal image” had been size-normalized.
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tional recourses of a given verification problem. This is because, in
case of flawless performance, the input-output function assumed in
the automata model and that of the IPM can be considered identical.
Thus, conclusions drawn from the automata model can be considered
valid as long as we restrict ourselves to flawless performance.
If extended as just sketched, the IPM opens up the possibility for
concrete implementations of the mITT. The most obvious example is
the following. If visual stimuli are presented for very short durations
the ‘symbolic route’ is blocked because there is not enough time for
counting, but the approximate route is still a viable option. Generally,
approximation of numerosity may be a fast and automatic process (cf.
Dehaene, 1997; Feigenson et al., 2004; Halberda et al., 2006) whereas
counting is slower and only used if appropriate in a given situation.
The key point is that one and the same compositional specification of
the truth evaluation process can be combined with different ways to
derive a representation of how many target objects there are. An in-
teresting consequence of this approach is a natural interface between
formal semantic theory and various models of sentence-picture veri-
fication.
A comment on the level of analysis (Marr, 1982) may be in or-
der. In developing the processing model, references to results from
theoretical and experimental neuroscience were made. The purpose
of these was to motivate the representations and computations that
are part of the model. However, the present proposal should not be
understood as a model at the level of neural computations. Marr
argued that cognitive information processing systems must be under-
stood at several distinct but related levels. He famously introduced
the three levels of (1) computational theory, (2) representation and algo-
rithmic and (3) hardware implementation (see section 2.1.1). Because the
present chapter focused on processing difficulty that was reflected in
RTs and proportions of errors, an analysis at Marr’s second level nat-
urally suggests itself and the proposed IPM is intended as such. At
the same time, care was taken to formulate the model in a way that is
consistent with descriptions and analyses at the other two levels. At
the computational level, a tight connection to linguistic theory is es-
sential, which – among other things – describes how truth conditions
are derived compositionally from the lexical parts of a sentences. In
addition, the theory of decisions and inferences on the basis of uncer-
tain information is important at this level. At the level of hardware
implementation, neurophysiological studies and computational simu-
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lations of how quantitative and numerical information is encoded are
essential. Moreover, the computations that are carried out with these
representations should be such that they can plausibly be realized at
the neuro-computational level. Altogether, the integrated model was
formulated such that it may eventually fit into a coherent descriptions
of the phenomenon at all three of Marr’s levels.
Two important questions are whether the IPM can be scaled to
other constructions beside comparative modified numerals and other
processes beside sentence-picture verification. These are discussed
in chapters 6 and 7, respectively. The answer to the first question
is positive, but an interesting follow-up is how far we get with the
present approach. The second question seems more difficult. In chap-
ter 7, some ideas are discussed and experimental data are presented
that demonstrate enhanced processing load of DE vs. UE quantifiers
already during reading.
6
MORE QUANTIF IERS , MORE MODELS : POSS IBLE
EXTENS IONS AND RELAT ION TO OTHER
APPROACHES1
The previous chapter had a narrow focus on the truth evaluation of
comparative modified numerals. The present chapter widens this fo-
cus and is concerned with the question whether and how the IPM can
be generalized beyond comparative modified numerals. Furthermore,
its relation to some other models of quantification is discussed.
For a start, let us put these questions into context. It is no ex-
aggeration to say that “our empirical and mathematical knowledge
of quantification in natural language has exploded” (Keenan, 2006,
p. 302) since Montague’s (1973) pioneering work. Since then “we
have witnessed three main stages of research: [g]rand uniformity
(the 1970s and 1980s) [...,] [d]iversity (the 1980s and 1990s) [...and]
[i]nternal composition (from 2000 on)”, as Szabolcsi (2010) explains
in her recent research survey on quantification. To her list can be
added research on the processing of quantifiers, which mostly took
place since the year 2005 (see e.g. the discussion in chapter 4).
Early research was aimed at discovering “semantic universals”
that apply to all natural language quantifiers in every natural lan-
guage. One well-known example is the Conservativity Universal
(Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Keenan & Stavi, 1986), which is discussed
in the next section (cf. also section 2.2.1). In contrast, more recent
research, including that presented in the previous chapters, aims to
1Amodified version of the model summarized in section 6.3was published in the pro-
ceeding of the Amsterdam Colloquium 2013 Bott, Klein, and Schlotterbeck (2013).
Moreover, section 6.3.1 was taken from Bott, Schlotterbeck, and Klein (n.d.) in
slightly modified form. These authors which also report the experiments referrred
to in section 6.3.2. Parts of the latter work were also presented at the workshop on
“Experimental Approaches to Semantics” at the European Summer School of Logic,
Language and Information 2015 in Barcelona (Bott, Klein, & Schlotterbeck, 2015), as
well as the workshop on “Linguistic and Cognitive Aspects on Quantification” 2015
in Budapest.
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obtain detailed pictures of individual quantifiers taking into account
rich and diverse empirical data.
A consequence of this development is that the more recent propos-
als do not attain the level of generality of some of the earlier ones. For
example, Hackl (2000), who devolped the semantic fundamentals on
which the IPM is based, set out to analyze a range of different com-
parative quantifiers but eventually conceded that “[f]uture research
has to show how the treatment of more than three can be extended to
cover more complicated comparative determiners like more than half
as well as amount comparatives like more books than Bill” (p. 246). It
is remarkable that there is, as far as I know, still no analysis of more
than half that meets his standards – even more so as both the ques-
tions raised by Hackl (2000) and also proportional quantifiers have
received quite a bit of attention in subsequent years.
While there are good reasons to shy away from what may be con-
siderd over-generalizations of the early reserach on quantification, it
may still be usefull to have at least some kind of roadmap that speci-
fies what the relevant or challenging cases of quantification in natural
language are and how one may proceed to investigate them system-
atically. However, as is explained in some detail below, devising such
a roadmap is difficult. All we can do is to focus on the most obvious
extensions of the IPM and highlight where difficulties are to be ex-
pected in extending the model. As an example, it is shown that the
proposal can be straightforwardly extended to comparative propor-
tional quantifiers and existing experimental results are related to this
extension. In the final part of the chapter, we discuss the model of
Bott et al. (n.d.) and establish a connection to the present one. In par-
ticular, it is shown that one of the characteristic features of the Bott et
al. model can be naturally derived from – or at least justified by – the
IPM.
6.1 what other quantifiers are relevant
The IPM was guided by two hypotheses. The first was the ITT (Hy-
pothesis 4:12) and the second was Hypothesis 5:1, which stated that
numerical quantifiers are built upon representations and processes of
number cognition (cf. R. Clark & Grossman, 2007). Now, the follow-
ing question arises naturally:
Question 6:1. How far do we get modeling quantification in natural lan-
guage using the building blocks of the integrated processing model?
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To approach this question, it would be useful to knowwhat “quan-
tification in natural language” encompasses or which quantifiers count
as relevant. Let us reflect on this briefly. 2 With regard to deter-
miner denotations, which are often considered a subclass of natural
language quantifiers, van Benthem (1986) noted the following:
There are two strategies of description here. One ap-
proaches from the outside, so to speak, accumulating
global conditions so as to fit to size. The other builds up
from the inside, starting from evident cases, and giving
an inductive generating procedure. (p.7)
A beautiful example of an approach that combines both of these
strategies and demonstrates how they may converge was presented
in a classical paper by Keenan and Stavi (1986), who proposed a se-
mantic characterization of the possible interpretations of English “de-
terminer expressions.” They started out with a list of examples. Here
are a few of them with their original labels:
(6:2) a. Simplex:
every, some, two, both, neither, my, your,. . .
b. Proportional:
every third, more than 2/3 of the, between 5 and 10% of
the,. . .
c. Modified numerals:
at least ten, more than two, the ten or more,. . .
d. Possessives:
John’s, no student’s, every teacher’s,. . .
e. Partitives:
less than five of the ten, the three tallest of the twenty or
more,. . .
f. Boolean combinations:
not even one, neither John’s nor Mary’s, most but not all,. . .
g. a(n)+AP+number of:
an even number of, a prime number of,. . .
h. Comparatives with APs:
more male than female, a prime number of,. . .
2 In discussing this question, exact, or almost exact, representations of numerosity
are assumed. This allows us to simplify and treat modified numerals in the IPM
as truth-conditionally equivalent to modified numerals under their standard GQT
based semantics.
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i. Comparatives with APs:
more of John’s than of Mary’s, fewer of the male than of the
female,. . .
...
The determiner expressions in this list share a few obvious proper-
ties. For example, they all can combine with what Keenan and Stavi
referred to as common noun phrases (CNPs) to form full NPs. More-
over, they all have extensional interpretations and they all combine
with CNPs that have countable denotations. It is evident from the few
examples provided here that the class of English determiner expres-
sions has considerable size.
In order to characterize the possible determiner denotations
Keenan and Stavi first approached “from the outside.” They started
by assuming that determiners denote functions from properties to
sets of properties (cf. Barwise & Cooper, 1981). Next, they hypothe-
sized that the possible determiner denotations are always conservative
(“The Conservativity Universal”, p. 260, also cf. section 2.2.1) – a
hypothesis that is still generally commonly accepted today (for dis-
cussion see e.g. Hamm & Zimmermann, 2002). Finally, Keenan and
Stavi approached “from the inside.” They defined a ‘small’ set of
basic determiner denotations which contained (1) at least n (“basic
cardinals”) and (2) expressions like Simon’s n or more (“basic posses-
sives”), for every numeral n, and (3) the Aristotelian every. They have
shown that the closure of this set under, possibly infinite, boolean
combinations corresponds exactly to the conservative functions in a
given model (see also Hamm, 1989).
What Keenan and Stavi have demonstrated is that it is possible
to systematically derive determiner denotations from a small set of
‘generators.’ They suggested that this fact may be exploited dur-
ing language acquisition and may substantially simplify the learn-
ing problem. Moreover, the general idea that, during learning, deter-
miner denotations are constructed from a small set of primitive build-
ing blocks is also implemented in recent statistical learning models
(Piantadosi, 2011, ch. 3). 3
Because the generators of Keenan and Stavi include modified nu-
merals, their result is encouraging and seems to suggest that we can
proceed in a similar way to extend the IPM. However, their approach
cannot be the model for the present case. This is mainly because of
3However, it should be noted here that these authors doubt the usefulness of the
Conservativity Universal for learning.
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three reasons all of which have to do with the fact that, from our
perspective, their set of basic determiners is to small and their set
of possible determiner denotations is too large. The first reason is
that infinite boolean combinations seem cognitively implausible. Sec-
ondly, some relatively simple determiners are derived in implausibly
complicated ways (e.g. proportional quantifiers). And finally, the
class of determiner denotations singled out by Keenan and Stavi is
too large in the sense that it includes cases that are beyond reach
from the perspective adopted here.
Let us focus on the last point. What sticks out immediately among
the examples in 6:2 are the possessives. It is rather obvious that the
building blocks of the IPM do not suffice to cover possessives and
this is also not intended. Possessives can be systematically excluded
if we restrict determiner denotations to functions that are isomorphism
invariant – the way we introduced GQs anyway. Moreover, recall
from section 2.2.1 that CE-quantifiers can be identified with binary
relations between numbers. If we restrict ourselves to these, it may
again seem reasonable to systematically derive determiner denota-
tions from the building blocks of the IPM: We could use boolean com-
binations of modified numerals (and their inner negations, cf. Peters &
Westersta˚hl, 2006) to enclose arbitrarily small regions in the number
tree (cf. Figure XXXVIa/b). By combining such regions we can in
principle define any CE-quantifier. But now we have the same three
problems as above. Note in particular that even the CE-quantifiers
are far too many to be covered by any cognitively plausible model. It
is easy to see that they are uncountably – more precisely 2@0 – many.
What is more, they contain cases that are clearly not realized in any
natural language like, for example, the quantifier that is true of A
and B iff either jA n Bj is a Fibonacci number or jA \ Bj is a prime
number (shown in Figure XXXVIc).
We could continue looking for further conditions to zone in on
a set of relevant quantifiers. For example, in terms of computability,
we could restrict ourselves to those that are computable by PDA (van
Benthem, 1986) or deterministic PDA (Kanazawa, 2013). The former
is particularly interesting from our perspective because of its corre-
spondence to expressibility in Presburger arithmetic (recall Theorem
4:8). It is not far-fetched to attempted to enrich the building blocks of
the IPM to achieve essentially that expressive power. However, as van
Benthem noted himself this class is still way too large. For the time
being, it thus seems difficult to find global properties that restrict the
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(a) jA \ Bj > k ^ jA \ Bj < l (b) jA \ Bj > k ^ jA \ Bj < l ^
jA n Bj > m ^ jA n Bj < n
 
+  
+ + +
+ +   +
  +      
+       + +
  + +   +    
      + +   + +
+   +       +    
(c)
Figure XXXVI. Number trees again. Panels a/b: defining regions in
the number tree via Boolean combinations; panel c: example of an
unnatural quantifier
vast space of possibilities to exactly those that are actually realized in
natural language.
As a consequence, question 6:1 posed at the beginning of this
section cannot get a simple answer. Concerning potential extension of
the IPM, we adopt a strategy akin to the second from the quote above.
In particular, we shall consider evident cases, study their internal
composition and how their building blocks can combine. Despite
the non-negligible risk that this may lead to nothing more than a
tentative collection of examples (Hamm, 1989, p. 7), the reader is
hopefully convinced that this is, at the moment, the most reasonable
way forward.
There is a yet another important reason to proceed this way: It has,
especially in recent years, repeatedly been argued that “true quanti-
fiers” in natural language are in fact limited to just a few cases and
that other “expressions of quantity” cannot be analyzed adequately
as GQs (e.g. Nouwen, 2010b; Sternefeld, 2015). The arguments for
this claim are not repeated here. They are based on a number of
fundamental contributions by Krifka (1999), Hackl (2000), Geurts and
Nouwen (2007), among others. In combination with the above con-
siderations, this implies that the class of GQs is on the one hand too
large, even if severely restricted, and on the other hand there are
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many expressions of quantity in natural language that are not con-
tained within it. The latter form a heterogeneous group that needs to
be studied on a case by case basis. This view is clearly expressed in
the following quote.
[T]he GQT notion of a quantifier is not really very suit-
able if we want to learn more about the semantics of ex-
pressions of quantity. If we want to appreciate the subtle
differences with which quantifiers communicate quanti-
ties, a focus on how they differ is to be preferred over one
which sets out to generalise as much as possible. [...] The
things we call quantifier are so varied, that they deserve
to be studied on a case by case [basis]. (Nouwen, 2010b, p.
254)
This quote contains two rather independent assertions. The first is
about the usefulness of GQT to study “expressions of quantity” and
only the second is about the heterogeneity of this class and how its
members demand individual consideration. I tend to disagree with
the first and think that we miss important generalizations and a use-
ful tool for formal analysis if we abandon the GQT perspective. As an
example, think of Szymanik’s (2010) results about the computational
complexity of polyadic lifts and how it ironically tells us something
general about cumulative readings of numerical quantifiers, which
were used by Krifka (1999), among others, as an argument against
GQT based analyses. Nevertheless, I agree with the second part of
the quote and subscribe to the strategy of case by case analysis for
the reasons explained by Nouwen (2010b) and those laid out above.
In the next section, a few rather obvious potential extensions of
the IPM are discussed. Boolean combinations of quantifiers are not
discussed. We simply note that these are generally possible but, if
expressed overtly, usually do not contain more than two parts. How
boolean combinations are processed is left open. Hypotheses like the
Conservativity Universal are understood as upper bounds. Models
of quantification that are able to derive non-conservative determin-
ers are in need of an explanation as to why these never occur. By
the same token, models that automatically restrict the possible de-
terminer meanings to conservative ones gain additional credibility.
How do the latter points relate to the IPM? In general, the processes
and representations involved in number cognition do allow to com-
pute non-conservative quantifiers. Maybe the simplest example is the
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Table XXXVII
Class A and Class B modified numerals.
Class A Class B
more than n at least n
fewer than n at most n
under n up to n
over n from n
between n and m from n to m
maximally n
minimally n
n or fewer
n or more
Note. Taken from Nouwen (2015).
quantifier that is true of two sets A and B iff jAj > jBj. However,
if we stick to the way meaning is actually assembled in natural lan-
guage expressions, as dictated by the ITT, we stay within the realm
of conservative quantifiers because, by the Conservativity Universal,
other quantifiers are simply not realized (cf. the “structural account
of conservativity” of Romoli, 2015, who refers to Gennaro Chierchia
and Danny Fox).
6.2 potential extension of the integrated model
The most obvious extensions of the IPM are other modified numerals
and other comparative quantifiers. Concerning the former, we have to
take into account the distinction between what are called class A and
class B modified numerals (Geurts & Nouwen, 2007; Nouwen, 2010a).
Examples of both classes are given in Table XXXVII. These two classes
are distinguished by several semantic and/or pragmatic properties.
The paradigmatic one is their potential for ignorance implications.
Class B modified numerals do systematically produce these kinds of
inferences whereas class A modified numerals do not. This is ex-
emplified in 6:3. The idea behind this example is that 6:3-b/c are
unacceptable because they express ignorance about an obvious truth
(cf. Nouwen, 2010a).
(6:3) a. A square has more than three sides.
b. #A square has at least four sides.
c. A square has fewer than five sides.
d. #A square has at most four sides.
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Class A and class B modified numerals do not only differ in terms of
semantic or pragmatic properties but also with regard to processing
and acquisition (Koster-Moeller et al., 2008; Geurts et al., 2010; Bott
et al., 2013, n.d.). While class A modified numerals are rather well
understood from a semantic stand point, there is an ongoing debate
how to analyze class B modified numerals (e.g. Geurts & Nouwen,
2007; Nouwen, 2010b; Schwarz, 2013; Nouwen, 2015; Penka, 2015).
Before the basic questions regarding the correct semantic and prag-
matic analysis of these modified numerals are answered, an approach
that is based on the ITT cannot get off the ground.
Thus, for now, extensions are best focused on class A modified
numerals. Specifically, those expressions in Table XXXVII which con-
tain spatial prepositions constitute a potential direction for extension.
Constructions like these are found cross-linguistically (for discussion
see Corver & Zwarts, 2006). What is interesting in this context, are hy-
potheses about close relations between the mental representations of
space and numerical quantity that have been put forward repeatedly.
Specifically, it has been hypothesized that numerical and spatial in-
formation is encoded and manipulated using shared representations
and mechanisms (e.g. Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, & Dehaene, 2005; Bueti
& Walsh, 2009).
Moreover, the computational model of spatial prepositions pro-
posed by Lipinski et al. (2012) seems relevant in this context. This
model was already mentioned when motivating the IPM in section
5.3.2 because the two models show close parallels. In particular, the
model of Lipinski et al. is based on a computation that is essentially
a generalization of that performed by the comparative morpheme -er
in the integrated model. It transforms a representation of the spa-
tial position of what is called the located object to a representation of
its position relative to the reference object. The spatial preposition is
represented as a region in (‘relative’) space. The relative position of
the located object may be within or outside of this region. The latter
determines whether a preposition is appropriate in a given context or
not. Thus, the preposition plays a role comparable to that of pos in
the integrated model.
It is not obvious whether we should expect similar differences in
processing difficulty between, e.g., under n and over n as observed be-
tween UE and DE comparative modified numerals. On the one hand,
there is no morphologically transparent indication of a scale reversing
operator in under n. Therefore, we may expect that no such operation
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takes place. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that
under n does involve scale reversal. In particular, we may assume
that DE modified numerals always have a derived meaning because
the corresponding semantic primitives are lacking. In some cases, e.g.
fewer than n, the internal composition is transparent, in others, e.g.
under n, it is not. We cannot decide between these alternatives at this
point (cf. H. Clark & Chase, 1972).
Concerning other comparative quantifiers beside comparative mod-
ified numerals, we can follow the footsteps of Hackl (2000), and focus
on the following types of expressions.
(6:4) a. Compartive proportional quantifiers, as in:
Elin read fewer than one third of the books.
b. Phrasal amount comparatives, as in:
Elin read more books than magazines.
c. Clausal amount comparatives, as in:
Elin read fewer books than Simon shredded magazines.
As regards comparative proportional quantifiers like 6:4-a, exten-
sion of the IPM is straightforward if we make one specific assumption
about expressions of proportion like one third. This is demonstrated
in the next section (6.2.1). Moreover, in section 6.2.2, it is discussed
how extension to the proportional case relates to empirical data from
sentence-picture verification experiments.
Extension to amount comparatives as in 6:4-b/c depends on what
syntactic and semantic assumptions we make about the than-phrases.
This is, however, beyond the scope of the present work. Let me just
note that than-phrases are often assumed to denote definite descrip-
tions of degrees (von Stechow, 1984) and in the case of 6:4-b/c these
correspond to numerosity.
Before we discuss comparative proportional quantifiers as an ex-
ample, Aristotelian quantifiers and most are briefly commented on.
With regard to the former, I just want to note the following. While
these can in principle be analyzed as special kinds of modified nu-
merals (e.g. some as more than 0), there are several experimental
studies that show clear differences between modified numerals and
Aristotelian quantifiers in terms of their processing. Sentence-picture
verification experiments that show this were summarized in section
4.1.3.2. These data in combination with theoretical considerations
(section 4.1.1) give us reason to believe that Aristotelian quantifiers
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are subserved by distinct processing mechanisms. Therefore, an ex-
tension of the IPM to Aristoitelian quantifiers would not be justified.
The quantifier most was already discussed in connection with the
automata model and the ITT in chapter 4. The following can be added
to this discussion. As an extended version of Pietroski et al.’s (2009)
proposal, the IPM is readily applicable to most. However, it has to
be left open at this point whether extending the model to most might
resolve some of the conflicts mentioned in chapter 4 regarding the
verification procedures associated with this quantifier.
6.2.1 Comparative proportional quantifiers
At least if judged from their morphosyntax, comparative proportional
quantifiers like more/fewer than half are among the closest relatives
of comparative modified numerals. Superficially, there are only two
differences (but see section 4.1 for some semantic differences). The
first lies in how the than-phrase is realized: In one case it contains a
numeral, in the other it contains half. The second difference is that
the proportional variant is always a partitive whereas this is optional
in the modified numeral variant.
In the present section, the IPM is extended to comparative propor-
tional quantifiers and, in particular, to the following German exam-
ples. While the discussion is focused on these examples, it applies to
other comparative proportional quantifiers as well.
(6:5) a. Mehr
More
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of the
Karten
cards
sind
are
rot.
red.
‘More than half of the cards are red’.
b. Weniger
Fewer
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of the
Karten
cards
sind
are
rot.
red.
‘Fewer than half of the cards are red’.
In order to derive symbolic meaning representation of the quantifiers
in 6:5, the expression die Ha¨lfte has to be integrated into the sentence.
The following is the simplest way to achieve this I can think of. We
simply assume that expressions like half, a third, a fourth, etc., which
we refer to as expressions of proportion, denote proportions (cf. Solt,
2016b). Proportions can be conceived of as degrees that are associated
with what Kennedy and McNally (2005a) call a totally closed scale. In
fact, the ability of gradable expressions to combine with expressions
of proportion is used by Kennedy and McNally (2005a) as a diagnos-
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tic for this kind of scale. Therefore, expressions of proportion can
be straightforwardly integrated into the sentence meaning as long as
we assume that an operator manyProp is available as an alternative
to many. Of course, manyProp has the same syntactic category as
many. But it maps two properties of pluralities, say card and red,
to a representation of the following proportion (under the obvious
interpretation function,
r

z
):
r
max

ld.9x cards x ^ red x ^ #(x) = dzr
max

ld.9x cards x ^ #(x) = dz (6:6)
The symbolic meaning representation of the quantifier in 6:5-b is de-
rived as shown in Figure XXXVIII. Apart from the mentioned changes,
the derivation is parallel to that of the modified numerals discussed
in the previous chapter.
I would like to mention three pieces of evidence that support the
assumptions just introduced. Firstly, expressions of proportion by
and large occur in the same syntactic positions as other degree denot-
ing expressions like, e.g. numerals, measure phrases or intensifiers.
Secondly, the existence of a silent operator manyProp is plausible in
light of the fact that overt many also displays an ambiguity between
a cardinal and a proportional interpretation (Partee, 1989) and that,
thirdly, proportional readings also surface in comparatives, as the fol-
lowing example shows.
(6:7) More residents of Ithaca than NYC know their neighbors.
(from Solt, 2016b, who refers to Barbara Partee)
As was reviewed by Jacob, Vallentin, and Nieder (2012), there is
accumulating evidence that proportions are represented using exactly
the same format as representations of numerosity. Thus, the symbolic
representations can be mapped to essentially the same truth evalua-
tion process as before. What is not discussed here are the implemen-
tation of manyProp and potential distinctions between approximate
and exact representations of proportions.
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6.2.2 Existing data from sentence-picture verification
What does the extension to proportional quantifiers predict and how
does it relate to existing data form sentence-picture verification ex-
periments? These questions are discussed in the present section. In
chapter 4, a number of relevant sentence-picture verification exper-
iments were discussed. The central finding was that, as predicted
by the automata model, comparative proportional quantifiers led to
enhanced working memory load during verification as compared to,
e.g. Aristotelian quantifiers or modified numerals.
The following difference between modified numerals and propor-
tional quantifiers carries over to the present approach. The truth
or falsity of modified numerals depends only on objects that have
both the property expressed by the restrictor argument and that ex-
pressed by the scope. In contrast, proportional quantifiers depend on
all objects that have the restrictor property. It is rather obvious that
the latter may cause enhanced working memory involvement. Apart
from informal considerations of this sort, predictions about which
cognitive resources or taxed specifically by the comparative propor-
tional quantifiers depend entirely on how the operator manyProp is
implemented. While it is easily conceivable that the corresponding
computation requires a substantial amount of working memory, fur-
ther characterization of this kind of computation is beyond the scope
of the present work. What is important to note here is that, once
manyProp has computed a representation of a proportion, there is
no substantial difference between comparative proportional quanti-
fiers and comparative modified numerals anymore.
A direct prediction is that the difference in processing difficulty
between UE and DE modified numerals should carry over to UE vs.
DE comparative proportional quantifiers. This is because the extra
processing step of scale reversal induced by few is predicted to take
place in the DE versions of both types of quantifiers. I am aware of
two existing studies that already tested this prediction. The first is
that of Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2013) that was already discussed
above in section 5.1. The second was reported by Deschamps et al.
(2015). These two studies did, however, report conflicting results.
Both are summarized briefly here. Afterwards, it is discussed what
may have caused the divergence.
When discussing the study of Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2013)
in section 5.1, we focused on the conditions with modified numerals.
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In addition to these, Polish versions of sentences like more/fewer than
half of the cars are black were included in the experiment. Szymanik
and Zajenkowski found an interaction between the direction of entail-
ment and the type of quantifier in RTs. DE modified numerals took
longer to judge than UE ones but there was no difference between the
DE and UE proportional quantifiers.
These results stand in contrast to what would have been expected
under the IPM and also to what Deschamps et al. (2015) found. These
authors also investigated effects of the direction of entailment (or po-
larity) of quantifiers on RTs and proportions of errors in sentence-
picture verification experiments. They compared the a- and b-variants
of 6:8–6:10 and found prolonged response times as well as increased
proportions of errors in the b-variants, which contained DE quanti-
fiers. This led to robust effects of the direction of entailment across
quantifier types. The DE conditions took about 100–200ms longer to
judge than the UE conditions.
(6:8) a. More than half of the dots are blue.
b. Less than half of the dots are yellow.
(6:9) a. Many of the dots are blue.
b. Few of the dots are yellow.
(6:10) a. More dots are blue than yellow.
b. Fewer dots are yellow than blue.
Like much of chapter 5, their study also investigated the interplay
between the direction of entailment of quantifiers and the processing
of numbers and numerosities. 4 In addition to polarity, the propor-
tion of yellow to blue dots shown on the pictures was manipulated.
The latter manipulation also affected processing difficulty, but there
was no interaction with the direction of entailment. The authors
concluded that the two experimental manipulations affect different
processing components. The polarity manipulation affects linguistic
encoding and processing whereas the manipulation of proportions
affects numerical processing. Additional support for this conclusion
was obtained from non-linguistic control conditions which had in-
4A comment on the time line: The study of Deschamps et al. was available online be-
ginning of July 2015. In March 2015, a compact version of the integrated processing
model and the results of Experiment 3 as well as design and prediction of Experi-
ment 4 were submitted to the “Experimental Approaches to Semantics Workshop”
at ESSLLI 2015 (Schlotterbeck, 2015). At that time I had no knowledge of the study
of Deschamps et al. (2015).
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structions as in 6:11. In these conditions, no difference between the a-
and b-variants were found (cf. Cummins & Katsos, 2010).
(6:11) a. > / >
b. < / <
Deschamps et al. related their results to recent proposals from
the linguistic literature that posit additional compositional structure
and thus more complex representations in sentences with DE as com-
pared to UE quantifiers. They call this a “syntactic account” and
dismiss several alternative explanations. Their syntactic account is
motivated by split scope data in sentences containing downward en-
tailing quantifiers (e.g Bech, 1955; Jacobs, 1982; Penka & Stechow,
2001). Their conclusions are strikingly similar to those presented in
chapter 5. A superficial difference between the IPM and the syntac-
tic account of Deschamps et al. is that the latter attributes the dif-
ficulty in the DE conditions to syntactic dislocation, i.e. movement
operations, whereas the present account only assumes an additional
semantic operation but remains silent about movement operations.
Apart from this difference, the two proposals are compatible. While
not attempted here, it should be possible to apply the IPM to the
other quantifiers tested by Deschamps et al. (2015), beside compar-
ative proportional quantifiers, namely the sentences in 6:9 and 6:10.
Amount comparatives as in 6:10 were briefly commented on above. A
detailed semantic analysis of many-sentences like 6:9 was conducted
by Solt (2009, 2014). See also references therein and Scho¨ller and
Franke (2015, 2016).
What sets the IPM apart, is that it specifies an explicit process-
ing model. As a consequence, explicit predictions about which pro-
cessing components are affected by experimental manipulations can
be derived. In particular, it is predicted that the direction of entail-
ment affects non-decision times whereas the difficulty of the numer-
ical comparison affects drift rates. These predictions can be tested
if data are collected in a way that allows for estimation of the DDM
parameters (cf. Dehaene, 2007). In order to collect enough data per
participant, this would probably require testing participants in multi-
ple sessions.
One aspect of the data reported by Deschamps et al. seems at odds
with the IPM at first sight: DE quantifiers led to more errors than
UE ones. In an experimental procedure without time limit the extra
processing step in the DE version should lead to slowdown, but there
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should not be an effect on proportions of errors in the experimental
conditions used by Deschamps et al. However, they used a time limit
of 3 s. This may have caused the effect. Equal proportions of errors
are only expected if the decision process is allowed to reach one of
the response boundaries. Otherwise, proportions of errors may be
affected in addition to RTs (cf. Experiment 4).
What may be the reason that Szymanik and Zajenkowski and
Deschamps et al. obtained conflicting results? There are several possi-
bilities. Firstly, there is the remote possibility that the effect reported
by Deschamps et al. is actually due to a confound. Their experiments
were well designed, for sure. But there was one confounding factor
that is difficult to control for: In their design, there is a mismatch
between the dominant color shown on the picture and the color men-
tioned in the sentence in the true DE conditions. In the false DE
conditions, on the other hand, there is a match. This may in principle
lead to some kind of interference effect between lexical fit and truth
values (cf. Urbach & Kutas, 2010). However, if this explanation was
on the right track, one would expect the effect of the direction of en-
tailment to be stronger at the extremes, with very many or very few
objects of one color. But this is not what Deschamps et al. found.
Secondly, the discrepancy may also be due to differences in task
demands. Whereas approximation did suffice in the experiments of
Deschamps et al., proportions were relatively close and precise judg-
ments were required in the experiment of Szymanik and Zajenkowski.
This may have affected the verification procedure used by the partici-
pants. In particular, it is possible that, in the experiment of Szymanik
and Zajenkowski, participants used the kind of “vote counting” or
“one-to-one-plus” strategy that was discussed in section 4.2. Under
the IPM, this is not expected but would also not be impossible. For
example, in an experimental setting in which the canonical verifica-
tion procedure does simply not succeed, it would be compatible with
the model if people switched to a different verification procedure that
is effective in that particular task.
However, the most likely explanation of the divergence is that sta-
tistical power was low in the study of Szymanik and Zajenkowski and
they did therefore not discover the effect. The mean RTs they report
for the proportional conditions are over 6 s with standard deviations
of around 2 s. If we assume that the true effect of the direction of
entailment is around 100–200ms as was observed by Deschamps et
al. and is also compatible with experiments 3a & 4 reported in the
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previous chapter, then it is rather likely that the effect was missed in
the experiment of Szymanik and Zajenkowski.
6.3 empty-set effects in different kinds of de
quantifiers
Another explanation of processing difficulty with DE quantifiers was
proposed by Bott, Schlotterbeck, and Klein (n.d.), who presented a
novel perspective on the semantics of quantifiers (see also Bott, Klein,
& Schlotterbeck, 2013). They developed an algorithmic theory of
quantifier interpretation roughly in the sense of Moschovakis (1994):
The sense of an expression is the algorithm which computes its denota-
tion. They modeled quantificational complexity at two levels. Firstly,
the algorithms corresponding to two quantified statements can inher-
ently differ in complexity, that is, one algorithm can be inherently
more complex than the other. They take this kind of complexity to
affect the difficulty of computing a semantic representation during
the comprehension of quantified statements presented out of context.
Secondly, the execution of a given algorithm can vary with respect to
the number and kind of steps required in order to compute the se-
mantic value. This corresponds to the complexity of a given instance
of the verification problem.
One interesting aspect of their proposal is that it automatically re-
stricts determiners denotations to conservative quantifiers. What sets
their proposal apart from the semantic automata model, for example,
is the assumption of a general asymmetry in processing positive vs.
negative instances of a predicate, i.e. entities that are vs. are not in its
denotation. On the basis of this assumption, they predicted that so-
called empty-set quantifiers, i.e. quantifiers that have the empty set
as a witness set, call for a more complex verification algorithm than
other quantifiers. 5 In the following, the basic idea of the Bott et al.
model is sketched briefly. After that, some of their experimental re-
sults are summarized. Finally, it is speculated what connections may
exist to the IPM.
5
Definition 6:12 (Witness set, Barwise & Cooper, 1981; Peters & Westersta˚hl, 2006).
Let Q be a CE GQ, A any set and let QA of type (1) be defined, for all M and B  M, by: 
QA

M (B) , QMS A(A, B). Then we call any set X  A for which  QAM (X) is true
a witness set of QA.
6.3 empty-set effects in different kinds of de quantifiers 185
k#1
k#2
k#3
k#4
k#5
a#1
a#2
a#3
a#4
a#5
kids animals...fed...
Figure XXXIX. A hypothetical situation in the zoo.
6.3.1 The model
Only the basic idea behind the model of Bott et al. is sketched here.
Moreover, the discussion is limited to sentences with at most two
quantifiers although their model also applies to sentences with arbi-
trarily many. Consider sentence 6:13 under its surface scope reading
(i.e. more than half of the kids takes wide scope) to be evaluated in the
situation depicted in XXXIX. The picture shows sets of boys and ani-
mals as well as the relation denoted by fed. Obviously, the sentence is
true in this situation because three out of five kids are such that each
of them fed either two or three – ergo more than one – animals.
(6:13) More than half of the kids fed more than one animal.
How could an algorithm for evaluating this sentence look like?
Bott et al. proposed the following rather simple verification proce-
dure: A doubly quantified sentence with quantifiers Q1 and Q2 un-
der the scope reading where Q1 takes scope over Q2 is evaluated by
successively adding quantifiers to the verb denotation starting with
the narrow-scope quantifier. The algorithm iterates through tuples s
from the predicate denotation P. It is described in 6:14. In order to
keep the description concise, the notation s[n/x] is used. This simply
denotes the tuple s0 that is identical to s except that the n-th element
is replaced with x.
(6:14) Simple expansion rule (for a quantifier Qn, where n 2 f1, 2g)
For each tuple s 2 P collect the set fx : s[n/x] 2 Pg. Next,
intersect this set with the restriction of Qn and check whether
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the result is a witness set of Qn. If so, add s[n/Qn] to the predi-
cate denotation.
In the above example, we would start by expanding the second argu-
ment slot of fed with more than one animal. In order to do so, we con-
sider each pair in the denotation of fed and check whether the number
of animals that the kid agent in that pair fed is larger than one. For
example, we could start by considering the pair hk#1, a#1i. Then, we
would have to check all pairs that have k#1 in the first position. These
are hk#1, a#1i and hk#1, a#3i. Thus, we have to evaluate the cardinal-
ity of the set fa#1, a#3g. Since this cardinality is two, we are licensed
to expand the verbal predicate with hk#1,more than one animali. Anal-
ogously, by application of the simple expansion rule to the other pairs
we can add hk#3,more than one animali and hk#4,more than one animali.
We refer to the set of pairs that are to be added as the expansion set.
It is a distinguishing feature of the simple expansion rule that
it often allows us to ignore entities not participating in the relation
expressed by the verb. That is, the entities a#2 and k#2 do not play any
role for simple expansion. The only exception is if they are needed
in order to check whether some set is a witness set of one of the
quantifiers involved. The latter is not relevant for the quantifier more
than one animal but will be when we apply simple expansion to the
proportional quantifier, Q1, more than half of the kids . What about
the pair hk#5, a#4i? Kid k#5 fed only a single animal, a#4. Therefore,
simple expansion does not succeed since the singleton set fa#4g is not
among the witness sets of more than two animals. We are not licensed
to add hk#5,more than one animali.
We start the evaluation of the next quantifier, more than half of the
kids, with the expansion set just computed:
f hk#1,more than one animali ,
hk#3,more than one animali ,
hk#4,more than one animalig.
Now, simple expansion is straightforward. We just have to check
whether the set fk#1, k#3, k#4g, which consists of three kids that fed
more than one animal, is among the witness sets of more than half of
the kids in the scenario in Figure XXXIX. In order to do so, we need
to know the cardinality of the set of kids. Note that at this point,
which we may call witness set identification, the whole restrictor set
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becomes relevant, no matter whether its elements participate in the
verbal relation or not. Since the three kids out of a total of five kids is
among the witness sets of more than half of the kids, simple expansion
of more than half of the kids yields:
fhmore than half of the kids,more than one animalig. (6:15)
We see that successful expansion with both quantifiers corresponds
to verification of the sentence in the given situation. If, however, the
pair in 6:15 could not be added, the sentence would be falsified.
To summarize, the simple expansion algorithm consists of a single
rule, which is used to add tuples containing quantifiers in addition to
individuals to the verbal predicate. The execution of this rule works
in the absence of negative predicate instances, i.e., once we know the
cardinalities of the restrictor sets (cf. more than half ) we can safely
ignore those individuals not in the relation.
Next, it is demonstrated that this simple expansion procedure
may fail if one of the quantified expressions has the empty set among
its witness sets (called empty-set quantifiers). This was not the case in
sentence 6:13. However, if we replace more than one animal by fewer
than two animals, a quantifier that is true in case there are no target
objects, simple expansion does not work anymore.
(6:16) More than half of the kids fed fewer than three animals.
The problem is that, for this sentence, not only those individuals are
crucial that participate in the relation, but also those that do not. In
the situation shown in Figure XXXIX, three out of a total of five kids,
namely k#1, k#2 and k#5, fed fewer than three animals. Hence, the
sentence is false. However, it is predicted to be true if we apply
simple expansion: Expansion with fewer than three animals allows us
to add the following pairs to the predicate.
f hk#1, fewer than three animalsi ,
hk#5, fewer than three animalsig
Expansion with Q2 reveals that the simple expansion rule misses
one crucial aspect of the situation in Figure XXXIX, namely that k#2
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fed no – ergo fewer than three – animals. As a result, no further
expansion is possible. This is undesired because it wrongly predicts
the sentence to be false.
This is not an isolated case but a general shortcoming of the sim-
ple expansion rule. Bott et al. prove that sentences that do not contain
any empty-set quantifiers can be evaluated with the simple expan-
sion rule. However, sentences with empty-set quantifiers, such as
fewer than three animals, call for a more complex expansion algorithm
– an algorithm that allows the interpretation system to not only keep
track of positive predicate instances but also of negative ones. They
develop such an algorithm in two steps. Firstly, negative predicate in-
stances are encoded in addition to positive ones. For the example at
hand, this means that the Cartesian product of the two restrictor sets
is partitioned into two subsets – the positive and the negative pred-
icate instances. Secondly, another rule that positively expands an
empty-set quantifier in an empty-set situation is added. With regard
to quantifiers that do not have the empty set among their witness sets
they propose that the simple expansion operation is used, but for the
others the extended complex expansion operation is used.
We do not go into any detail here but simply note that the simplest
way to think of the additional rule is presumably as an inference
from a sentence where the to-be-expanded quantifier is replaced with
no. For example, with regard to 6:16, this rule would implement the
following inference.
(6:17) k#2 fed no animals.
) k#2 fed fewer than three animals.
This inference would in turn license addition of the pair
hk#2, fewer than three animalsi
to the denotation of fed.
6.3.2 Predictions and data
Since the complex expansion operation is more complex than the sim-
ple expansion operation, the theory of Bott et al. immediately predicts
processing differences between empty-set and non-empty-set quantifiers.
Furthermore, because all DE quantifiers are empty-set quantifiers the
theory explains some processing differences between monotone de-
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creasing and other types of quantifiers. Specifically, Bott et al. discuss
three predictions of their model. The first is that empty-set quanti-
fiers are especially difficult to process in situations where no target
objects are present (called empty-set situations). This prediction is de-
rived from the assumption that it is particularly difficult to draw a
positive conclusion from the absence of predicate instances. The sec-
ond prediction is that empty-set quantifiers cause difficulty during
comprehension because a more complex verification procedure has
to be prepared than in the case of non-empty-set quantifiers. It could,
for example, be costly, to retrieve the additional rules from memory
or to retain them in memory. The third prediction is that evaluation
of empty-set quantifiers is generally more difficult than evaluation
of non-empty-set quantifiers. This prediction depends on whether
we assume that the complex expansion operation is used to evaluate
empty-set quantifiers in cases where the simple expansion operation
would do as well. If we assume that this is the case, we may, for
example, expect difficulty because attention is directed to negative in
addition to positive predicate instances or because there is a larger
set of rules in complex than in simple expansion from which the ap-
propriate has to be chosen.
Bott et al. report evidence from three experiments that supports
their model. I would like to focus on the first prediction here, in
particular with regard to modified numerals. The reason is that we
did not derive this prediction from the IPM, but it is shown in the next
section that the IPM can be taken to justify the distinction between
simple and complex expansion theoretically.
In all three experiments of Bott et al., participants performed a
truth-value judgment task after they had read a sentence self-paced.
Evidence for enhanced difficulty of empty-set as compared to non-
empty set quantifiers was obtained across experiments. This difficulty
was especially pronounced in empty-set situations. For example, sen-
tences like 6:18-a led to substantially more errors and longer RTs than
sentences like 6:18-b when evaluated against visual contexts in which
all the squares had a different color than pink.
(6:18) a. More than five squares are pink.
b. Fewer than five squares are pink.
This “empty-set effect” manifested itself most clearly in the propor-
tions of errors. In empty-set situations, 6:18-b led to 25% errors
whereas there were below 10% errors in all other conditions. Simi-
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lar effects were also observed with boolean combinations that were
non-monotone (i.e. neither UE nor DE) but had the empty set among
their witness sets and also in doubly quantified sentences. The au-
thors rule out several alternative explanations of these effects.
6.3.3 Relation to the integrated processing model
There are three questions about the relation between the study of
Bott et al. (n.d.) and the IPM. The first is whether the model of Bott
et al. can account for the data presented in the previous chapter. The
second question is whether empty-set effects, as observed by Bott et
al., can be accounted for in the IPM. The third question is whether
the two models are compatible.
With regard to the first question, we note that the simple expan-
sion operation would have sufficed to solve the tasks of experiments
3a and 4, even for the DE conditions, because none of the experimen-
tal conditions involved empty-set situations. However, participants
did not know this in advance because what rules are needed depends
on the pictures that are actually presented in each trial. In order to be
able to deal effectively with all possibilities, the complex expansion
operation would have had to be prepared during reading. The ob-
served increase in RTs of fewer than n as compared to more than n can
be accounted for if we assume that a larger set of rules from which
the appropriate one has to be chosen incurs processing cost.
However, the basic ingredients of the IPM are needed anyway
and thus the model of Bott et al. can hardly be considered a genuine
alternative: Firstly, the result that the UE conditions led to a higher
proportion of errors than the DE ones in experiments 3a and 4 is
completely unexpected under the model of Bott et al. Obviously, it
is possible to account for this effect if the processing of numerical
information is taken into account, as is done in the IPM. Secondly,
as discussed in section 5.2.3.2, there are also independent reasons
to assume some kind of antonym operator to be part of the lexical
semantics of fewer than.
While the model of Bott et al. is intended to apply to all natural
language quantifiers, the authors note themselves that the distinc-
tion between simple and complex expansion is not the only source
of quantificational complexity. Among other things, they explicitly
mention the possibility that the DE comparative modified numerals
of the form fewer than n may introduce inherent processing difficulty
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as compared to their UE counterparts due to their internal composi-
tion.
The second question is whether empty-set effects, as observed by
Bott et al., can be accounted for in the IPM. While these effects do not
follow directly from the IPM, there is one close parallel between the
two models. In particular, just as the simple expansion operation, the
IPM does also not suffice in empty-set situation. Remember how a
representation of numerosity was derived in the IPM. It was assumed
that approximate representations are derived as described in the con-
nectionist models of Dehaene and Changeux (1993) and Verguts and
Fias (2004). These network models received ‘visual’ input, specifically
the input was a map of object locations. The amount of activity in this
map was summed up to compute a “summation code.” However, if
no target objects are present, then no activation can be summed up
and, as a result, no representation of numerosity can be computed.
Moreover, it was assumed that precise number is learned via asso-
ciation of numerosity representations and number symbols (Verguts
& Fias, 2004). Again, no association can be learned without any in-
put to the model and, as a result, no precise representations can be
computed in empty-set situations either. The claim here is not that
people have no knowledge or representation of the number 0. To the
contrary, it was assumed in the IPM that the comparative morpheme
-er semantically corresponds to a kind of subtraction operation and
this may of course lead to a representation of 0 and even of negative
numbers. What is claimed here instead is that the ‘usual’ way (or
ways) in which a representation of the number of target objects is
computed from visual input is blocked or does not succeed in empty-
set situations. We do not have to stipulate this, but it can be derived
from the IPM.
As a consequence, it is expected that, in empty-set situations, the
IPM does not suffice to perform the verification task. However, this
applies equally to both UE and DE modified numerals. In order to
explain the effects reported by Bott et al., we have to make additional
assumptions. In particular, we may assume that the IPM defaults
to the “no false” response, in case no representation of the number
or numerosity of target objects is computed. Furthermore, we may
assume that in the case of fewer than n an inference as in 6:17 may be
used to override this default. However, such inferences are costly and
do not succeed always. But this is the essence of what is implemented
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in the model of Bott et al.. From this perspective, the IPM may be
taken to justify what is implemented in the model of Bott et al.
Our third question was whether the two models are compatible.
As has hopefully become clear from the previous paragraphs neither
of the two models can account for all of the data on its own. Rather
the model of Bott et al. may be viewed as a description of part of
a control structure that manages different potential verification pro-
cedures. One of these is what I would call the canonical procedure,
as implemented in the IPM for comparative modified numerals. An-
other potential procedure consists of inferences rules like exemplified
in 6:17. If none of the available procedures succeeds the sentence can
not be verified and the system defaults to falsification. Under this
perspective the two models complement each other.
7
MORE PROCESSES : COMPREHENS ION
Two questions are discussed in the present chapter. The first is whether
the more complex internal composition of fewer than as compared
to more than that is assumed in the IPM also leads to difficulty dur-
ing online comprehension, in addition to verification. The previous
two chapters were concerned with processing difficulty that emerged
while evaluating the truth of a sentence against a picture after the
sentence has already been read and understood. These data are com-
plemented in the present chapter, which focuses on difficulty that
emerges already during reading, before a truth-value judgment is per-
formed. Increased difficulty of fewer than vs. more than during reading
is demonstrated using eye tracking data recorded while subjects read
German sentences containing these modifiers. The second question
that is discussed in the present chapter is whether and how the IPM
may be used to model other aspects of the processing of quantifiers
beside sentence-picture verification. A short theoretical section is de-
voted to this question. Two potential linking hypotheses between the
IPM and processing difficulty during reading are discussed there.
7.1 difficulty during reading
In line with current semantic theory, the IPM assumes that the inter-
nal composition of DE comparative quantifiers is more complex than
that of UE ones. This may lead one to expect that DE comparative
quantifiers cause difficulty during reading in comparison to their UE
counterparts. Closely related to this issue, a number of recent studies
used event related potentials (ERPs) to test whether the quantifiers
few and many as well as other pairs of UE vs. DE quantifiers are in-
terpreted incrementally (Urbach & Kutas, 2010; Urbach et al., 2015;
Freunberger & Nieuwland, 2016; Nieuwland, 2016), as evidenced by
the N400 component (see also Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Roucos, &
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Perry, 1983). For instance, Nieuwland (2016) presented stimulus sen-
tences like the following.
(7:1) a. Many gardeners plant their flowers during the spring...
b. Many gardeners plant their flowers during the winter...
c. Few gardeners plant their flowers during the spring...
d. Few gardeners plant their flowers during the winter...
In the majority of studies, an incongruency between online N400-
effects and offline judgments like plausibility ratings or truth-value
judgments was found. While offline ratings always showed a “full
crossover interaction” (Urbach & Kutas, 2010), i.e. increased process-
ing cost for 7:1-b vs. 7:1-a, and for 7:1-c vs. 7:1-d, the N400-effects on
the critical words, e.g. spring vs. winter, were reversed only under cer-
tain conditions. More specifically, conditions with UE quantifiers like
7:1-a/b always showed congruent online and offline effects whereas
in conditions with DE quantifiers this was dependent on several addi-
tional factors like, e.g., supporting linguistic context, high cloze prob-
ability of the critical words or auditory presentation of the stimulus
sentences. These results have been taken to show that DE quanti-
fiers, like few, are often interpreted delayed in comparison to their
UE counterparts, like many.
With regard to the behavioral literature, the question whether DE
quantifiers cause disruption during online comprehension that is ob-
servable in reading behavior, as stated in the following hypothesis, is
still an open question.
Hypothesis 7:2. As compared to their UE counterparts, DE comparative
quantifiers lead to disruption during online comprehension that is due to
their semantic processing difficulty and observable in reading behavior.
Self-paced reading experiments that compared UE vs. DE compara-
tive quantifiers obtained mixed results. On the one hand, Geurts et
al. (2010) and Szymanik and Zajenkowski (2013), who used self-paced
reading of complete sentences, did not find any significant difference
in reading times between sentences that either contained an UE or
a DE comparative quantifier. In these studies, the variance was rel-
atively large because the dependent variable were reading times of
complete sentences. This may have led to low statistical power. More-
over, on the conceptual side, the reading time data of these experi-
ments are difficult to interpret because of lexical differences between
conditions.
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On the other hand, Bott et al. (2013) did find increased reading
times for DE vs. UE quantifiers. They tested doubly quantified sen-
tences in a word-by-word self-paced reading experiment with moving
window presentation (Just, Carpenter, & Woolley, 1982). The effects
were found on the final word of the test sentences which also com-
pleted the quantifiers’ scope. More evidence that points in the same
direction was obtained by Bott et al. (n.d.), who compared intransitive
sentences with more than five vs. fewer than five (cf. example 6:18). The
latter quantifier led to a slowdown on the sentence-final region which
contained the scope of the quantifier. In that study, sentences were,
however, only segmented into two regions and, therefore, spillover ef-
fects from the regions containing the quantifiers cannot be excluded
with certainty. Such spillover effects could simply be due to differ-
ences in lexical frequency, for example. In sum, both behavioral and
ERP studies offer mixed results concerning the questions whether
DE quantifiers lead to on-line processing difficulties in comparison to
their UE counterparts.
In order to contribute to this debate, two sets of eye tracking data
that compared the online comprehension of sentences with UE vs. DE
comparative quantifiers are presented in what follows. Both of these
data sets were collected together with the data presented in Experi-
ment 3a. In order to exclude spillover effects a simple “recipe” was
used: (1) A buffer region was included between the region contain-
ing the quantifier and the region that contained its scope – an AdjP in
both cases. (2) Effects on the adjectival region were only interpreted
if no differences were observed in the buffer region. In both data sets,
evidence was found that the DE quantifiers cause disruption during
reading. Towards the end of this chapter, two possible explanations
of the observed disruptions in terms of the IPM are discussed briefly.
7.2 experiment 3b
As was described above in section 5.4, eye movements were recorded
in addition to the verification data reported in Experiment 3a. These
are the subject of the present section.
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7.2.1 Methods
7.2.1.1 Materials
Materials were the same as in Experiment 3a. The factor modifier (two
levels: more and fewer) was crossed with the factor numeral (four levels:
four, six, eight, ten) which led to eight conditions (see example 5:23).
Sentences were segmented into regions of interest (ROIs) (of course,
invisible to the participants) as is shown in the following example:
(7:3) a. j1Mehr
j1More
als
than
vier
four
j2Punkte
j2dots
j3auf
j3on
dem
the
Bild
picture
j4sind
j4are
blau.
blue.
b. j1Weniger
j1Fewer
als
than
vier
four
j2Punkte
j2dots
j3auf
j3on
dem
the
Bild
picture
j4sind
j4are
blau.
blue.
7.2.1.2 Procedure
Same as in Experiment 3a.
7.2.1.3 Participants
Same as in Experiment 3a.
7.2.1.4 Predictions
The present experiment tested Hypothesis 7:2. As was hinted at
above, in connection to the study of Bott et al. (n.d.), there is a tech-
nical complication in testing this hypothesis. The quantifiers them-
selves, e.g. fewer than n vs. more than n, differ in a number of su-
perficial lexical features, such as word length and lexical frequency.
Therefore, potential effects on the regions that contain the quantifiers
cannot be interpreted safely as reflecting semantic processing diffi-
culty. Moreover, such potential effects may cause spillover effects at
the subsequent region. To circumvent this difficulty, the present ex-
periment made use of the recipe mentioned above: Effects on the
quantifiers themselves and on following spillover regions are not in-
terpreted. Instead, our analyses exclusively focus on a later sentence
region that contained the scope of the quantifiers. Effects on that re-
gion are only interpreted in the absence of effects on the regions that
directly preceded it.
7.2 experiment 3b 197
This prediction that the semantic complexity of the quantifiers sur-
faces when reading their scope can be justified theoretically: When
reading the quantifiers’ scope, it is integrated into the semantic rep-
resentation of the sentence. This presumably involves retrieving the
quantifier from memory. Moreover, this is the first position in the sen-
tence at which the quantifier can be fully interpreted, i.e. has received
all its arguments (c.f. Bott et al., 2013, n.d.; Nieuwland, 2016).
7.2.1.5 Statistical analysis
Before statistical analysis, the eye movement recorded was prepro-
cessed. All fixations below 80ms were merged into the nearest neigh-
bor fixation if it was within a radius of 1°. After that, all fixations
below 80ms or above 1200ms (4% of all fixations) as well as fixations
that fell outside of any ROI (8.8% of all fixations) were deleted. Next,
after visual inspection of the eye movement record, trials with total
reading times below 560ms were excluded from further analysis. In
addition, trials with total reading times of more than 10s were also ex-
cluded. Together, the last two steps affected 1.29% of all trials. These
trials were regarded as contaminated.
The following eye tracking measures were calculated and ana-
lyzed (cf. Clifton, Staub, & Rayner, 2004):
• First pass durations: total duration of all fixations in a ROI from
its first fixation until it is first left, provided that the region was
not skipped
• First pass regression ratios: proportion of regressive fixations fol-
lowing fixation in a ROI, provided that (i) the region was not
skipped and that (ii) the ROI has not already been fixated and
exited
• Total duration: total duration of all fixations in a ROI.
First pass durations and total durations were analyzed using lin-
ear mixed effects models. First, saturated models were fitted. These
included only the factor modifier as fixed effect. Each of the noun ad-
jective combinations was coded as an item (cf. section 5.4.1.2). As ran-
dom effects, the models included random intercepts of participants,
items and also of the factor numeral. In addition, by-participant, by-
item and by-number random slopes were included, i.e. the maximal
random effects structure was used but without random correlations
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(as suggested by Barr et al., 2013). Next, model comparisons on the
basis of the LRT were used to test for significant effects. The propor-
tions of first pass regressions were analyzed with logit mixed effects
models (see Ja¨ger, 2008 for discussion of its advantages) using the
same procedure. As justified above, analyses were carried out on the
sentence-final region and the preceding buffer regions. Predictions
were, however, restricted to the final region and the analyses on the
buffer regions only served the purpose of excluding spillover effects.
All models were fitted using the lme4 package (Bates, Ma¨chler, et al.,
2015) of R (R Core Team, 2016).
7.2.2 Results
On the first ROI, fewer than n led to longer reading times than more
than n (mean first pass durations: 623ms vs. 552ms; mean total du-
rations: 906ms vs. 745ms). This can be explained by superficial
differences of the lexical material in that region (e.g. word length).
Mean first pass durations, first pass regression ratios and total dura-
tions in ROIs #2 through #4 are shown in Figure XL. The results of
the statistical analysis are given in Table XLI. As demanded by the
above mentioned recipe, there was no effect of the modifier on the
buffer ROIs, #2 and #3. Therefore, we are allowed to interpret effects
on the final ROI. Although on the final ROI first pass durations were
numerically longer and first pass regression ratios slightly higher for
the DE than for the UE conditions (305ms vs. 294ms and 44.3%
vs. 41.9%, respectively), this did not result in significant effects. To-
tal durations on the final ROI were, however, significantly longer for
DE than for UE conditions, albeit the effect was nummerically rather
small (346ms vs. 320ms).
7.2.3 Discussion
On the sentence final region, which contained the color adjective, DE
modified numerals of the form fewer than n led to significantly longer
total durations than UE modified numerals of the formmore than n. In
line with our recipe, no difference was found in earlier regions. There-
fore, we interpret the effect to reflect semantic processing difficulty
due to the integration of the scope of the quantifiers (i.e. the adjec-
tive) into the semantic representation. Although statistically robust,
the effect was numerically small. The next section reports an experi-
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ment in which UE and DE quantifiers were combined with negation
in order to boost the effect (cf. the introduction to the next section
which refers to Sherman, 1976 and Va´zquez, 1981).
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Figure XL. Eye movement measures from Experiment 3b. The de-
picted means and 95% confidence intervals were calculated from the
by-participant means. The legend applies to all four panels.
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7.3 experiment 5
In the present experiment, eye movements were recorded while par-
ticipants read scope disambiguated sentences containing either an
UE or a DE quantifier in subject position and a possibly negated ad-
jectival predicate in the scope of the quantifier. As in the previous
experiment, a truth-value judgment had to be given afterwards, at
the end of each trial. We expected that combining the quantifiers
with negation would magnify the effect of the direction of entail-
ment. Especially under semantic proposals which assume that the
antonym operators few and little contain propositional negation
(e.g. I. Heim, 2006; Bu¨ring, 2007b), it is expected that the effect of
the direction of entailment is magnified in combination with nega-
tion. This expectation is based on previous empirical findings which
show that multiple negations in a sentence have over-additive effects
on processing difficulty (Sherman, 1976; Va´zquez, 1981).
The prediction is, however, not limited to proposals that assume a
propositional negation operator to be part of the lexical semantics of
DE quantifiers. The relation between the direction of entailment and
negation is a more general one. Firstly, as was already mentioned
above in section 5.2.3, any DE quantifier is the negation of some suit-
able UE counterpart. Secondly, even if few and little do not contain
propositional negation but map degrees to their negative image, as in
the IPM, they share some properties with negation: In both accounts
antonym operators and overt sentence negation are modifiers in the
sense that they do not change the semantic type or syntactic cate-
gory of their arguments. Moreover, both have the potential to intro-
duce subtle ambiguities (cf. section 5.2.3.2). For these reasons, it can
generally be expected that overt negation taxes processing resources
that are also needed for the online comprehension of DE compara-
tive quantifiers. Conversely, if the two factors affected independent
and serial processing stages, we would expect purely additive effects
according to the additive factors logic (Sternberg, 1969).
In addition to the direction of entailment, the specific quantifier
type was manipulated: Comparative proportional quantifiers (more
than half and less than half ) were compared with Aristotelian quanti-
fiers (every and no). For Aristotelian quantifiers, a decompositional
analysis which makes use of covert negation is commonly assumed
(see e.g. Jacobs, 1982; Penka & Stechow, 2001; Penka, 2011 but also
Abels & Martı´, 2010, Geurts, 1996 and de Swart, 2000 for opposing
7.3 experiment 5 203
views). However, with regard to proportional quantifiers such an
analysis has only little empirical support. By comparing these quan-
tifier types, the present study thus contributes to a current theoretical
debate about the compositional structure of DE as compared to UE
quantifiers from a processing perspective.
7.3.1 Methods
The trials of the present experiment served as filler trials in Experi-
ments 3a/b.
7.3.1.1 Materials
Thirty-two sets of sentences like the example in 7:4 were constructed.
The sentences contained a quantifier in subject position and a pos-
sibly negated adjectival predicate. The factors type of quantifier (lev-
els: Aristotelian and proportional), negation (levels: present and absent)
and direction of entailment (levels: UE and DE) were crossed yielding
the eight sentence conditions exemplified in 7:4-a 7:4-h. The Aris-
totelian quantifiers were jed- (‘every’, UE) and kein- (‘no’, DE). As
proportional quantifiers Mehr als die Ha¨lfte d- (‘more than half of the’,
UE) andWeniger als die Ha¨lfte d- (‘less than half of the’, DE) were used.
Sentences were constructed according to the pattern: for Q N it holds
that Pro (Neg) Aux Adj. The clause-boundary was placed between
the quantifier and the negation in order to ensure a surface scope in-
terpretation of the sentences (see, e.g., Bu¨ring, 1997 for a discussion
of scope ambiguities in German sentence with quantifiers and nega-
tion and Ruys &Winter, 2011 for a recent discussion of restrictions on
scope ambiguities). This way effects of the processing of scope am-
biguity could be excluded. The nouns denoted geometrical shapes
(Punkt(e) (‘dot(s)’), Dreieck(e) (‘triangle(s)’), Quadrat(e) (‘square(s)’) or
Kreuz(e) (‘cross(es)’)). The adjectives were gru¨n (‘green’), rot (‘red’),
blau (‘blue’) or orange (‘orange’). Thus, there were 16 distinct com-
binations of nouns and adjectives in total. The vertical lines in the
example sentences indicate the ROIs.
(7:4) a. jAuf
jon
jjedes
jevery
Quadrat
square
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
es
it
jblau
jblue
ist.
is
‘It holds for every square that it is blue.’
b. jAuf
jon
jjedes
jevery
Quadrat
square
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
es
it
jnicht
jnot
blau
blue
ist.
is
‘It holds for every square that it is not blue.’
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c. jAuf
jon
jkein
jno
Quadrat
square
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
es
it
jblau
jblue
ist.
is
‘It holds for no square that it is blue.’
d. jAuf
jon
jkein
jno
Quadrat
square
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
es
it
jnicht
jnot
blau
blue
ist.
is
‘It holds for no square that it is not blue.’
e. jAuf
jon
jmehr
jmore
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of
Quadrate
squares
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
sie
they
jblau
jblue
sind.
are
‘It holds for more than half of the squares that they are blue.’
f. jAuf
jon
jmehr
jmore
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of
Quadrate
squares
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
sie
they
jnicht
jnot
blau
blue
sind.
are
‘It holds for more than half of the squares that they are not
blue.’
g. jAuf
jon
jweniger
jless
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of
Quadrate
squares
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
sie
they
jblau
jblue
sind.
are
‘It holds for less than half of the squares that they are blue.’
h. jAuf
jon
jweniger
jless
als
than
die
the
Ha¨lfte
half
der
of
Quadrate
squares
jtrifft zu,
japplies
jdass
jthat
sie
they
jnicht
jnot
blau
blue
sind.
are
‘It holds for less than half of the squares that they are not
blue.’
Each sentence was paired with a picture showing objects of the men-
tioned shape. A target item consisted of a set of eight sentences-
picture pairs. In half of these items, the sentence described the picture
truthfully. In the other half, it did not. Example pictures are shown
in Figure XLII. For each sentence, a new picture with random object
positions was generated. Thus, no picture was used twice.
The target items were distributed over the eight lists of Experi-
ment 3a/b using a Latin square design. Each list included 391 ad-
ditional sentence-picture pairs, yielding a total number of 423 trials.
These distractor sentences also contained quantifiers, nouns that de-
scribed geometrical shapes and color adjectives. They were paired
with similar pictures as in the target items. In approximately half of
the trials in each list, the sentences matched the pictures and in the
other half they did not.
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Figure XLII. Example pictures used in Experiment 5. The first row
shows pictures that satisfied the sentences’ truth conditions. The sec-
ond row shows pictures that don’t. From left to right, pictures of
these types were paired with the sentence conditions exemplified in
7:4-a & 7:4-d, 7:4-b & 7:4-c, 7:4-e & 7:4-h and 7:4-g & 7:4-g, respec-
tively.
7.3.1.2 Apparatus and Procedure
Were the same as in Experiment 3a/b.
7.3.1.3 Participants
Were the same as in Experiment 3a/b.
7.3.1.4 Predictions
As explained in the introduction to the present section, it was ex-
pected that effects of the direction of entailment are magnified in
combination with negation. Under semantic theories which propose
a parallel treatment of Aristotelian and comparative quantifiers, for
example with regard to their internal composition (e.g. Abels &Martı´,
2010), it is predicted that the two types of quantifiers are affected in
the same way when combined with negation. Therefore, the men-
tioned type of uniform approach would be in need for an explana-
tion if over-additive effects of the direction of entailment and negation
were found within the Aristotelian but not within the proportional
quantifiers.
In addition to these predictions, a number of trivial lexical ef-
fects were expected. For example, the second ROI, which contained
the quantifiers, was substantially longer in conditions with propor-
tional than with Aristotelian quantifiers. Moreover, UE and DE quan-
tifiers also differed in length and presumably also in frequency of
occurrence. These factors led us to expect differences in eye tracking
206 more processes : comprehension
measures between conditions in the quantifier ROI. Furthermore, ef-
fects due to the presence or absence of negation were expected in the
sentence-final ROI.
What is more, we cannot exclude the possibility that lexical effects
carry over to the ‘buffer’ regions (ROI #3 and ROI #4) due to spillover
or preview. For this reason the recipe from the previous experiment
was used again and a prerequisite to interpreting effects involving the
direction of entailment in the sentence final ROI was formulated: Such
effects would only be interpreted as reflecting semantic processing if
they were absent on at least one of the two buffer regions. This way,
effects of semantic processing difficulty can be distinguished from
superficial lexical ones.
7.3.1.5 Statistical Analysis
Preprocessing of the eye movement record proceeded exactly as de-
scribed in Experiment 3b. Total durations were not analyzed in the
present experiment. In addition to the eye-tracking measures men-
tioned above in section 7.2.1.5, the following eye-tracking measures
were analyzed in the present experiment (cf. Clifton et al., 2004):
• Regression path durations: total duration of all fixations from the
first fixation in a ROI until it is exited in a progressive manner,
provided that the region was not skipped
• Second pass duration: total duration of all fixations in a ROI fol-
lowing the initial first pass time, including zero durations if a
region is not re-fixated
First pass durations, regression path durations and second pass
durations were analyzed using linear mixed effects models. First, sat-
urated models were fitted. As fixed effects these included the factors
type of quantifier, direction of entailment, negation and their interactions.
As random effects they included random intercepts of participants
and items as well as by-participant and by-item random slopes of all
the fixed effects. As above, model comparisons were used to test for
significant effects. The proportions of first pass regressions and the
truth-value judgments were analyzed with logit mixed effects mod-
els. In the analysis of eye movements, each of the noun adjective
combinations was coded as an item. In the analysis of the judgment
data, truth values were also taken into account in the coding of items.
The procedure outlined by Levy (2014) was used to test for significant
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main effects in the presence of higher order interactions. In case of
non-convergence of the statistical models, the random effects struc-
ture was simplified (cf. Barr et al., 2013). This happened on two
occasions. In the analysis of first pass durations in ROI #5 and of the
truth value judgments the by-item random slopes of the three-way
interaction was dropped.
Because of our recipe for the interpretation of potential effects,
first pass durations, first pass regression ratios, regression path dura-
tions and second pass durations were analyzed in ROIs #2 through
#5. In the following results section, all effects are mentioned that are
significant at a = .05. Predicted effects are highlighted in the text.
Moreover, it is also highlighted if effects can be explained based on
superficial lexical features of the stimulus material. In the discussion
below, the focus is on effects without an obvious lexical explanation
and in particular on those mentioned in the predictions.1
7.3.2 Results
7.3.2.1 Eye movements
Condition means and 95% confidence intervals of the eye tracking
measures in all the ROIs are shown in Figure XLIII. Results of the
statistical analysis are shown in Tables XLV and XLV. As expected,
there were a number of trivial effects. For example, proportional
quantifiers led to longer reading times on the second ROI than Aris-
totelian ones simply because this region was longer and contained
more words in the former conditions. Unsurprisingly, this effect was
highly significant across reading time measures. Moreover, lexical
differences between conditions may also account for an interaction of
the direction of entailment and the type of quantifier in the second region
and the effect of the type of quantifier in the first pass regression ra-
tios in the following ROI. Similarly, a number of significant effects
were found on the fourth and on the fifth ROI that involve the factor
1 Following current practice in psycholinguistic studies of eye movements during read-
ing, no a-correction was performed. Lately, von der Malsburg and Angele (2015)
did, however, recommend to do so. The predictions for the present experiment con-
cerned eye movements that took place after the first visit of the sentence-final ROI.
Relevant measures are first pass durations, first pass regression ratios and regression
path durations on the final ROI as well as second pass durations on all ROIs (most
importantly the second and final regions). In total this adds up to a maximum of
seven relevant measures with mutual stochastic dependencies. On the basis of the
provided information, the reader may form his own judgment as to whether effects
should be considered significant.
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negation. Some of these effects are most likely due to the one addi-
tional word in the negated conditions that was fixated in ROI#5 and
lay within parafoveal preview of fixations in ROI#4. In addition, the
adjective lay within the word identification span (Rayner, 1998) when
ROI#4 was fixated in the non-negated conditions whereas it was be-
yond the word identification span in the negated conditions. In the
former case, regressions that are typically launched from the end of
a sentence may have been launched earlier because the end of the
sentence was already predictable. Finally, in the sentence final ROI,
the singular vs. plural form of the auxiliary in the proportional vs.
Arsitotelian conditions, respectively, showed clear effects in the eye
movement record.
In addition to these expected but trivial effects, our central predic-
tions were borne out. In particular, let us focus on the first pass regres-
sion ratios and regression path durations in the sentence final ROI.
In both measures, a significant interaction of the direction of entail-
ment and negation as well as a main effect of the direction of entailment
were observed. The three-way interaction was, however, far from sig-
nificant in both measures. A detailed picture of these eye tracking
measures is shown in panels a and b of Figure XLIV, respectively. As
predicted, DE quantifiers led to a higher ratio of first pass regressions
and longer regression path durations on average than UE quantifiers.
Moreover, these increases were larger in negated than in non-negated
conditions. To resolve the interaction, conditions with and without
negation were analyzed separately. Within the non-negated condi-
tions, the main effect of the direction of entailment was neither signifi-
cant in the first pass regression ratios (c2(1) = 0.209, p = .648) nor in
the regression path durations (c2(1) = 2.62, p = .105). In contrast, in
the negated conditions, the DE quantifiers led to reliably higher ratios
of regressions (c2(1) = 8.69, p = .0032) and reliably longer regression
path durations (c2(1) = 18.8, p < .001) than DE quantifiers.
These effects carried over to the second pass durations. Specifi-
cally, let us have a look at the second pass durations in regions #2
and #5. These are shown in panels c and d of Figure XLIV. In both
of these regions, there was again a significant interaction between
the direction of entailment and negation. Separate analyses of negated
and non-negated conditions, revealed that DE quantifiers led to sig-
nificantly longer second pass times in the negated conditions (ROI#2:
c2(1) = 19.9, p < .001; ROI#5: c2(1) = 6.05, p = .0139) but not
in non-negated conditions (ROI#2: c2(1) = 4.53, p = .103; ROI#5:
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c2(1) = 0.317, p = .573). Moreover, the same pattern of effects was
observed in the fourth region.
It is important to note here that, in contrast to the effects discussed
at the beginning of this section, none of the effects mentioned in the
previous two paragraphs has an obvious explanation in terms of su-
perficial lexical differences. Moreover, there were no effects involving
the direction of entailment during first pass reading in the buffer re-
gions, #3 and #4. Thus, according to our recipe we are allowed to
interpret these effects.
7.3.2.2 Judgments
The proportions of errors in the different conditions and approximate
95% confidence intervals are shown in Figure XLVII. Overall, negated
sentences were judged erroneously more often than non-negated ones
(14% vs. 4%) producing a significant main effect (negation: c2(1) =
33.5, p < .001). Furthermore, proportional quantifiers led to signif-
icantly more errors than Aristotelian ones (14.5% vs. 4.2%). This
also led to a reliable effect (type of quantifier: c2(1) = 23.7, p < .001).
Finally, DE quantifiers led to more errors than UE ones (14.3% vs.
4.4%). This was reflected in a reliable main effect of the direction of
entailment (c2(1) = 24.6, p < .001). There were no significant inter-
actions in the proportions of errors. In particular, the interaction be-
tween the direction of entailment and negation was far from significant
(c2(1) = 0.586, p = .444).
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(a) first pass regression ratios, ROI
#5
(b) regression path durations, ROI
#5
(c) second pass durations, ROI #2 (d) second pass durations, ROI #5
Figure XLIV. Selected eye tracking measures of Experiment 5. Means
and 95% confidence intervals based on participant means are de-
picted. The legend in panel b applies to all four panels.
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Figure XLVII. Proportions of errors per condition obtained in Experi-
ment 5 and 95% confidence intervals estimated under the assumption
of independent samples using the exact method.
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7.3.3 Discussion
The eye movements were generally as expected: Until the sentence fi-
nal region was first reached, the observed effects exclusively reflected
superficial lexical differences between conditions. Analogously to the
previous experiment, the earliest point at which semantic properties –
the direction of entailment, in particular – unambiguously affected
eye tracking measures was in the first pass regression ratios in the
final region. In the negated conditions, DE quantifiers led to substan-
tially higher regression ratios than UE ones. Since no such effects
were found in the buffer regions we are entitled – according to our
recipe – to interpret the effect as an indication of enhanced semantic
processing difficulty.
As expected on the basis of assumptions about the internal com-
position of DE quantifiers, this increased processing difficulty was
strongly pronounced if overt negation was combined with DE quan-
tifiers. It also affected subsequent eye-tracking measures. Regression
path durations of the final region and second pass durations in all
regions except #1 and #3 were all exceptionally long if DE quanti-
fiers were combined with negation. This confirms the prediction that
the direction of entailment has a larger effect in negated than in non-
negated sentences. In particular, the results support the hypothesis
that the direction of entailment affects processing components that
are also involved in the processing of negation. Specifically, decom-
positional semantic analyses of DE quantifiers led us to expect the
observed type of interaction.
In the judgment data, cumulative effects of negation and the di-
rection of entailment were observed. Both, the presence of negation
and of downward entailing quantifiers increased the proportions of
errors. In addition, proportional quantifiers led to more errors than
Aristotelian ones. Thus, all three manipulated factors have an influ-
ence on processing difficulty spanning a range from nearly perfect
performance to performance near chance level. A tentative conclu-
sion is that in the most difficult conditions comprehension did not
succeed and it was in many trials of these conditions impossible to
derive a compositional interpretation of the sentences.
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7.4 potential linking hypotheses
The results of the previous two experiments give us reason to believe
that, in comparison to their UE counterparts, DE comparative quan-
tifiers lead to enhanced processing difficulty during comprehension
(cf. also Bott et al., 2013, n.d. but also the ERP studies of Urbach &
Kutas, 2010, Urbach et al., 2015, Freunberger & Nieuwland, 2016 and
Nieuwland, 2016). Cases in which DE comparative quantifiers are
combined with negation appear to be especially demanding. What
may be potential linking hypotheses between the IPM and observa-
tions like these? Three speculative possibilities are highlighted here.
Firstly, although it is a model of verification and falsification, the
IPM may, in principle, also be used to model how expectations about
the state of the world can be derived from the meaning of a sen-
tences. One way to model this kind of process using the IPM is to
‘run the verification process in reverse’, so to speak (cf. Figure XXIX):
In the IPM it was assumed that (1) a representation of the symbolic
numeral is retrieved from memory, (2) a representation of numerosity
is computed on the basis of visual input, and (3) a truth value judg-
ment is computed by a process that involves comparison of the two.
Reversely, we may assume that (1’) a representation of the symbolic
numeral is retrieved from memory, (2’) the hearer takes the utterance
to be true, i.e. trusts the speaker, and (3’) a representation of numeros-
ity is computed on the basis of the two (cf. Lipinski et al., 2012 for
related ideas).
In fact, when we introduced the IPM, it was argued that the com-
putation performed by the comparative morpheme er is neurobiolog-
ically plausible because similar computations have been proposed to
implement multisensory integration in the brain (Pouget & Sejnowski,
1997; Dayan & Abbott, 2001). What happens in the latter kind of com-
putation is, somewhat simplified, that one representation is derived
or inferred from two others. Which are known and which is inferred
does not matter. An example was to infer a representation of an ob-
ject’s position in head-centered coordinates from representations of
its eye-centered coordinates and the viewing angle. Adopting this
kind of mechanism, it is, in principle, possible to derive a representa-
tion that encodes an expectation of how many target objects there are.
In a trial of a sentence-picture verification experiment, this would cor-
respond to an expectation about the visual stimulus that is presented
(related is also the discussion whether population codes can and do
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encode probability distributions see e.g. Zemel, Dayan, & Pouget,
1998; Pouget, Dayan, & Zemel, 2003).
Since DE comparative quantifiers are assumed to involve an addi-
tional processing step of scale-reversal, it is conceivable that this kind
of process takes longer in the DE than in the UE variant. Moreover,
it is not surprising that semantic processing difficulty surfaces when
the scope of the quantifier is read because (under canonical word or-
der as used in the above experiments) this is the first position in the
sentence where concrete expectations can be derived. Furthermore,
the interaction with overt sentence negation can receive a straight-
forward explanation in this approach. We only need to assume that
the process of scale-reversal and some process that is involved in the
comprehension of negation tax a common scarce processing resource.
The second possibility is essentially a ‘parsing approach.’ It is
based on the derivation of a symbolic meaning representation. We
may think of this in terms of the CCG derivations discussed in sec-
tions 5.3.1 and 6.2.1, but we may also think of it in terms of the con-
struction of logical form representations as, for example, shown in
appendix A.2. As was discussed in section 5.2.3.2 the antonym oper-
ators few and little introduce the potential for subtle ambiguities.
However, in the end, sentences like those investigated in the previous
experiments turn out completely unambiguous. Now, it is conceiv-
able that the presence of the antonym operator and the way it can in-
teract with other parts of the semantic representation leads the parser
to consider parsing decisions that eventually turn out impossible. Fur-
thermore, it is plausible that the earliest point at which the parser
can get rid of the impossible alternatives is when the quantifier has
received both of its arguments. For example, consider the derivations
in section 5.3.1, in which few can also combine with many instead of
er. In fact, recall that this is the explanation Rullmann (1995) gave for
the Seuren-Rullmann ambiguity. If that happens in simple sentences
with comparative quantifiers, the result will always be a tautology.
Thus, this parse of the sentence is ruled out on semantic grounds,
which may only be possible at the end of the sentence or at least after
the quantifier has received both of its arguments. That the pruning
of parsing alternatives leads to slow down is a common assumption
(see e.g. Hale, 2016 for discussion). Under this approach, the ob-
served interaction between the direction of entailment and negation
is not surprising because of the combinatorial possibilities. A piece
of evidence that supports this type of parsing account was provided
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by fMRI study of S. Heim et al. (2012) who found that DE compartive
quantifiers lead to increased activity in Broca’s area (BA45), which is
usually associated with syntactic processing.
The third possibility is the one proposed by Bott et al. (2013, n.d.).
In their account increased processing difficulty during online com-
prehension is attributed to the preparation of a more complex verifi-
cation algorithm. Concretely, their complex expansion operation (cf.
section 6.3.1) consists of more rules that have to be retrieved from
long term memory and retained in working memory during the veri-
fication task. Moreover, the complex expansion operation depends
on what Bott et al. call negative in addition to positive predicate
instances. The latter feature renders it possible that DE or rather
“empty-set” quantifiers are especially difficult to process when the
predicate is negated.
Of course, all of these three possibilities are not worked out, yet.
Moreover, they are certainly not the only possibilities to explain the
observed effects. Future research has to show which, if any, of these
alternative linking hypotheses is on the right track.
8
CONCLUS IONS
The present work discusses several case studies in order to address
the question whether and how the semantic processing difficulty of
quantified sentences can be modeled based on semantic theory. The
general approach is to amend rather uncontroversial aspects of se-
mantic theory with minimal and well-motivated processing assump-
tions. The main focus is on sentence-picture verification but some
connections to comprehension processes are also drawn. Some of the
main results are recapitulated in this concluding section.
Inspired by previous work on the computational complexity of
polyadic quantification in natural language, chapter 3 investigates
reciprocal sentences with quantificational antecedents. It is asked
whether the computational complexity of the verification problem in-
duced by different readings of such sentences restricts which interpre-
tations are viable. For certain quantificational antecedents, the verifi-
cation problem that corresponds to their logically strongest interpre-
tation is computationally intractable. Complementing such complex-
ity analyses chapter 3 presents hypotheses about how the language
processor reacts when faced with intractable verification problems.
On the basis of these hypotheses predictions about the comprehen-
sion and verification of reciprocal sentences are derived. One such
hypothesis states, for example, that intractable interpretations are al-
ways avoided by a shift in meaning towards a logically weaker alter-
native because the stronger alternatives simply cannot be expressed
in the relevant fragment of the ‘language of thought.’ Contrary to
this hypothesis, empirical data that are presented in chapter 3 show
that intractable readings do occur, but in order to verify them against
a specific context people rely on certain guessing strategies.
Motivated by these results, a closer look is taken at concrete proce-
dures that are employed to verify or falsify quantificational sentences.
Chapter 5 discusses one particularly challenging test case: the verifi-
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cation and falsification of UE and DE comparative modified numerals
of the form more than n and fewer than n. As previous experimental
work has shown, the DE versions may lead to increased difficulty as
compared to their UE counterparts. Since existing processing mod-
els have difficulty explaining these effects, several alternative amend-
ments of existing models are discussed that can account for the ex-
perimental data. Moreover, an integrated processing model (IPM)
is developed that combines semantic theory with insights from cog-
nitive psychology. In line with the interface transparency thesis, this
model implements a transparent interface between semantic represen-
tations and models of decision processes involved in the comparison
of numerosities. Thereby, previous approaches are extended in two
respects. Firstly, the compositional fine structure of the studied quan-
tifiers is taken into account, in particular that the DE variants contain
an additional semantic operator that has the effect of scale-reversal.
Secondly, truth evaluation is described as a stochastic decision pro-
cess the running time and outcome of which may be affected by var-
ious factors. Initial support for the proposed model comes from two
experiments that are described in the empirical part of the chapter. In
addition, it is discussed what potential relations may exist between
the IPM and automata theoretic analyses.
Chapters 6 and 7 discuss generalizations of the IPM to (1) other
quantifiers and (2) processes during online language comprehension.
With regard to (1), several possible extensions of the model are dis-
cussed briefly and one example is worked out in some detail. More-
over, it is discussed how potential extensions may relate to existing
experimental findings. One aspect that may be worth highlighting is
a discussion of how the IPM relates to so-called empty-set effects dur-
ing the verification of DE quantifiers, i.e. disproportionate processing
difficulty that is observed when no target objects are present. It is
shown that the proposed IPM naturally explains such effects. Regard-
ing (2), two eye tracking experiments are reported that demonstrate
increased difficulty of DE quantifiers already during reading. It is
speculated how the IPM may be extended to model comprehension
in addition to verification processes.
A general conclusion that can be drawn from the present work
is that theory in semantics and neighboring disciplines has evolved
to a point where it is possible to develop integrated processing mod-
els. But of course, not all approaches to semantics are equally well-
suited to be developed into processing models. And, moreover, not
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all auxiliary processing assumptions and linking hypotheses provide
us with adequate explanations or accurate predictions of experimen-
tal data. It is possible that different theoretical approaches may prove
useful for different aspects of semantic processing. In some cases it
may even be necessary to modify some of the fundamental assump-
tions of the underlying semantic theory in order to connect semantic
theory to processing data obtained in psycholinguistic experiments.
Hopefully, the approach taken in the present work will be useful to
model and predict outcomes of future psycholinguistic experiments
and, in addition, will also contribute to our understanding of natural
language in general.
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A
EXAMPLE DERIVAT IONS
a.1 the seuren-rullmann ambiguity
In section 5.2.3.2, an argument for decomposition of less into -er little
was presented. It was based on the Seuren-Rullmann ambiguity in
A:1. Central to the argument was that the ambiguity disappears with
heavier, which indicates that it is not due to an ambiguity in the than-
phrase (but cf. Beck, 2012b).
(A:1) Li is less heavy than lightweights are allowed to be.
a. Li’s weight is below the maximum permitted weight for
lightweights. (maximum reading)
b. Li’s weight is below the minimum permitted weight for
lightweights. (minimum reading)
In particular, the argument was based on an explanation Rullmann
(1995) gave for the ambiguity. Rullmann did not work out the com-
positional details of his explanation and in section 5.2.3.2 they were
omitted as well. The general idea is not repeated here, but the present
section describes two alternative compositional derivations of the am-
biguity. The first one is that proposed by Bu¨ring (2007a, 2007b). The
second is a slightly modified version of the former that incorporates
some of Rullmann’s original assumptions. 1 For simplicity, we use
the same syntactic structures in both derivations although there are
differences in what structures Rullmann and Bu¨ring assumed. The
syntactic structure of the maximum reading in shown in Figure XLVI-
IIa and that of the minimum reading in Figure XLVIIIb.
1 The analysis of I. Heim (2006) is not discussed here because it depends on the as-
sumption that there is a second little in the than-clause and this assumptions seems
difficult to defend when we want to apply the analysis to comprative quantifiers, like
e.g. less than half, which is the main reason why we discuss ordinary comparatives
here.
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a.1.1 Bu¨ring’s account
Bu¨ring assumes the interpretations below. Additionally, he uses a se-
mantically vacuous much (for discussion see e.g. Wellwood, 2015).
Under these assumptions, we derive the maximum reading straight-
forwardly (Figure XLIXa, cf. section 2.6).r
little
z
B
=lP.ld0.:P d0r
heavy
z
B
=ld.lx.weight(x)  dr
er
z
B
=lT .lP.lQ.9d0(:T (P) d0 ^ T (Q) d0)
To compose gradable adjectives with little Bu¨ring uses what he calls
the “k-combinator,” which he motivated elsewhere (Bu¨ring, 2005).
For our purposes, it can be defined as: k := lR.lS .ls.S(lr.R r s).
Gradable adjectives then compose with little as follows, which allows
us to derive the minimum reading (Figure XLIXb).uv
heavyk
little
}~ = rlittlez k rheavyz = ls.ld0.weight(s) < d0.
a.1.2 Compositional Version of Rullmann’s account
To obtain a compositional version of Rullmann’s (1995) account, we
make a few changes to the lexicon. The interpretation of little is
based on I. Heim’s (2006) suggestion to implement Rullmann’s pro-
posal. That of -er is a slightly modified version of what Rullmann
suggested.r
little
z
R
=lP.ld0.P( d0)r
heavy
z
R
=ld.lx.weight(x) = dr
er
z
R
=lT .lP.lQ.9d0

T  Q d0 ^ T  ld.d0 > d max(P)
This allows us to derive the two readings completely parallel to how
it is done in Bu¨ring’s account. Of course, we have glossed over some
difference between the two accounts here. But we have neverthe-
less seen that Rullmann’s core assumptions can be integrated into
a derivation of the ambiguity that is as compositional as other alter-
natives.
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a.2 comparative modified numerals
In section 5.2.3.2, it was briefly discussed how the semantics of or-
dinary comparatives, which involve gradable adjectives (see section
2.6), can be applied to comparative modified numerals. With respect
to UE more than n, the proposal of Hackl (2000, 2002) was sketched.
Moreover, it was stated that a decompositional analysis of fewer than,
as discussed at length in that section, can straightforwardly be ap-
plied to DE modified numerals of the form fewer than n. Below, in
figures LI and LII an analysis of both types of quantifiers is sketched
by means of example derivations that incorporate ideas of Bu¨ring
(2007a), Hackl (2000, 2002) and others mentioned above.
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